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Abstract 
The immediate concern of this thesis is to understand the role played by 
Confucianism in the capitalist development of the East Asian NISs. In pursuit of this 
aim, it focuses on the relationship between Confucian political philosophy and state 
intervention in economic activities, on Confucian family practice and its links to 
modem organisations, on the Confucian emphasis on frugality and hard work and the 
work ethic, and on the Confucian stress on knowledge and high level modem 
education. It contends that through these mechanisms contemporary Confucian 
values have helped to facilitate the development of capitalist order and economic 
growth in the East Asian NISs. 
The thesis also explores the Confucian tradition and its modern transformations. It 
traces the historical evolution of Confucianism and shows how, more recently, it has 
changed in response to the challenge of capitalist development. It further identifies 
the contemporary forms of Confucian values and illustrates their variations across 
different East Asian societies. This line of enquiry is pursued empirically through an 
analysis of the development of Confucian themes in one of the principal spaces for 
public commentary and debate on economic, social and political issues - the popular 
press. The present analysis is one of the first to investigate the practical deployment 
of Confucian themes in everyday public discourse. 
The thesis approaches the questions in a Weberian tradition, which takes culture as 
an explanatory variable in social change, and recognises the influence of socio- 
economic conditions on cultural change at the same time. It believes that change is 
an integrated process which involves all sectors of society. During this process 
cultural, social, political and economic forces compete and interact with each other 
within the specific contexts that conditioned the change. 
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The capitalist development in the East Asian NISs is a process which involves the 
interaction between Confucianism and capitalism. Capitalism failed to develop in the 
Far East when it first emerged, due to the inhibitions of traditional Confucianism. 
But after it had triumphed in the West and been introduced to these societies by the 
colonisers, Confucianism could no longer resist the force of capitalist modernity, it 
had no choice but to adapt to the new situations. As a result, Confucian culture 
absorbed the idea of profit seeking, competition and rationalisation of economic 
activity, but retained its emphasis on collectiveness, family, and harmony. Combined 
with the continuing Confucian emphasis on education, merit, hard work, discipline 
and high achievement motivation, these values form a potent underpinning for 
economic growth. And this force has given rise to a special kind of capitalism in the 
East Asian NISs. 
V 
Contents 
Introduction 
Chapter I The Development Process in South Korea and Taiwan 10 
1.1 Korea 10 
1.2 Taiwan 25 
1.3 Concluding Remarks 40 
Chapter 2 The Development Process in Singapore and Hong Kong 41 
2.1 Singapore 41 
2.2 Hong Kong 55 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 71 
Chapter 3 The Distinctive Features of East Asian Capitalist Development 72 
3.1 Situational Factors 72 
3.2 The Export Orientation of the East Asian NISs 74 
3.3 The Role of the State 76 
3.4 The Quality of Human Resources 80 
3.5 Peaceful Industrial Relations 82 
3.6 The High Rate of Saving 86 
vi 
3.7 Income Distribution 89 
Chapter 4 Contending Approaches to the East Asian Success 95 
4.1 The Neo-classical Approach 95 
4.2 The Statist Approach 99 
4.3 The Cultural Explanation 105 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 118 
Chapter 5 Popular Confucianism: Traditions and Transitions 120 
5.1 The Confucian Tradition 121 
5.2 The Modem Transformation of Confucianism 128 
5.3 Popular Confucianism - Tales from Two Newspapers 137 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 155 
Chapter 6 Patterns of Contemporary Confucianism 158 
6.1 The Content Analysis Design 160 
6.2 Results 164 
6.3 Themes 171 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 188 
Chapter 7 Confucianism and Modem Capitalism: A Theoretical Inquiry 192 
7.1 Culture and Social Change 192 
7.2 Confucianism and Capitalism 203 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 216 
vii 
Conclusion 
References 
Appendix: Coding Schedule F 
217 
228 
244 
viii 
Introduction 
In the early 1960s few economists noticed South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong. They seemed to be trapped in poverty and unable to succeed in 
economic development. South Korea had been devastated by the Korean War; 
Taiwan appeared little more than a beleaguered outpost of a defeated government; 
Singapore was a small city state facing internal economic and ethnic problems and 
external hostilities; and Hong Kong was inundated with refugees. 
Despite these unpromising starting points, and a range of constraints, these 
economies have grown faster than any other countries for the past three decades. 
They have sustained rates of economic growth at over 8%1, and they are still 
expanding at a considerable speed. What is more, rapid economic growth has been 
accompanied by superior educational performance, low crime rates, rising life 
expectancies, and relatively egalitarian patterns of income distribution. Increasingly, 
as a group of newly industrialising societies (NISs)2' South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong have come to stand for a special kind of capitalism which 
combines rapid economic growth with social stability, and is characterised by 
extraordinary individual effort and persistent group support. 
These societies share a number of similarities and common bonds. All are densely 
populated and deficient in natural resources. All have strong and authoritarian 
governments committed to economic growth. All have emphasised exports of 
manufacture products. All share an extraordinary enthusiasm for education. And all 
I When no specific reference is given, the sources are: World Development Report; International 
Financial Statistics; and Taiwan Statistical Data Book. 
2This group of societies are commonly referred to as NICs - newly industrialising countries. This 
term is not used in the thesis because neither Hong Kong nor Taiwan can properly be called countries 
in the author's view. 
were raised under the umbrella of Chinese cultural influence. These similarities have 
led to lively scholarly debates regarding the sources of economic growth. Most 
commentators have concentrated on identifying the 'right' economic policies and 
investigating the relations between the free market and strong government. 
Economic policies and the lead provided by strong government are undoubtedly 
important factors contributing to the success of the East Asian NISs, but they are not 
enough. There are many other Third World countries which promoted the free market 
or adopted similar policies without producing sustained economic growth. There are 
also strong governments elsewhere, but they have generally devoted more to the 
personal interests of high-level officials than to their nations' economic development. 
In order to develop a satisfactory explanation we need to reach beyond the 
boundaries of economics and politics to explore the factor that has allowed the 'right' 
policies to work and has kept the worst abuses of strong government in check. This 
factor, as I will argue in this thesis, is Confucianism. 
At first sight this may seem paradoxical, since the Confucian tradition was not 
oriented toward the development of wealth. In fact in his seminal comparative 
sociological study of religions, Max Weber identified Confucianism as the major 
barrier to the emergence of capitalism in imperial China. This thesis does not argue 
that Weber was wrong. On the contrary, he was right. He was right to acknowledge 
that Confucianism had an impact on capitalism in China, and to insist that religion as 
a cultural, symbolic form, is a relatively independent force capable of influencing 
economic activities. He was also right to recognise that the formation of a culture has 
its roots in socio-economic conditions. And he was right to be aware of the 
continually changing nature of historical contexts, a line of reasoning he pursued in 
his argument that the later development of capitalism in Europe no longer needed the 
support of Protestant Ethic. 
Following Weber's general line of reasoning, I will argue that although Confucianism 
acted as a barrier to the rise of capitalism in imperial China, it has become an 
important support for the contemporary establishment of capitalism in the changed 
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circumstances of modem East Asia. Since the western powers forced the capitalist 
system on East Asia, the societies in this region have experienced great changes in 
their socio-economic conditions. As different sectors of society interact with and 
influence one another, these shifting conditions have led in turn, to transformations in 
Confucianism, so that it has been able to offer a cultural setting conducive to rapid 
capitalist development in post-war East Asian NISs. As we will see in our later 
analysis, Confucian values and institutions have fostered social attitudes that have 
encouraged people to work and study hard. They have nurtured political attitudes that 
have legitimated strong governments committed to economic development. And they 
have played an important role in promoting patterns of familial and social 
organisation that have helped to sustain key features of capitalist structures. 
Confucianism however, is a very elastic notion, it can mean religion, ethical codes, 
social rituals, or political philosophy. Even so, the basic themes - the emphasis on 
filial piety, self-cultivation, and benevolent and moral government - emerge clearly. 
Historically there have been two distinct Confucian traditions: the so-called Great 
Tradition, a belief system held by scholar-officials and based on the classic texts; and 
the Little Tradition, a system of popular ethics with the accent on family, education, 
savings and hard work. In modem East Asia, the Confucian tradition has been active 
mainly in the second form, and has become a codeword for a set of widely-held 
values: loyalty to the family, subordination of the individual to the collective, 
commitment to education, and dependence on authority. 
The immediate concern of this thesis is to understand the role played by 
Confucianism in the capitalist development of the East Asian NISs. In pursuit of this 
aim, it focuses on the relationship between Confucian political philosophy and state 
intervention in economic activities, on Confucian family practice and its links to 
modem organisations, on the Confucian emphasis on frugality and hard work and it 
influence on the work ethic, and on the Confucian stress on knowledge and high level 
modem education. It contends that through these mechanisms contemporary 
Confucian values have helped to facilitate the development of capitalist order and 
economic growth in the East Asian NISs. 
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The thesis also explores the Confucian tradition and its modem transformations. It 
traces the historical evolution of Confucianism and shows how, more recently, it has 
changed in response to the challenge of capitalist development. It further identifies 
the contemporary forms of Confucian values and illustrates their variations across 
different East Asian societies. This line of enquiry is pursued empirically through an 
analysis of the development of Confucian themes in one of the principal spaces for 
public commentary and debate on economic, social and political issues - the popular 
press. 
In examining the interaction between the symbolic forms of Confucianism and the 
economic operations of modem capitalism, the thesis concentrates particularly on the 
impact of modem Confucianism on economic growth. But it should be noted that the 
transformation of Confucianism itself results from the changes in socio-economic 
conditions. Nor is this process of interaction complete. On the contrary, the rapid 
social changes brought by Confucian supported economic growth are likely to pose 
serious challenges to the cultural centrality of Confucianism in the near future. By 
deepening our understanding of the specific dynamics of the case analysed here, it is 
also hoped that this work will help to refine broader conclusions concerning the 
dialectical relationship between culture and economic development. 
Recently a growing number of scholars and observers have acknowledged the role of 
Confucianism in the process of East Asian economic development. Understandably, 
few have agreed on the precise meaning of Confucianism, except that its modem 
version has transcended its historical and textual origins. However, since East Asian 
societies have experienced tremendous social and cultural changes and are still in 
transition today, the problem arises as to whether there is any justification for them as 
Confucian in any meaningful sense. In order to ground this assertion empirically, it 
needs to be demonstrated that the contemporary contents labelled as Confucianism 
continue to play a central role in public culture and enjoy some popular currency. To 
achieve this goal, this thesis investigates the practical deployment of Confucian 
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themes in everyday public discourse through a content analysis of two newspapers, 
one from Hong Kong and one from Taiwan. 
Previous studies which have ventured into this area have tended to concentrate on 
officially sponsored or approved initiatives, such as the mobilisation of Confucian 
virtues in Taiwanese and Korean school textbooks (Meyer, 1988; Lee, 1993) or the 
moral campaigns launched by the government of Singapore (Kuah, 1990). 
Consequently, they have strengthened the position of writers who argue that in the 
context of contemporary East Asia, the Confucian emphasis on hierarchy, 
responsibility and duty, and the low priority given to individual rights, are weapons 
deployed by the powerful, designed to provide a 'fig leaf of legitimacy' to 
authoritarian political regimes (Chan, 1996: 43) and/or to exploitative relations of 
production (Palat, 1996). There is much force to this argument, but it ignores the 
presence of vernacular traditions with roots in common sense and everyday life. 
Contemporary Confucianism is a bottom-up as well as a top-down phenomenon. The 
variants of the 'dominant ideology thesis' deployed by critics such as Chan, miss the 
interplay between these levels. 
The position taken here is closer to the notion of hegemony, which sees the 
reengineering of common sense as the key to securing consent. The press provides a 
particularly productive site on which to observe this process in action since its role in 
the orchestration of public culture rests precisely on its ability to knit together 
official discourses, grounded experiences, and vernacular expression. At the same 
time, the way it mediates between these cultural domains will depend crucially on 
the degree of government oversight and control it is subject to. The impact of these 
structural differences on representations of Confucianism is explored in detail in 
Chapter Six through the contrast between the two titles under analysis: the Hong 
Kong title is market oriented with minimal state intervention, and the Taiwanese title 
is owned by the ruling party and was subject to stringent control under Martial Law 
for the first twelve years of the period covered by the content analysis (January 1975 
- August 1993). In this situation we might expect presentations of Confucian themes 
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in the Taiwanese case to be strongly oriented around official discourses and 
spokespeople and those in the Hong Kong case to be more open 
We would also expect press coverage of Confucianism to reflect the particular 
emphases of official economic policy and government views of political priorities 
Here again, the contrast between Taiwan and Hong Kong offers an excellent 
opportunity to explore this question. In Taiwan, economic policy goals were 
constantly overshadowed by the need, firstly, to heal the breach between the 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders, and secondly, to address the ever-present perception 
of possible military attack from the mainland. We would therefore expect press 
mobilisations of Confucianism to lay particular emphasis on questions of patriotism, 
loyalty to the nation, and the legitimacy of government. 
In Hong Kong, on the other hand, because its political system remained relatively 
closed under a colonial administration, public discourse focused more concertedly on 
the conditions for economic growth within a system in which family owned 
enterprises played a key role. We would therefore expect press deployment of 
Confucianism to place more emphasis on aspects related to family, personal 
morality, and business relations. This is no simple matter however. It requires two 
contradictory identities to be stitched together: the fixed identity mobilised by the 
'imagined community' of the nation-state, and the fluid identity required by an 
economic order increasingly based around mobile investment, transnational 
enterprises and global consumption (Ong, 1997: 173). As we shall see in Chapter 
Five, one of the primary devices for linking these subjectivities is through 
romantised biographies of successful businessmen who serve as ideal models of the 
reconciliation of the material to the spiritual, individual success and wealth to 
Confucian responsibilities and duties. 
Although the sample newspapers mobilise and inflect Confucian themes differently, 
there are also strong continuities and commonalties. 'East Asian capitalism is 
different from its western counterparts in some important ways, but its is still 
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capitalism' (Xia, 1996: 120). It is based on property relations which generate 
structural inequalities and it involves various forms of exploitation. Governments in 
the NISs have addressed these dynamics by constructing a social contract. The 
government guarantees certain collective goods (such as housing) and intervenes to 
ameliorate income inequalities, while transferring much of the responsibility for 
welfare to families and firms. At one level, the resulting bonds between rulers and 
ruled, employers and workers, are thoroughly pragmatic. In accordance with 
Confucian definitions of good government, popular consent is conditional on the 
delivery of expected and promised benefits, and collective rights take precedence 
over individual rights. At the same time, these forms of personalised contract require 
continual ideological support. As we shall see, at the centre of this enterprise is the 
Confucian conception of the paternalistic family. This serves as a model for all 
relations of rule, in the home, in the workplace and within the nation state, and 
enables the core Confucian virtue of filial piety to be mobilised to secure 
compliance. 
The deployment of Confucian themes is not confined simply to ideological 
constructions of relations within the nation-state however. They are also central to a 
strong and increasingly shared conception of East Asia's distinctiveness as a cultural 
region. This notion now enjoys increasing currency in the West, as commentators 
struggle to identify new global fault lines in a post Cold War world. A number have 
followed Samuel Huntington (1993) in identifying 'the clash' between Asian and 
Western 'civilisations' as the key ideological battleground. This conception is also 
widely shared in East Asia, where the rapid economic growth of the NISs and the 
increasing economic power of China since 1979, have revivified a long standing 
tradition of Han enthnocentrism which presents Chinese culture as both superior and 
capable of serving as a world model. This ideological project has received additional 
impetus from the growing perception among East Asia political elites, that the 
increasing incursion of western emphases on individualism and personal rights poses 
escalating problems for paternalistic forms of authoritarianism. 
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Confucianism is central to East Asian attempts to define the distinctive qualities of 
the Chinese cultural formation, and as we shall see, provided the main context in 
which Confucian themes appeared in the press items sampled. This is not particularly 
surprising. Ethnic Chinese investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan has played a key 
role in the rapid industrial development of south China. At the same time, over the 
period covered by the content analysis, both societies had unresolved political 
business the mainland, which revolved around the terms of re-unification. 
Consequently, we would expect a negotiation of the links between the Confucian 
legacy and the nature of Chinese identity and culture, to be particularly salient in 
both countries. 
Chapters One and Two introduce the discussion by briefly tracing the course of 
economic development in the four East Asian NISs and the socio-political. 
backgrounds against which it has taken place. They also investigate the development 
strategies of these societies and their sources of growth. 
Chapter Three discusses the general characteristics of East Asian economic 
development: the emphasis on export-oriented industrialisation; the leading role of 
the state; the high quality of the workforce; the orientation of corporate management 
practice; the high rate of savings; and the relatively equitable distribution of income. 
Chapter Four looks at the major explanations of East Asian economic growth. After 
examining two dominant paradigms: the neo-classical approach that attributes the 
East Asian success to the free market and 'right' economic policies, and the statist 
approach which stresses the interventionist role of government, it introduces the 
literature which discusses the contribution of Confucianism to economic 
development. 
Chapter Five attempts to chart the main lines of development within Confucianism 
and to discern its basic tenets. It analyses its transformations from the classic texts to 
the variants current in contemporary East Asia. This account is supported by detailed 
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analyses of typical newspaper stories selected from the sample constructed for the 
content analysis presented in the next chapter. This exercise in close reading 
confirms that Confucian values in contemporary East Asian NISs are much more 
than simple outgrowths of Confucian traditions. While some aspects of 
Confucianism cease to function today, many other elements have been reasserted and 
deployed in the process of modernisation and industrialisation. 
Chapter Six presents the result of the quantitative content analysis. It attempts to 
establish a fuller picture of the concrete patterns of working Confucianism and to 
delineate the differing ways Confucianism has been mobilised in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. By studying the everyday application of Confucianism to contemporary 
issues, it also seeks to examine how key elements of this cultural tradition enter into 
and help shape the ways that the process of transformation is understood and 
evaluated within contemporary East Asia. 
Having looked at arguments around the range of possible factors contributing to the 
economic development process of the East Asian NISs and having paid particular 
attention to Confucian values and their possible influence, Chapter Seven returns to 
the general problem of explanation first posed by Max Weber. It begins by reviewing 
Weber's studies on both Protestantism and Confucianism, and their relationship with 
the emergence of Capitalism. It also explores the theory of culture and social change 
embedded in Weber's writings. Using this as a framework it then offers a general 
model of the relationship between Confucianism and modem capitalist development. 
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Chapter I 
The Development Process in South Korea and Taiwan 
The development of South Korea and Taiwan since the 1960s has been celebrated as 
a 'miracle' worldwide. In material terms it is indeed miraculous. Within three 
decades, their GNP per capita have increased 50 times, and the relatively equitable 
distribution of income has ensured that everybody has benefited at least to some 
extent from their growth. Their economies have been transformed from ones based in 
agriculture to ones driven by industry, as their major products have changed from 
rice and sugar to automobiles and personal computers. While they had to depend on 
foreign aid in the 1950s, both have now graduated from the ranks of the World 
Bank's borrowers, and have in turn become lenders to developing countries. Nor is 
their achievement solely economic. The socio-economic transformation in South 
Korea and Taiwan has improved people's general quality of life in many ways. They 
are among the most educated people in the world. They enjoy comfortable housing 
with a full range of public facilities, convenient transportation networks, and ready 
access to comprehensive health care services. And since the 1980s they have gained 
increasing freedom to participate in political processes. 
1.1 Korea 
The rapid growth of the Korean economy can be fully understood only in the context 
of a long historical process which began in the late nineteenth century as a 
consequence of Japanese aggression. Although the actual annexation of Korea by 
Japan occurred in 1910, Japanese penetration into the Korean economy had been 
gathering momentum some time before. In 1876, Japan forcibly opened the door of 
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Korea to foreign trade under the Korean-Japanese treaty of commerce. The opening 
of the ports led to an expansion of foreign trade from a near zero base to 20% of the 
combination of domestic products and imports. This trade was dominated by 
Japanese immigrants. The Japanese also opened banks and built factories. The first 
bank was opened in 1878 and assumed the role of a central bank in 1905. In 1908 
there were 79 incorporated Japanese manufacturing finns employing an average of 
41 workers, compared with 6 owned by Koreans employing a total of 92 workers. By 
the time of annexation the Japanese had already established complete control over the 
Korean economy (McNamara, 1990). 
Japan's ambition was not limited to Korea. Its ultimate aim was to control the Asian 
continent. The geographical position of Korea as the link between Japan and the Far 
East gave it a particular strategic importance as a base for territorial expansion. Not 
only could Korea serve as a convenient platform from which the Japanese could 
launch an armed campaign, its food and mineral resources also provided important 
basic resources for military expansion. 
The Japanese did not expect to lose control of their colonies. Consequently, they 
made vigorous efforts to modernise Korea. They started by creating a powerful, 
intrusive state, unprecedented in Korean experience. Power was centralised in a large 
colonial bureaucracy backed by an impressive array of coercive force. The local 
administration system was expanded so that central control could penetrate to the 
lowest levels of Korean society. However, despite these substantial changes in 
structure, the Japanese did not disturb underlying cultural continuities. According to 
Jacobs (1985), although the Japanese authorities modernised the goal of government 
in Korea and made administrative control more effective, its essential character 
remained patrimonial. 
In economic affairs the colonial state was growth-oriented and interventionist. The 
geographical proximity of Korea had made its economic growth closely related to the 
economic fortunes of Japan. In an effort to modernise the Korean economy, the 
Japanese reorganised the financial system and provided support to private 
enterprises. Vast amounts of money were invested to provide the Korean peninsula 
with a substantial infrastructure. Telegraph and telephonic communication were 
greatly expanded; railways and roads were constructed to link the major cities; and 
harbours and hydroelectric plants were built. 
But what was to have a more profound longrun effect on Korean society was the 
introduction of an universal public education system. The emphasis, however, was on 
primary education. Very few Koreans had any chance to go beyond this level. Even if 
they did, what they could obtain was mostly vocational training. The education 
system was designed to produce a literate labour force and above all, to educate 
Koreans in Japanese language and customs, as illustrated by the Educational 
Ordinance, which decreed that, 'Common education should pay special attention to 
the engendering of national (Japanese) characteristics and the spread of the national 
(Japanese) language; the essential principles of education in Chosen (Korea) shall be 
the making of loyal and good subjects ..... (quoted in Eckert, 1990: 262). 
The colonial education system in Korea was modelled on the lower level of the Meiji 
system in Japan, which placed strong emphasis on modem science and technology. 
But it also included a significant amount of instruction in East Asian cultural 
traditions, represented primarily by Confucianism. Confucian tenets such as 
benevolent rule, loyalty, hierarchical status relations and family morality were given 
particular attention. It was thought that presenting these values as a common heritage 
would help to secure the loyalty and co-operation of the Korean people. 
The Japanese public schools expanded quickly, and the number of students attending 
full time education increased significantly. At the time of colonisation (1910), the 
primary school enrolment rate for boys was about 20%. By 1940, it had risen to 70%. 
The enrolment rate for girls increased less spectacularly, from almost nil to more 
than 20%. During this period, the number of students attending all schools increased 
from 110,800 to 1,776,078 (Jacobs, 1985). These students, most of them reaching 
their prime of life in the 1960s, would later become major players in South Korea's 
post-war push for economic growth. 
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The economic structure of the colony was designed to serve Japan's needs. During 
the first two decades of colonisation, Korea was developed as a major source of 
foodstuffs for Japan. The Japanese invested heavily to raise agricultural productivity, 
especially in the production of rice. As a result, new seeds and planting schedules 
were introduced; a measure of mechanisation achieved; and irrigation and flood 
control improved. 
As Japanese war preparations and territorial expansion heightened in the 1930s, the 
emphasis on rice production in Korea was replaced by the promotion of 
manufacturing industries designed to provide for both the needs of Japan proper and 
of Japanese forces in East Asia. In 1931 Japan occupied the Manchuria province of 
China, a vast area rich in natural resources. This was followed by the overall invasion 
of China in 1937, the advancement into Vietnam in 1940, and finally the attacks 
throughout Southeast Asia at the end of 1941. As Japanese military power expanded, 
Korean mining and other extractive industries were stimulated by the demands of 
war-heated industrial production; the chemical and textile companies received 
inexhaustible orders from the Japanese armed forces; and sophisticated tool and 
machinery were built to meet the growing needs of the arms build-up. 
The Japanese left in 1945 following their defeat in World War 11. By then Korea had 
been equipped with the infrastructure necessary for a modem transformation of the 
economy. The transportation and communication networks were relatively well 
developed. The agriculture sector was modemised. And the manufacturing and 
mining industries grew at an annual rate of about 10%. Such development was 
remarkable in a colony. Although much of this infrastructure and industrial base was 
later lost to South Korea through the peninsula's partition and the Korean War, the 
remaining railways and textile industries provided a framework for later economic 
development. 
Social change accompanied economic development during the colonial period. In 
spite of Japanese dominance in the colonial government and in industry, many 
13 
Koreans did gain substantial exposure to modem organisational structure and 
technologies. In the greatly expanded bureaucracy, they occupied most low ranking 
civil posts. In the industrial sector, while. most factories were owned and managed by 
the Japanese, Koreans constituted most of the work force, including some in 
positions of managerial assistant and technician. Between 1910 and 1941, the urban 
population increased over threefold, from about 6% to 20% of the total population. In 
addition, many Korean peasants were mobilised by the war effort to work in Japan 
and Manchuria and many of these were also living in cities (Eckert et al, 1990). 
Universal primary education increased literacy and helped to produce skilled 
workers, but because colonial policies offered few opportunities for Koreans to 
receive higher education, many of the ablest went to Japan to study modem science 
and technology and to receive military training. There they learned new ideas and 
saw a different way of life, which was to inspire their vision of a future Korea. 
Together, the educated Korean elite, the entire both blue- and white-collar workforce 
which had acquired knowledge and skills in Japanese controlled government and 
large-scale industries, and the few privileged Korean entrepreneurs able to conduct 
business in a Japanese dominated market, constituted South Korea's most valuable 
resource: human capital. 
The period following the end of colonisation was marked by political instability and 
economic turmoil. Immediately after liberation, the Korean People's Republic (KPR), 
a national coalition led by the left, assumed control of the country. The United States 
and the Soviet Union, however, were anxious to ensure that whatever political form 
Korea ultimately took would be friendly to their respective security interests. A deal 
was struck between them to divide Korea into two occupation zones. This led to an 
enduring partition of the country by ideology, political and economic systems, and 
above all, foreign interests. 
Things went relatively well in the North because the KPR's policies of industry 
nationalisation and redistribution of wealth were in line with the plan of the Soviets. 
In the South, however, the Americans met considerable resistance from the KPR and 
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its people's committees. In response, a formal United States Army Military 
Government in Korea was established. It set out to repress any social activities 
inspired by 'communists', using American troops. Many Korean nationalists who had 
fought the Japanese were imprisoned or killed. 
Neither the North nor the South wanted to see Korea divided. Their ambition to bring 
the whole peninsula under their own rule led to the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950. The war started between North and South Koreans, but it was fought by the 
Americans and the Chinese. Their involvement meant that neither side could gain 
control of the whole Korean peninsula. Three years of fighting resulted in ruin to 
both halves of the country. In the South alone, the combined total of military and 
civilian casualties was about 1.3 million people. Nearly half of the industrial capacity 
and a third of the housing were destroyed along with much of the public 
infrastructure. 
In 1948 the Americans handed over control of the South to a Korean government 
headed by Syngman Rhee. He had been one of the liberals advocating a popular 
elected national assembly at the end of the nineteen century. However, when he came 
back to Korea after forty years' absence, his conception and practice of power seemed 
to have more in common with the Korean kings than with his American colleagues. 
Lacking an independent power base, Rhee resorted to intrigue, intimidation, 
patronage, and reliance on the infamous police who had collaborated with the 
Japanese, to consolidate his rule. He managed to amend the constitution by locking 
up the assemblymen, and eliminate a number of potential competitors through 
assassination. By the late 1950s Rhee had made the political system largely his own. 
During Rhee's rule, the Korean people suffered from severe economic hardship and 
wide spread corruption. The lack of opportunities for ordinary people, especially the 
younger generation, added further frustration. The mounting discontent finally 
toppled Rhee's authoritarian government in 1960. Following his fall, relatively free 
and fair elections were held to elect National Assembly members and local 
governors. The Second Republic, though more democratic, was plagued by internal 
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factionalism, and was not prepared to institute the changes demanded by the public. 
Furthermore, even democracy itself appeared to many of the urban educated elite to 
pose a threat to the social order. They feel that the chaotic conditions in 1960-61 
required strength and resolution from the government. But the government was too 
weak. In less than a year the Second Republic fell to a military coup which started 
the Park era, with little protest from the people. 
The War and the ensuing political instability precluded any orderly movement 
toward economic development. During the period from 1948 to 1961, the economy 
was kept alive mainly by massive economic and military assistance from the United 
States. Post-war reconstruction, which began after the cease-fire in 1953, had left the 
economy stagnant at the subsistence level. Between 1953 and 1961 per capita GNP 
in real terms increased by no more than 1% on average each year, which meant that 
the Korean people had to struggle for food and clothing (Cho & Kim, 199 1). 
Nevertheless some of the groundwork for later economic development was laid down 
during this period. The literacy rate more than tripled in the 15 years after liberation. 
Education facilities of all kinds, especially those for higher education, mushroomed. 
Urbanisation continued at a rapid pace. By 1960, almost 30% of the population of 
South Korea were living in cities. The infrastructure destroyed by the War was 
rebuilt. But most important of all was the land reform which improved the life of 
peasants and eliminated the resistance to industrialisation from the landlords as a 
class. 
Land reform was introduced by the Americans and completed by the Rhee 
government. He carried it through partly because it was a political necessity in view 
of the successful land reform taking place in the North, and partly because it helped 
to undermine his political opposition, which was based on the landlord class. Despite 
Rhee's intentions, land reform helped to bring about a more equitable distribution of 
assets and income. It also transformed the land-based traditional elite into a group of 
business leaders. They received money from the government for their land and they 
continued to retain the high level of education and the personal connections that have 
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always been important factors for success in Korean society. By the mid-1950s, not 
only was landlordism no longer an obstacle to economic growth, but the former 
landlords themselves were already well on their way to becoming entrepreneurs or 
professionals of one kind or another. 
By the time General Park seized power in 1961, South Korea possessed many of the 
essential ingredients for rapid economic growth: international political support; 
access to foreign capital and technology; a moderately well developed infrastructral 
and industrial base; a small class of entrepreneurs; and hard-working and relatively 
well educated workforce. What had been lacking before was a government 
committed to economic growth and capable of mobilising these resources effectively 
in its pursuit. 
From the beginning the Park government was wedded to a vision of national power 
through economic development. This was partly derived from Park's admiration of 
Meiji success which had been deeply imprinted in his mind when he was an officer in 
Japanese colonial army, and partly from the need to legitimate his rule in the absence 
of other credentials. Park's vision of a new Korea, however, did not have any space 
for democracy. For him, citizens were expected to tolerate the banishing of their 
political rights in exchange for prosperity. As he put it: 
In order to ensure efforts to improve the living conditions of the people in Asia, 
even undemocratic emergency measures may be necessary... The people of Asia 
today fear starvation and poverty more than the oppressive duties thrust on them 
by totalitarianism... The Asian peoples want to obtain economic equality first 
and build a more equitable political machinery afterward (Park, 1971: 112). 
Park's central economic development strategy was to promote export-led growth. 
External pressure was an important factor accounting for this move. A new emphasis 
in the United States aid programme on achieving 'self-sufficiency' and reducing aid 
commitments pressed the Park government to look for new ways to acquire foreign 
exchange. Yet pressures from the Americans had been applied before. The transition 
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to an export-oriented development strategy under the Park government must 
therefore be understood in the context of the particular physical, economical and 
political conditions of South Korea in the early 1960s. 
Physically the division of the Korean peninsula had left South Korea with few natural 
resources, and its population in the early 1960s was not big enough to provide a 
sufficient domestic market for rapid industrialisation. Economically the initial 
populist policy of expanding pubic works, granting pay increases and favouring 
import substitution had run into trouble. By 1963 high levels of public spending had 
led to rising inflation and the possibilities of import substitution in low-technology 
industries had been exhausted. In fact the production capacities of the textile industry 
had already surpassed the needs of domestic market. Exporting surplus 
manufacturing products seemed to be a viable alternative. Politically state power was 
concentrated in the hands of Park and a small group of technocrats. Coming from a 
military background, Park was relatively free from the influence of various business 
interest groups. Therefore a major policy reform such as shifting to exports was 
relatively easy to press through and implement quickly (Haggard, 1990). 
The introduction of an outward-looking development strategy stimulated impressive 
export growth. Korean exports in 1962 valued only $0.5 million, but reached $150.6 
million in 1979. Their share in GNP increased from 2.4% to 24.6% during the same 
period. The growth in exports led to accelerated economic growth during the Park 
era. The average growth rate of GNP was 8.4% between 1961 and 1970 and 9.8% 
between 1971 and 1979. GNP per capita grew from less than $ 100 in 1961 to $1,662 
in 1979 (Kim, 1987; Hamilton 1983). 
Economic growth was accompanied by a change in the industrial structure, which 
was illustrated in the composition of exports. In 1961 South Korea's top ten exports, 
constituting 62% of the total, were composed entirely of raw materials and 
agricultural goods. By 1970,41% of South Korea's exports were composed of 
textiles and garments. By 1980, while textiles still remained important at 29%, 
electronic products, steel products and footwear together made up 27% of exports 
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and raw materials disappeared from the top ten (Sakong, 1993). When Park first 
started his industrialisation drive, agriculture was the main contributor to the national 
economy. By the end of his rule, the top contributors were the clothing, electronics 
and shipping industries. Within less than two decades, South Korea had been 
transformed from an underdeveloped agrarian society into a modestly industrialised 
society with the manufacturing sector as its economic backbone. 
Despite the impressive figures, the economic development process under the Park 
regime did not proceed entirely smoothly. In the early 1970s economic recession in 
the major industrialised countries and the increasing protectionism in world trade 
generated a slowdown in South Korea's export growth. This coincided with the 
increasing influence of the opposition party and the partial withdraw of American 
troops. In response, Park initiated a push to develop the heavy and chemical 
industries. The plan was to upgrade Korea's industrial capability so as to give more 
depth and integration to the economic structure, and at the same time, to build up an 
industrial base for a self-sufficient defence industry. Since the transition from light to 
heavy industry involves a move from competing on the basis of cheap labour to 
competing on the basis of modem facilities and skills, the heavy and chemical 
industry (HCI) drive was designed to achieve import-substitution and export 
upgrading simultaneously. 
To carry out the plan, some large and well-established business groups were 
encouraged to expand into the new industries in strategic areas such as petroleum, 
chemicals and iron and steel. State owned enterprises were also founded. Special 
economic policies such as tax subsidies, loans with negative real interest rates, and 
credit rationing were applied. Throughout the 1970s, colossal amounts of money 
were invested in heavy and chemical industries, and light industry was starved of 
capital. As a consequence, foreign debts multiplied, inflation accelerated, and income 
distribution worsened. When the world entered recession in the late 1970s, South 
Korea experienced severe economic difficulties. However, the HCI drive paid off 
handsomely in the mid-1980s. In 1970 heavy and chemical industrial exports 
amounted to only 12.8% of total exports; by 1985 their share was up to nearly 60%. 
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The promotion of heavy and chemical industries transformed South Korea's 
economic structure and provided a springboard for the renewed export offensive 
(Lee, 1991) 1. 
In the export expansion of 'Korea, Inc. ', the state was the leader, businessmen the 
junior partner, and workers the effective instrument. The government owned and 
controlled all commercial banks. The officially set real interest rates were kept close 
to zero or even negative. These very low rates encouraged businessmen to borrow 
heavily from banks, creating a dependency relationship between government and 
business. By issuing business licences and extending the accompanying subsidies 
and protection to a limited number of selected enterprises, the government was able 
to decide what, when and how much to produce on a macro level (Park, 199 1). 
The exercise of discipline by the state over private enterprises was part and parcel of 
the vision that drove South Korea to industrialise. Many businessmen had originally 
been targets of the Park government because of their participation in corruption and 
the 'dishonest accumulation' of wealth. In order to realise his grand economic 
development plan, however, Park had reached an agreement with the business sector, 
that the government would extend support in exchange for their devotion to national 
development goals. To cement this bargain the state imposed performance standards 
on private firms. Poor performance would be penalised and good performance 
rewarded. The sternest discipline of all was exercised in relation to exports; 'The 
export targets agreed upon between the government and individual finus were taken 
by businessmen as equivalent to compulsory orders. Firms that failed to achieve their 
export targets without a plausible excuse ran the risk of heavy administrative 
sanctions from the government' (Song, 1990: 9 1). 
While control over the business sector was exercised mainly through incentives and 
policy instruments, control over labour operated mainly through oppression and 
1 As a daring state-led industrial project, the HCl drive has given rise to a wealth of discussions, 
especially in relation to the effectiveness of government intervention in the market place. For detailed 
accounts and alternative views, please see Cheng (1990), Rhee (1994) and Stem, etc. (1995). 
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moral persuasion. Limiting labour demands was viewed as an integral component of 
the new industrial plan since low wages and worker efficiency were seen as essential 
to international competitiveness. The major instruments for keeping the working 
class under control were force and repression. Dissenters were subject to 
surveillance, interrogated and intimidated. Legal containment and moral persuasion 
were also applied. The restrictive terms contained in numerous labour laws and 
regulations curtailed union activities. In effect, they eliminated any possibility of a 
'legal' strike. In addition, periodic ideological campaigns were waged to promote the 
tradition values of loyalty to family, firm, and country so that workers would 'work 
hard without being conscious of the closing hour of work' and 'behave toward 
employers as sons to their fathers' (Bello & Rosenfeld, 1992: 32). 
Moral persuasion based on Confucian values was not applied only to workers 
however. Indeed, according to one view, it 'appears to be one of the most important 
policy instruments in Korea and other East Asian countries' (Song, 1990: 101). For 
Park, economic development had to be accompanied by a stable and harmonious 
social order. This was to be achieved by inculcating in the Korean populace the 
Confucian values of loyalty, filial piety, and harmony. One of his very first deeds as 
president was to place greater emphasis on traditional values. Efforts to promote 
exports were accompanied by slogans such as 'loyalty to the country through export'. 
Once the goal of export-led industrialisation was set, it was left to the chaebols, the 
government sponsored major conglomerates, and their competitive work force, to 
realise it. The chaebols are modelled after the Zaibatsu, Japan's pre-war big business 
groups. They are highly centralised, most being owned and controlled by the founder 
and his heirs through a central holding company. A single person at the top exercises 
authority over all the firms in the group. The enormous size of the chaebols and their 
diversification into non related products have allowed them to realise substantial 
economies of the scale, to survive the hardship of international competition, and to 
penetrate the lower end of foreign markets. The chaebols were promoted by the 
government, by way of easy access to bank loans and substantial subsidies. The 
rationale behind the government's policy was to concentrate resources on 
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entrepreneurs with proven track records, to encourage economies of scale, and to 
narrow the span of administrative control (Amsden, 1989). 
With South Korea's cutting edge in export competition based almost exclusively on 
low prices, labour was a critical factor in the development process. South Korean 
workers were hard working, cheap and relatively well-educated. They hold the world 
record for the longest working week. Even at the peak of Japan's rapid growth, the 
famous 'not-going-home-until-midnight' Japanese never worked more than 50 hours 
a week. During South Korea's rapid growth, the working week approached 60 hours. 
Even in the late 1980s it continued to average about 55 hours (Vogel, 1991). In 
addition, wages were prevented from rising rapidly by a mixture of forces: deliberate 
political repression, an unlimited labour supply at the onset of growth, and the lack of 
strong union leaders. 
The Korean workforce was well-educated because of the high value placed on the 
acquisition of knowledge, a principle strongly underwritten in the Confucian 
meritocratic tradition. Korean society has invested heavily in education, from the 
primary level upwards but especially in higher education. Between 1953 and 1963 - 
prior to the turn to export-led growth - Korea's literacy rate rose from 30% to 80%, 
implying an effective commitment to rural as well as urban education. Primary and 
secondary education ensured that production workers were quick to command 
sophisticated modem technology. The efforts made both by the society and by 
individuals to obtain a higher and higher level of education meant that a large pool of 
salaried engineers were produced, capable of facilitating the modern management of 
enterprises and technology transfer. The sheer quantity also meant strong competition 
for the best jobs and fastest promotion, thereby driving up productivity. 
Although Park achieved great success in the economy, his ruthless repression in the 
1970s had alienated many of his supporters. As the economic difficulties resulting 
from the HCI drive were further worsened by the second oil shock in 1979, for the 
first time South Koreans started to question the government's ability in handling 
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economic activities. Park's authority was shaken. Political unrest grew and finally led 
to his assassination. 
The Korean people hoped that a democratic government might replace Park, but 
another coup, a bloody one, put general Chun Doo Hwan in power. Chun's coup had 
involved not only an exchange of fire between soldiers, but also a murderous assault 
on civilians. In May 1980 the university students in Kwangju, the home city of the 
famous opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, gathered to demand Kim's release and an 
end to martial law. Paratroopers were sent into the city, bayoneting both 
demonstrators and spectators. Their brutality outraged Kwangju residents and led to a 
full-scale insurrection. A week later regular troops invaded the city and killed 
thousands of people. The Kwangju Incident and Chun's refusal to acknowledge any 
responsibility for it tarnished the image of his government and denied him the 
legitimacy he sought. The Kwangju Incident also marked the beginning of an era of 
radical student movements. 
Like Park, Chun promised a new age of economic growth and used this incentive as a 
justification for authoritarian rule. He also carried out some minor changes to convey 
an impression of greater political liberation. But the social and economic situation of 
South Korea had changed tremendously from the time when Park first assumed 
power. People now took economic growth for granted, what they wanted was 
political freedom and greater equity. Industrialisation had generated a strata of 
middle class reformers demanding political change and actively participating in 
politics, with students as their most active representatives. The downfall of the 
Philippine dictator Marcos in early 1986 encouraged the opposition in South Korea 
to press their demands with greater determination. Throughout Chun's and his chosen 
successor, General Roh's, rule, especially in the second half of the 1980s, student 
protests and workers' strikes and their violent confrontations with the police became 
common in South Korea. 
In January 1987 a Korean student was tortured to death at the hands of police 
interrogators. This incident provoked more people to participate in violent 
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demonstrations. On the 10th of June, the day Roh assumed the mantle of the ruling 
party, Seoul erupted in the worst street fighting since 1979-80, and it quickly spread 
to other cities throughout the country. In the face of extensive student demonstrations 
Roh finally declared a reform programme. It included an endorsement of direct 
presidential elections, restoration of civil rights for political prisoners, and a number 
of other political and social reforms. The South Korean democratisation process took 
a sharp turn. Since then South Korea has developed steadily and less violently 
towards democracy. In 1992, after 31 years of military rule, South Korea elected a 
civilian president, Kim Young Sam, in an orderly and fair election. In June 1995, for 
the first time since Park's coup, governors, mayors and county chiefs were elected. 
At the economic level the development strategy of the Chun government was a 
continuation from the Park era, with more emphasis on economic stabilisation and to 
a certain extent, on liberalisation. Overall, the Korean economy did well in the 1980s, 
expanding at an average 8.3% every year. But it started the decade in some difficulty. 
Investments related to the HCI drive and the Middle East construction boom had put 
tremendous pressure on the economy by the end of the 1970s. The huge demand for 
skilled workers in the HCls also resulted in substantial real wages increases which 
further eroded Korea's export competitiveness. On top of these developments, the 
economy was hit by the second oil shock of 1979 and by the political uncertainty 
following the death of Park. As a result, GNP growth in 1980 became negative for 
the first time since the 1950s, and the inflation rate soared to nearly 40%. Under 
these circumstances, the Korean government had to shift its emphasis from growth to 
stabilisation. Park announced the stabilising package in March 1979, and Chun 
carried out his unfinished plans. 
Major stabilisation policies included restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
supported by an informal income policy. Salaries of civil servants and public 
enterprise employees were held down in order to induce private sector wage restraint. 
Moral persuasion was again an important part of the plan. A campaign was waged to 
promote 'burden sharing', which urged workers to demand fewer wage increases, 
farmers to accept fewer subsidies, businesses to refrain from price hikes, and 
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households to spend less and save more. By 1982 the inflation rate was down to a 
single digit. By the mid-1980s the Korean economy was ready to take advantage of 
the favourable international economic conditions and advance at a rapid pace. 
Together with stabilisation efforts, various liberalising measures were introduced in 
response both to the American pressure and the government's inability to manage the 
increasing complex economy. The financial sector was liberalised, industrial policy 
rationalised, and the public sector privatised, but the Korean government still 
controlled and operated the economy with detailed regulations (Sakong, 1993). 
In spite of the impressive growth rate, many problems appeared from the late 1980s. 
One of the most serious was the concentration of economic power in the hands of the 
chaebols. The Korean chaebols had grown into mega-congalomates. The Fortune list 
of 500 international private non-oil-producing firms in 1986 included ten from Korea 
as against seven from all other developing countries combined. Under Park's rule the 
chaebol had played an subordinate role to the government. Under Chun's regime, 
however, the traditional relationship between the government and chaebol was 
perverted. 'While Park promised the chaebol rewards if they supported the policy of 
export-led growth, Chun apparently promised favours if the conglomerates 
contributed to his personal and political slush fund' (Bello & Rosenfeld, 1992: 72). 
With a virtual monopoly of South Korea's economy and no discipline from a 
corrupted government, the chaebol acquired huge amounts of wealth and gradually 
seemed willing to challenge traditional power holders. The bid for the presidency 
from former Hyundai Chairman, Chung Ju Yung, on the basis of Hyundai's economic 
might and organisational capabilities had alerted the Korean people to process 
whereby economic wealth could be transferred into political power. 
Another serious problem was the conflict between a commitment to productivity and 
a concern for the rights and needs of the working class. Political reform in 1987 
opened the door to a long-suppressed social conflict between labour and 
management. The demand to rectify the worsening distribution of income by militant 
labour movements secured a 60% rise in average wages between 1987 and 1990, and 
wages have continued to rise faster than productivity since (Bello & Rosenfeld, 
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1992). Although the wage rises of Korean workers do not compare to the increases in 
the chaebol's wealth, they have critically affected Korea's export competitiveness 
which was based largely on cheap labour. Clearly, if South Korea was to stick to the 
export-oriented development strategy, domestic industry would have to concentrate 
on more capital- and technology-intensive production. Given the need to develop the 
long-postponed social welfare system, to upgrade the public infrastructure and to 
meet the demands for higher incomes, no Korean government in the 1990s could 
continue to direct most of its investment to a few chosen chaebols as Park had done 
in building up the HCIs. 
1.2 Taiwan 
The modernisation effort on Taiwan started with Qing China in the 1880s when 
Taiwan became increasingly important as the front line in its defence of the 
mainland. It was interrupted by the colonisation by Japan, starting in 1895. The 
colonial experience of Taiwan was very similar to that of Korea. After a harsh period 
of consolidating their colonial power, the Japanese went on to develop Taiwan as an 
agricultural appendage to their home country. This brought capital and new 
agricultural technology to farmers and increased the production of rice and sugar 
among smallholders. The Japanese also made a six-year term of elementary 
education compulsory in order to impart basic literacy and other skills and to 
indoctrinate the Taiwanese in loyalty to Japan. In the 1930s, however, Japan's policy 
on the economic development of Taiwan was changed due to its gradual war 
involvement in Asia. Taiwan, as the stepping stone to the South Seas, was developed 
into an industrial base that could process raw materials coming from Southeast Asia 
to serve the imperial war machine (Barclay, 1954). 
As in Korea, the Japanese in Taiwan left behind extensive railways and roads, a 
modem telephone and communications grid, an effective administration system, a 
better-educated people, a small but growing manufacturing industry, and a highly 
developed agricultural sector. Although much of the infrastructure was destroyed by 
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bombing during the Second World War, the Taiwanese who had gained experience in 
Japanese developed industries or commercial markets were able to seize 
opportunities to set up their own business. 
With Japan's defeat in the Second World War Taiwan was returned to China. At the 
time China was governed by the Nationalist party (the Kuomintang, or KMT), which 
was engaged in a civil war with the Chinese Communists. The KMT mobilised 
Taiwan's economy to support their battle on the mainland. It devastated Taiwan's 
economic base and caused soaring inflation. The Nationalist administration in 
Taiwan also treated local people arrogantly, as colonised people. The deteriorating 
conditions of life and the second-class treatment soon turned the original enthusiasm 
of the Taiwanese into resentment, and eventually resulted in the bloody riot of 
February 28,1947. Thousands of people, many of them lawyers, teachers and 
students, were killed by KMT troops. The February incident had a profound effect on 
Taiwan's social character and subsequent development. On the one hand, it triggered 
the antagonism of the Taiwanese against mainlanders and the KMT regime. On the 
other hand, it weakened the force of the island's social elites and taught the locals 
how dangerous it would be to defy a brutal government. 
In 1949 the KMT headed by Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by the Communists on 
the mainland. Chiang retreated to Taiwan, bringing with him the formal national- 
level party and government structures and two million refugees, predominantly 
soldiers and bureaucrats. At the time, the indigenous Taiwanese population 
numbered around 6 million, most of whom had immigrated from the mainland China 
over the past several hundred years. The mainlanders who arrived in the late 1940s 
occupied most of the civil and political positions and virtually imposed a one-party 
dictatorship on the people of Taiwan. The resulting political and social differences 
created an enormous gulf between the Taiwanese, descendants of the Chinese who 
had migrated to Taiwan before 1945, and the mainlanders, the Chinese who arrived 
in Taiwan after 1945. 
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The economic future of Taiwan in 1949 seemed bleak. It had few natural resources 
apart from harbours and cultivated farmlands. World War II and the civil war on the 
mainland had also exacted a heavy toll on the island. When Chiang arrived he faced a 
crumbling infrastructure, rampant inflation, and stagnant industrial and agricultural 
production. The problems became even more acute when two million new comers 
had somehow to be absorbed into the economy. But the KMT had an unusually 
dominant position in Taiwan. Politically Japanese colonial rule and the brutal 
repression of the February uprising had left the local population submissive and 
leaderless. Facing no internal opposition and having no social base within Taiwan, 
the transplanted Nationalist government had substantial scope for manoeuvre. 
Economically, it had inherited all the productive assets which used to be the 
monopolies of the Japanese. With financial and technical support from the United 
States, the KMT was able to proceed to create a self-sufficient economy. 
The first stage was land reform. Apart from the pressing economic consideration of 
raising agricultural production to feed the suddenly enlarged population, land reform 
was important to the KMT ideologically and politically. The founder of the KMT, 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, had envisaged a society with'land to the tiller'. When the KMT was 
in control of the mainland it had been unable to initiate land reforms because the 
landlord class was its major basis of support. This had cost the KMT dearly. Since 
the Chinese population was overwhelmingly dominated by landless peasants, the 
Communists' concerted efforts to redistribute land had won widely spread popular 
support. On Taiwan, the KMT was anxious not to make the same mistake, and 
conditions there made it much easier to implement land reform. Coming from the 
mainland the KMT had very few links with the indigenous gentry, and they had no 
land to lose themselves. 
Land reform extended farm leases, lowered farm rentals, sold public land to small 
farmers at cheap prices, and limited individual land holdings. Thirty-seven percent of 
total cultivated land, 320,000 hectares, was redistributed. Stimulated by these 
reforms, agricultural productivity increased dramatically. Land reform also created 
the conditions for a more equitable distribution of rural wealth, even though the 
28 
KMT had not carried it out with social justice in mind. Finally it produced a group of 
entrepreneurs. Many previous landlords, armed with collateral from government 
compensation, became small businessmen (Koo, A. Y. C, 1968; Yager, 1988). 
Throughout the 1950s, while agriculture production was being consolidated, an 
import substitution strategy was also adopted. The agricultural surplus was directed 
to the industrialisation effort. Multiple exchange rates, tariffs and import quotas were 
used to protect new industries. It was a successful strategy: during this period 
Taiwan's economy grew by an annual average rate of 8.2%. By the end of the decade 
Taiwan had a canning and food-processing business, a textile industry and its own 
cement, plywood and glass factories (Lin, 1973). 
By the end of the 1950s Taiwan faced a choice between upgrading import- 
substituting industrialisation and exporting surplus industrial goods. As in the Korean 
case, the United States played an important role in the decision making process. In 
the late 1950s, American officials made it clear that they intended to end economic 
aid but were prepared to support an industrial drive based on export growth. As the 
gains from agricultural exports were reaching a plateau and could not finance further 
industrial-substitution, it was essential to find alternative sources of foreign 
exchange. Under these circumstances, it seemed wise to follow the Americans' 
advice. 
In Taiwan there were a number of factors conducive to economic growth by the early 
1960s. The past decade's industrialisation had built a solid industrial base. The rural 
labour force released by the increased agriculture productivity had acquired 
important experiences in rapidly growing industries. The abundant labour force was 
better educated than that of most developing countries and cheaper than that of the 
developed world. The infrastructure left by the Japanese, though declining, was still 
able to sustain increased economic growth. And more importantly, Taiwan enjoyed 
political stability and a government committed to economic development. 
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Immediately after retreating to Taiwan the KMT's top priority was to retake the 
mainland. They had no intention of staying on, and thus made no long-term plan for 
Taiwan's development. By the early 1960s, however, it was clear that their ultimate 
goal could not be achieved in the near future. A series of clashes broke out between 
the mainland and Taiwan which demonstrated to the KMT that the security of 
Taiwan could only be guaranteed by backing from the United States. But the 
Americans also made it known that they were not prepared to support any KMT 
effort to recover the mainland. Thus the KMT's conception of Taiwan was 
transformed from a military base to the new homeland. Retaking the mainland moved 
down the list of priorities, and economic development was put at the top of the policy 
agenda. Developing a strong economy was also important for legitimating and 
consolidating the rule of the KMT. Like the Park regime in Korea, the KMT did not 
have much popular support in Taiwan. The promise and delivery of a better living 
seemed a viable way to achieve a firmer popular base. 
It has been mentioned that the KMT govenunent on Taiwan was strong. It was also 
capable and relatively free of corruption. After the devastating failure on the 
mainland, the KMT was determined to build a secure Taiwanese base. Corruption 
was curtailed by strict and detailed regulations which controlled government 
officials' interactions with local businessmen or any susceptible interest groups. It 
was easier for Chiang to regulate his officials because only his loyal allies had 
followed him to Taiwan, most of whom were the cream of his previous political and 
bureaucratic system on the mainland. The KNIT government consciously presented 
an image of itself as a morally correct government, and in true Confucian fashion, 
promised prosperity in return for the Taiwanese people's obedience. 
While the political leadership determined Taiwan's priorities and policies for national 
development, its economic transformation was managed by a group of officials. Most 
of them had a background in science or engineering rather than economics or 
business. Without fixed rules to follow, Taiwanese economic policy makers were 
relatively practical and flexible. They saw economic activities as scientific 
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experiments which could be adjusted in response to conditions and they believed in 
social engineering. 
The major instrument deployed to regulate the economy was state control of the 
banking system and big enterprises. Beside the state-owned Central Bank of China, 
which has the power to set interest rates, the government controlled practically all the 
commercial banks. This ensured the dominant position of the state in the financial 
sector. In addition, the government engaged directly in economic activities through a 
relatively strong sector of state enterprises. When the KMT took over Taiwan, the 
enterprises belonging to the Japanese were turned into state owned businesses. Due 
to the fast growing private sector encouraged by the KMT government, the state 
enterprises' share in industrial production declined continuously. At the end of the 
phase of import-substitution industrialisation, state enterprises accounted for around 
40% of industrial production. By the early 1980s, their output only made up about 
20%. However, these figure do not convey the actual weight of the state sector. State 
enterprises dominate strategic sectors ranging from petroleum, steel, railways, power 
stations, to shipbuilding and telecommunications. They operate on a large scale and 
are the major suppliers of energy, raw materials and intermediate products in Taiwan. 
This has created a situation whereby private enterprises depend heavily on the public 
sector (Pang, 1992). 
What made Taiwanese products competitive in the international market, however, 
was ultimately cheap labour. Land reform and improving agricultural productivity 
had released an abundant labour supply. Strict government regulations and the 
dispersal of labour in small businesses limited the bargaining power of Taiwanese 
labour, and thereby help to ensure continuing low wages. Even among the East Asian 
NISs, the wages of Taiwanese workers were the lowest. In 1972, skilled labour in 
Taiwan earned an average of US$72 per month, compared with US$102 in South 
Korea, US$122 in Hong Kong, and US$183 in Singapore (Chung, 1987). 
This cheap labour force was also relatively well-educated. As noted earlier, extensive 
public education began during the Japanese colonial period. In 1943, for example, 
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70% of all school age children were enrolled in school. As in Korea, however, the 
Japanese did little to promote higher education. Later, the government of Chiang 
Kai-shek devoted a large part of its budget to education and emphasised equal 
opportunity through competitive exams. As a result, the adult literacy rate increased 
from 45% in 1946 to 92% in 1986. Even more important was the improvement in 
student enrolments in high schools or vocational schools, which increased from 
28.3% of the relevant age group (15-17 years old) to 72% between 1966-86. The 
much improved high school education produced an abundant supply of skilled 
workers who were in great demand from the increasingly sophisticated industrial 
sector (Metraux, 1991). 
Another important agent of economic development in Taiwan was the new stratum of 
entrepreneurs. Traditionally under the influence of Confucian thought, business was 
a profession to be looked down on. Every man's dream was to become an official or 
an intellectual. In Taiwan under the KMT, however, while academic opportunities 
were open to everyone, most of the civil Posts were filled by mainlanders. Doing 
business therefore provided an attractive alternative route to upward mobility for the 
local Taiwanese. They were eager to respond to entrepreneurial opportunities. Since 
the 1960s, the government had consciously promoted private business. To this end, it 
limited foreign investment so that local firms could gain strength without being 
displaced by multinationals. The relatively open credit market and the high rate of 
savings made it easier to get started. The relatively high level of education also 
enabled Taiwanese entrepreneurs to learn the relevant skills quickly. And the support 
of family in finance and labour helped them to endure economic hardship. As a 
result, entrepreneurs have flourished in Taiwan. 
Closely related to the rise of entrepreneurship was the proliferation of small-scale, 
export-oriented family business. Small businesses have played a major role in 
developing Taiwan's overall manufacturing capacity. In 1986 enterprises with fewer 
than ten workers made up nearly 70% of all businesses (Long, 1991). In part this 
represents an extension of the traditional dominance of the family into the economic 
life of the people. An individual would normally start his or her business by 
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borrowing money from family members and relatives and then call on the labour of 
the family or the help of relatives. As the business grew and opportunities expanded 
the successful one would in turn help his or her family members to set up their own 
businesses. The goal is not individual prosperity, but rather the prosperity of the 
family. 
The presence of many small firms was also in part a consequence of government 
policies. Most typically, the government has induced the multinational companies to 
invest and establish large manufacturing plants in Taiwan, and at the same time 
requested them to use local suppliers by specifying this condition in the investment 
licence. These terms generated a market for a host of small-scale manufacturers as 
suppliers and sub-contractors. The predominance of small businesses was further 
encouraged by factors such as Taiwan's public ownership of monopoly-prone 
industries, relative ease of access to finance, and the fact that incentives given to 
start-ups disregarded size. 
The advantages of having a large number of small private businesses are many. 
Small firms are more adaptable to changing conditions than big ones. From the 
government's point of view, the small size limited their bargaining power in 
economic policy making, which meant that they are more manageable. The large 
number of small businesses also help to keep the market competitive and the 
entrepreneurial spirit alive. Moreover, the profusion of small businesses in Taiwan 
played a significant role in reducing income inequality (Long, 199 1). 
The new economic policies in the 1960s sought vigorously to encourage private 
business and foreign investment for export promotion. Preferential interest rates were 
set up to generate high volume of private savings which came largely from the 
prospering peasantry. The money was then lent to local businessmen at subsidised 
rates to establish exporting industries. The government also provided them with tax 
incentives, subsidised cheap raw material and administrative assistance. In 1966 the 
first export-processing zone was set up to attract foreign investment. Finns in the 
zone enjoy all the privileges and tax incentives provided to export producers in 
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Taiwan but without the red tape. These policies have been successful in attracting a 
growing number of large-scale foreign-owned assembly plants and generating a pool 
of local small business to supply them. 
During the 1960s Taiwan's economy grew at an average rate of 9.7% every year. 
There was an enormous upsurge in industrial output and in exports. Manufactured 
goods became the dominant component of exports, replacing agriculture products. 
Textiles overtook sugar as the most important export contributor in 1965, and 
electrical machinery and apparatus and plywood also became major contributors. 
This brought about a radical transformation in the economic structure of Taiwan. 
From a country that in 1960 prospered on agriculture, it had by 1970 become an 
economy that relied primarily on the industrial sector for economic growth. 
But new problems arose in the early 1970s. Manufacturing industry had grown too 
fast for the island's infrastructure to support it adequately. Limitations on 
transportation and communication had put a serious break on industrial output. 
Rising labour costs had eroded the competitiveness of Taiwan in a world market 
where more and more new low-cost entrants had appeared. Also hit by stronger 
western protectionism, Taiwan's exports, the main contributor to economic growth, 
were under serious threat. These inherent structural problems were accentuated by 
the first oil price shock of 1973-74 and the following global recession, which 
effectively slashed the double figure growth rate in the earlier years to a mere 1.1 % 
in 1974. 
The situation was further worsened by diplomatic setbacks. In the early 1970s China 
ended its self-imposed isolation and sought to build wider diplomatic relations with 
the West. No country could ignore a vast potential market of one billion people for 
the sake of the island of Taiwan. Between 1971-72, Taiwan was expelled from the 
United Nations, President Nixon visited Beijing, and finally Japan undermined 
Taiwan by establishing relations with Communist China. Taiwan became more 
isolated and less secure. 
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Against this backdrop the Ten Major Development Projects were announced in 
November 1973 by Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. This 
initiative addressed the needs to tackle economic problems as well as to boost the 
morale of the people. Three of the projects aimed to develop capital- and technology- 
intensive industries by building a shipyard, an integrated steel mill and a 
petrochemical complex. The rest concentrated on building a new highway, railroad, 
harbour, airport and nuclear power station to improve Taiwan's infrastructure. The 
Projects comprised nearly 30% of Taiwan's total fixed capital formation in the mid- 
and late seventies. This huge government spending enabled Taiwan to weather the 
impact of severe world-wide recession and helped the economy make a quick and 
full recovery (Long, 1991). 
Most of the projects were completed by 1979. They were counted so successful that 
the government immediately announced Twelve New Projects. Again, these projects 
emphasised communications, transport systems and power stations. Some of them 
were actually the second stage of the earlier set of projects. Since then more projects 
of a similar nature have been planned by the KMT government, and have accelerated 
the economic transformation and improved people's lives. 
The KMT government undertook the task of upgrading the industrial structure 
directly through state-owned enterprises. The government played a major role as both 
investor and operator in creating some heavy industries like steel, upstream 
petrochemicals, and shipbuilding. These industries gradually began replacing foreign 
importers in intermediary and capital goods supplies. The upgrading policy also led 
to further industrial transformation: the agricultural processing industries declined in 
importance in favour of electronics, electrical goods, iron and steel, and 
petrochemicals. 
In contrast to the HCI drive of South Korea, the expansion of heavy and 
petrochemical industries in Taiwan was carried out in a less aggressive and more 
incremental manner. Apart from expanding state enterprises, the government relied 
mainly on general incentives and the provision of infrastructure and institutional 
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supports to steer the private sector in the desired direction. This reflected the 
conservative nature of Taiwan's overall economic and fiscal policies, which was 
decided by its vulnerable position in international trade and the technocratic style of 
decision-making. The diplomatic isolation of Taiwan had exerted great pressures to 
maintain and foster international economic ties as a surrogate for political ones. This 
dependency on international trade and the small size of Taiwan made a 'big push' 
strategy more risky. Moreover, in contrast to the personal involvement of Park in 
South Korea, technocrats were the major economic policy makers. They did not 
enjoy the near absolute power of Park. Their rather distant relationship with private 
businessmen, which was designed to curtail the problem of corruption, also favoured 
an incremental approach (Li, 1988). 
The establishment of heavy industries in Taiwan paid off well: its economy grew by 
an annual average of 8.9% in the 1970s. The industrial upgrading policy was carried 
on through the 1980s with the emphasis on more technology-intensive industries, and 
has been pursued into the 1990s with the aim of moving into high-tech industries. It 
seemed a natural response to the combined problems of the increasing protectionism 
of the trade partners, intensified competition from other less developed countries, and 
rising wages and more expensive land in Taiwan. 
The second wave of industrial upgrading started from the late 1970s with greater 
emphasis on technological upgrading and the development of an indigenous 
scientific, engineering and research base. The second oil shock hastened the trend. As 
before, the government relied on a mixture of foreign investment promotion, direct 
involvement and incentives to the indigenous private sector to complete this 
transformation. The electronics and information industries were singled out as the 
main target. Specialised non-profit organisations were created by the government to 
conduct R&D and to assist in its dissemination to the private sector. And in 1980, 
another industrial park was established, which offers the usual package of incentives 
but is only open to science-based companies. 
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During the 1980s, despite the slower growth of world trade and world-wide 
protectionist sentiments, Taiwan was able to sustain remarkable economic growth at 
an average annual rate of 8.2%. Exports continued to grow with a range of upmarket 
products such as personal computers and scientific equipment and more diversified 
destinations. Taiwan began to run a string of large trade surpluses. By the end of the 
decade the official foreign exchange reserves ranked behind only Japan. The 
liberalisation of the economy has taken place since the mid-1980s, as a response to 
the pressure from trading partners and the growing complexity and openness of the 
economy. Import restrictions were lowered to a minimum, with the exception of 
agriculture, low tariff rates were adopted, and capital flows became freer. 
Encouraged by previous successes, the KMT government launched ambitious new 
plans for the 1990s. The Six-Year National Development Plan was designed to 
upgrade Taiwan's outmoded infrastructure and generate growth momentum by a huge 
infusion of government expenditure. 'Ten newly emerging industries' and 'eight key 
technologies' were identified as the high-tech areas which manufacturers should shift 
to. Government expenditure on R&D increased sharply, foreign technologies were 
vigorously sought after, and again, low-cost loans, tax holidays and cheap public land 
were offered to high-tech industries. 
This time, however, the KMT government has seen a different response from the 
export industry. Instead of moving upmarket, they have moved off-shore to the 
Chinese mainland and surrounding less developed countries. According to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, total investment on the mainland by Taiwan 
businesses was around $10 billion in the 1989-93 period. Given the fact that many 
businessmen went to the mainland behind the government's back, the real figure 
could well be much higher. The Economist's estimation of Taiwanese investment on 
the mainland was US$20 billion (The Economist, 10 October 1992). As a 
consequence, the government is now having great difficulties in steering the course 
of Taiwan's economic development. This is partly because the growing complexity of 
the economy has made it less manageable. But more importantly, the KMT 
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government is losing its capacities in regulating economic activities because of the 
rapid political development. 
In the late 1980s a startling turn towards democracy occurred in Taiwan. It was 
brought about by the KMT itself under growing international pressure and escalating 
demands from a new middle class at home. Internationally, the economic reforms led 
by Deng Xiao-ping on the mainland had improved the image of the Communist 
China beyond recognition. Autocratic Taiwan could no longer present itself as a 
democratic heaven in contrast to a grimly totalitarian mainland. Just as importantly, 
US-backed dictatorships around the world were crumbling. The fall of Marcos in 
Philippines in particular, had provided a lesson that no regime could ignore popular 
demands indefinitely. At home, the KMT was rocked by a series of scandals. 
Meanwhile, rising living standards and exposure to American democratic values, 
prompted a younger generation, which had not experienced the bloody oppression of 
the late 1940's, to demand more political rights and freedom. 
Chiang Ching-Kuo recognised the need to change and instituted political reform from 
above. His own prestige as the chairman of the KMT and president of its government 
was crucial to its success in the face of the resistance from the old guard. Starting 
from March 1986, Chiang formed a 12-member committee to discuss political reform 
and instructed the Party to open talks with the opposition. He then indicated that 
martial law would be lifted and new political parties allowed. The first opposition 
party was founded in September 1986, and many others followed. Although they 
were still technically illegal under martial law, the government actively sought a 
dialogue with the new parties and allowed them to compete with the ruling party on 
an equal basis. In July 1987, martial law was officially terminated. Constitutional 
rights such as freedom of assembly and association to the people, which had been 
suspended since 1949, were restored. Press freedom was extended in January 1988 
when the newspapers were allowed to double in size to 24 pages each, and new 
publications permitted to establish themselves following the lifting the restriction on 
new launches originally introduced in 195 1. 
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The political transformation was gathering momentum when Chiang died in January 
1988. Despite attempts by the KMT's old guard to turn back a reforming tide, 
Chiang's hand-picked successor Lee Teng-hui, with the backing of the reformists 
who had been given high office by Chiang, was able to pursue reform with no less 
gusto than his predecessor. From 1988 Taiwanese people have been able to visit the 
Chinese mainland and trade and cultural exchange activities between the island and 
mainland have increased dramatically. Electoral reform was undertaken to make the 
parliament more representative. In 1991, for the first time ever, Taiwanese people 
had the opportunity to determine a majority of the National Assembly seats by 
casting a ballot. Since then more multiparty elections have been held, and the first 
direct presidential election by popular vote was held in 1996. The KMT also pledged 
to reform itself. At its 13th Congress in July 1988, the Central Committee was, for 
the first time, elected rather than nominated. At its 14th Congress in August 1993, 
the party chairman was, again for the first time, elected by a secret ballot rather than 
by the public and docile acceptance of the Party's decision. 
It is noteworthy that the KMT garnered 71% of the popular vote for the Assembly, 
and captured 15 of the 23 contested mayoral and magistrate positions in the local 
election. Even under full democracy, the KMT continued to enjoy substantial 
political power and support. This suggests that most voters are pragmatic and 
concerned with stability and economic prosperity when it comes to choosing their 
leaders (Leng & Lin, 1993). However, even though the KMT holds a veto-proof 
majority in the government, they still have to face challenges from interest groups 
spawned by the new liberal political climate. 
Local capitalists have started to exert more influence on economic policy-making 
because their wealth is sought after by wide spread interests in election campaigns. 
The growing middle class demand more political participation in politics and a 
higher quality of life. Workers want a greater share in the prosperity of Taiwan. The 
public sector has been especially badly hit by strikes, not only because public 
enterprises tend to be large, which encourages labour militancy, but also because it 
was hard for them to withstand worker demands by turning to illegal immigrants. 
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Environmentalists, who are gaining more and more weight, have forced the 
cancellation of a plan to build the fourth nuclear plant. Among these competing 
forces, the KMT government has more and more difficulty in designing and realising 
the future of Taiwan. 
1.3 Concluding remarks 
The success of South Korea and Taiwan has not been achieved overnight. The 
foundations of the modem economy were laid during the colonisation period. 
Although the Japanese developed Taiwan and Korea for their own needs, the 
infrastructure, industries and better educated labour they promoted had the 
unintended effect of helping later economic development. The substantial inflow of 
American aid and technical assistance designed to build strong anti-communist 
bastions in East Asia was also an important factor boosting their economies. 
But these external factors, though important are not a sufficient basis for explaining 
the rapidity of their recent economic growth. We need to look at the internal factors. 
One such factor was the strategy for stimulating growth through the creation of an 
export-oriented economy, which was designed and implemented by the governments 
of both South Korea and Taiwan. The development of education at all levels was also 
important. But the ma or player in the development process of both these economies 
was the government, which designed economic policies, provided investments and 
raw materials, and directly controlled the operations of key enterprises, the chaebols 
in the case of South Korea and the state-owned enterprises in the case of Taiwan. 
With the help of a diligent and highly educated labour force, the governments of both 
societies have staged an economic and social transformation with unprecedented 
speed. 
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Chapter 2 
The Development Process in Singapore and Hong Kong 
Of the four East Asian NISs, Singapore and Hong Kong are both small city-states 
that began as British colonies in the nineteenth century and owed their early 
prosperity to their role as regional entrepots. Their economies have remained open 
and outward-looking ever since. The rapid economic development of these two 
societies, however, came with labour-intensive manufactures for the world market. 
Hong Kong was forced down this road in the early 1950s when its entrepot trade was 
closed off by embargoes. Singapore followed the example of Hong Kong in 1965 
after its separation from Malaysia. From the 1970s both economies went through an 
export upgrading process. They also moved into the finance and service sector, with 
revived entrepot trade. Rapid economic growth has brought a dramatically improved 
standard of living. Real per capita income in both cities has risen by over 5% every 
year since the mid- I 960s. They are now already better off than many EEC countries. 
2.1 Singapore 
Singapore is a multi-ethnic city state. Of its 2.7 million population, 76% are Chinese, 
with Malays making up the biggest minority group at 15%, and the rest being Indians 
7% and others 2%. The modem history of Singapore began in 1819 when the British 
established control of the island then inhabited by about 120 Malays and 30 Chinese. 
But its real development started in the last quarter of the nineteen century following 
the opening of Suez Canal and the extension of British control over the rich 
hinterland of the Malay states. Because of its ideal geographical position on the 
Malacca Straits trade route, the major waterway from Europe to the Far East, 
41 
Singapore prospered as the entrepot for South-East Asian raw materials and western 
manufactured goods. The trade also stimulated the growth of a preliminary 
processing industry, an infrastructure, communication system, together with 
commercial institutions and expertise. By 1941, Singapore had become one of the 
world's wealthiest and busiest ports. 
Increasing economic prosperity attracted large numbers of Chinese immigrants in the 
early years of the Century. By the outbreak of World War I they constituted a little 
over three-quarters of Singapore's population and have maintained that proportion 
ever since. The Chinese were open to contact with European officials and quick to 
seize economic opportunities. They soon established a major presence in trade, 
shipping, banking and industry. The Malays found themselves submerged in a 
European-ruled Chinese city and faced strong competition from the Chinese in 
economic life (Parmer, 1983). 
The Pacific War (1941-45) brought political oppression and the hardships of inflation 
and food shortages to the island, but it also weakened British control and led to 
gradual decolonization. In 1959 the first Singaporean government which took control 
over all domestic affairs from the British was established by the People's Action 
Party (PAP) after a resounding victory in a popular election. The PAP was led by 
Lee Kuan Yew, a charismatic English-educated lawyer who advocated a moderate 
nationalist platform that included the provision of social services, economic 
development, and merger with Malaya. Lee had gained wide support from the 
working-class through the strategic employment of strikes organised by the PAP's 
left wing. 
In 1959 Singapore's economy was dependent upon international entrepot trade, with 
services to British military bases as a support. However, it had been badly disrupted 
by endless strikes and demonstrations, many of them organised by the PAP, and the 
rapid population growth resulting from immigrant inflow added another burden. The 
unemployment rate in 1959 was estimated at 13.5%. Given a population growth rate 
which averaged 4.5% during the 1950s, maintaining real incomes and employment 
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became a major political and economic challenge for Lee Kuan Yew (Turnbull, 
1977). 
The initial economic policies of the PAP government were centred on improving 
social services to fulfil its electoral promises, and preparing for merger with Malaya. 
Housing and education accounted for nearly 30% of public investment under the 
1961-1964 State Development Plan. But integration with the Malaya peninsula was 
seen as the principle means to restructure the economy and alleviate unemployment. 
Because Singapore lacks natural resources and a sufficient domestic market, the 
merger would provide it with the opportunity to industrialise by manufacturing for a 
much larger market. 
The merger finally took place in 1963. After almost 20 years separation, however, 
urban, commercial, socialist and Chinese-dominated Singapore was incompatible 
with rural, communal, conservative and anti-Chinese Malaya. Their economies, both 
industriali sing, were competitive instead of co-operative. For Singapore, the merger 
accentuated the ethic and religious tension between the Chinese and Malays. For the 
Malaysia federation, the merger had made the Chinese the largest single community 
in a united Singapore/Malaya. The economically aggressive and politically ambitious 
Chinese from Singapore seriously endangered the course of Malay nationalism. In 
1965, Singapore was expelled from the Malaysia federation and became independent 
with full sovereignty over its territory. 
Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia destroyed the basis on which Lee and his 
colleagues had considered the state viable. The prime minister publicly lamented in 
tears this 'moment of agony'. However, in spite of the failure in Malaysia, the PAP 
government was in a strong position at home. People were happy with a stable 
government after years of political turbulence. They also appreciated the 
government's efforts in providing housing and other public services. Furthermore, the 
crisis of survival had drawn Singaporeans into a more cohesive solidarity. 
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The first problem for the PAP was to create a feeling of nationhood. Because the 
Chinese majority and the other minorities differed in language, religion, and culture, 
the government sought to create a unique kind of Singaporean identity and sense of 
values which could transcend differences. To this end, discipline, hard work, 
propriety, self reliance, respect for worldly success and desire for material gains were 
promoted as the distinct features of the new Singaporean identity. However, since the 
Chinese made up the majority of the population and Lee himself is Chinese, it is not 
surprising that these 'Singaporean values' bore a strong resemblance to Chinese 
traditional values and more particularly to Confucian values (Turnbull, 1977). 
Vital as the promotion of national identity was, the biggest problem facing the PAP 
government was the economy. Singapore was born in a series of political, economic 
and ethnic crises. Given its multi-ethnic societal structure and its very small size, 
economic prosperity was the only means to provide a certain degree of bargaining 
power in dealing with its big and unfriendly neighbours. The early years of 
independence fortunately coincided with a time of world prosperity; and its economy 
grew with the increase in international trade. But in the longrun the entrepot trade 
could not generate adequate employment for the increasing population. Therefore 
modernisation and economic development were the overriding priorities for modem 
Singapore. 
Since the prospect of industrial integration with Malaysia was shattered by the 
separation, the government turned to the strategy of export-oriented industrialisation, 
the only practical alternative. To achieve this goal, the PAP set out to attract 
multinational companies. They seemed to be ideal because they would bring 
investment and technical expertise to Singapore, and provide direct access to 
overseas markets. Incentives were offered to attract foreign investment, but with little 
success in the beginning. Investors were sceptical about the active labour movement 
in Singapore and the PAP's ability to maintain political stability. It was not until the 
PAP subdued the labour movement and created a more favourable environment for 
business that the multinationals started to arrive. 
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In January 1968 the British decided to withdraw from their Singapore bases within 
three years. Britain's spending in Singapore accounted for 25% of its gross national 
product and had been vital to its economic growth. Thus, the British withdrawal 
would deal a double blow, to Singapore's security and to its economy. Citing the 
need to respond to the new crisis, an early election was called in April 1968. The 
result was a stunning success for the PAP. They won all of the legislative seats. Since 
then, the PAP have won all elections and have built in effect a one-party state. 
The PAP did not hesitate to use its power to develop the economy. Its first move was 
to provide a predictable and stable pattern of industrial relations for investors by 
enforcing stricter labour discipline. Already, a legal framework for the orderly 
management of industrial conflict had been established in 1960; and the PAP 
controlled National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) was created in 1962 to replace 
the 'leftist' unions, Lee's erstwhile allies. In 1968 new labour laws were introduced, 
which reduced a whole range of workers' benefits, downgraded collective bargaining 
power and gave management full discretionary power over dismissal, promotion, 
transfer, and other vital issues in labour-management relations. As a consequence the 
potential for confrontational industrial relations was greatly reduced (Haggard, 
1990). 
The strict control over labour was based on the PAP's argument that the survival of 
Singapore had to be placed above all other considerations, that economic survival 
could not be separated from political survival, and that survival demanded individual 
self-sacrifice for the national interest (Rodan, 1989). In 1969 a labour modernisation 
seminar was organised to set up new goals for the labour movement under the 
NTUC. It was decided that collective bargaining was counter-productive in the new 
climate, and that confrontation had to be replaced by co-operation with management 
and government. What new-style trade unionists should do is to 'think out ways and 
means of how workers can get a greater share of the growing cake without slowing 
down the rate of development' (Rajaratnam, 1987: 277). 
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As a result, 1969 became the first strike-free year since the PAP came to office. 
Throughout the 1970s key positions in the NTUC were filled with members of the 
PAP. By the 1980s, Lee Kuan Yew had successfully created one of the world's most 
docile labour forces. The aura of stability projected by Lee's authoritarian regime has 
become the most important factor in its appeal to multinational corporations. As 
shown in a 1985 study of manufacturing firms, 69% of the 67 wholly owned foreign 
firms surveyed listed political stability as their main reason for investing in 
Singapore (Milne & Mauzy, 1990). 
Apart from being compliant, Singapore's labour force was of a relatively high quality 
and low cost. Compared to the workers in most developing countries, Singaporean 
workers were better educated, and to a large extent English-speaking. At the same 
time their wages were much lower than those of any industrialised country. 
Government guidelines have kept the average wage in manufacturing the lowest of 
all occupational groups in Singapore - even below agriculture and fishing. When 
labour shortages appeared along with Singapore's rapid economic growth, the 
National Wages Council was established in 1971 to set up guidelines for wage 
increases at the national level. In principle its recommendations are only indicative, 
but they have been strictly followed by the public sector, and the private sector is 
also highly influenced by them (Fong & Seow, 1983). Although Singapore's labour 
costs have never been as competitive as those of Taiwan and South Korea, the 
combined advantage of a high ratio of quality to cost coupled with the predictability 
of industrial relations and wage determination proved very appealing for 
multinational investors. 
The government also proceeded to provide an excellent infrastructure for 
manufacturing and business activities. Historically Singapore's port, airport, and 
telecommunications system were relatively well developed due to its roles as a major 
port, a military base, and a nodal point in maritime communications. Later 
improvements after the 1960s have had the port containerised, and 
telecommunications converted to optic fibre. Transportation on the island was also 
greatly improved with a rapid transit system. And well planned industrial sites 
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provided ready built factories which could adapt to the different requirements of 
different industries. 
More financial incentives were offered to attract investment. While in South Korea 
and Taiwan the investment regime favoured local firms, in Singapore investment 
policy was biased in favour of foreign enterprises. For instance, the requirement that 
pioneer enterprises had to have investments of over $1 million to be entitled to tax 
breaks automatically cuts out most private local firms since they cannot generally 
reach that level of capitalisation without help from the state. Some of Singapore's 
advantages, such as very low tariffs on imports and exports, free capital flow, 
unrestricted repatriation of profits and investments, and unlimited foreign equity 
participation, derived from its entrepot status. Further tax exemption and duty-free 
imports were offered to export-oriented companies. Above all, profits from the 
export of approved manufactures were to be taxed at only 4% instead of the usual 
40% corporate tax (Castells et al, 1990). 
In the new atmosphere of industrial peace and political stability, foreign investors 
began to pour into Singapore. By 1972 foreign or joint-venture companies accounted 
for nearly 70% of industrial production and 83% of direct exports. Since then the 
foreign capital has become a key source of Singapore's rapid industrialisation and 
extraordinary economic growth. As the figures for 1984 show, in the manufacturing 
sector, foreign owned companies generated 71% of gross output, 82% of direct 
exports, and 53% of employment (Chong, 1986). 
Not only did the government provide a highly favourable business environment, it 
also directly engaged in economic activities through state and semi-state companies, 
many of them organised under three wholly-owned government holding companies. 
The government also started joint ventures with both foreign and domestic 
enterprises. Through these companies the Singapore government owns or participates 
in a large number of key industries and businesses in banking, transportation, 
communications, trading, shipbuilding and steel production, and other manufacturing 
activities. The state-owned enterprises had a total capital of S$4.75 billion (including 
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holding companies) in 1985. Since the total paid-up capital of all Singapore-quoted 
stocks at the time was roughly S$10-11 billion, the state sector dominated local 
business (FEER, 8 January 1987). 
The PAP government and multinationals have together sustained a remarkable level 
of economic performance in Singapore. During the period between 1965 and 1973, 
real GDP grew at an average rate of 12.7%. The first oil shock of 1973 brought an 
end to this expansion however, and in 1975, Singapore registered near zero growth. 
But it did not take long to recover from the blow. While growth slowed considerably 
from its previous peak, it remained high by the standard of most countries, recording 
an 8.7% average rate for the period from 1973 to 1984 (Castells et al, 1990). 
Moreover, such growth was achieved with low inflation rates, the lowest in the 
capitalist economies of East Asia. 
Economic growth was to a large extent based on the growth of manufacturing 
exports. In 1960 the manufacturing sector constituted 11.9% of GDP, by 1979 it had 
increased to 28.1%, and provided more that half of all merchandise exports. The 
change was also reflected in the employment structure, with the employment share 
for the manufacturing industry increasing from 20.7% in 1960 to 35.3% in 1979. 
During the same period, the composition of manufacturing industries also changed 
from a range of textiles, footwear and other leather products to one centred around 
electrical and electronic products and petroleum and petroleum products (Krause, 
1987). 
From the early 1970s, a concerted effort was made to diversify the economy and to 
upgrade the industrial structure in order to make it less vulnerable to international 
downturns. The infrastructure was improved to support Singapore's potential as an 
international business centre. State owned enterprises started to invest in higher- 
value-added and skill-intensive activities such as ship-repairing and speciality oil 
refining. New incentives were offered to foreign companies in specially selected 
fields such as electronics. 
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The most important move came in 1979, when the government decided that it was 
time to conduct the Second Industrial Revolution, aimed at transforming the island 
into a base for skill-intensive, high-tech, and higher-value-added economic activities, 
with the emphasis on advanced services rather than manufacturing. A number of 
policies were devised and implemented. Central to these was a substantial rise in 
wages, which was intended to push lower value-added, labour-intensive industries to 
upgrade operations. But the sharp rise in wages did not bring the expected 
technological upgrading of production processes. Instead, increasing labour costs 
undermined competitiveness with respect to other Asian NISs. Many foreign 
companies redirected their labour- intensive business to other countries without 
significant increases in skill- and technology-intensive production in Singapore. 
The new policy led to a decline in profitability and a slower growth in exports. The 
world-wide recession of 1981-82 caused reduced demand for goods and services 
from Singapore. This was not reflected in Singapore's economy immediately 
however. The strong performance of the advanced services sector, especially the 
construction boom, kept the economy alive. However, when it became obvious that a 
major property glut had been created, Singapore's economy fell apart. In 1985, after 
twenty years of growth, the city-state's real GDP declined by 1.7%. The recession 
lasted well into 1986, and only recovered in 1987. 
After the shock of the 1985-86 recession, the Singaporean government engaged in a 
new process of restructuring that picked up steam in 1987. Wages were again the 
focus, though this time the aim was to reduce labour costs. After two years of freeze 
in 1986 and 1987, further wage increases were linked to productivity on a company- 
by-company basis. The drive toward high-technology industries, which began in the 
early 1980s, was also intensified. R&D expenditures and government expenditures 
on higher education were increased. Moreover, immigration policy was reviewed to 
attract doctor's or master's degree holders from China and Hong Kong. More 
recently, the government is trying to urge both public and private sectors to 'go 
abroad', in search of alternative markets and niches. Since 1985 it has been allocating 
resources to help establish Singapore's 'second wing', a strategy which gained 
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momentum in 1993 as multinational companies relocated their businesses elsewhere 
(Elkan, 1995). 
Due to these efforts, the economy has again grown at a respectable speed. Financial 
and business services, transport and communication, and construction have all grown 
at a faster speed than manufacturing. International investment continued to flow in, 
so that in 1990 71% of domestic exports were produced by the multinationals. The 
effort to move into hi-tech manufacturing also bore fruit. Singapore is now the 
world's largest manufacturer of disk drives, and is strong in computers, 
telecommunications and electronics. Nearly 90% of the value of the top ten export 
items are from the electronics field (FEER, 1993). 
Singapore's economic success has been closely interrelated with its social initiatives. 
The engineering of a disciplined, orderly society has helped to create an attractive 
business environment. In return, economic success has empowered the government 
to regulate people's everyday life in considerate detail. The Singaporean government 
have not only provided housing and education for its citizens, they have also 
attempted, successftilly to a certain extent, to inculcate particular values and patterns 
of behaviour through a combination of punishments, rewards and moral lessons. 
Arguably Singapore has the most successful housing programme in the capitalist 
world. When Singapore attained self-rule, the new government inherited an urban 
housing crisis from the British colonial administration. The city was overcrowded 
with half of its urban population living in degenerated slums and squatter 
encampments. The Housing and Developing Board (HDB) was established in 1960 
to provide low cost public housing and rebuild a planned city. Since then, the HDB 
has built 640,000 apartments and other residences as well as shops and industrial 
premises. By 1988,86% of the population lived in government flats, more than two- 
thirds of which were owner occupied (Quah, 1983; Castells et al, 1990). 
Already, by the late 1970s, the great majority of the population had been housed in 
government flats. The public programme began to play an important role in 
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encouraging desirable social values and internalising social control. Residents' 
Committees (RCs) based on public housing estates were launched in 1978. RCs 
organise activities and services for residents to promote cohesion between groups of 
different races and religions and to regulate dwellers' behaviour in accordance with 
government campaigns. For example, in a government drive against 'killer litter', 
objects being thrown or falling from high rise flats, RCs took an active part in 
channelling the message to residents on housing estates and in reporting any 
misdemeanours to the police and the HDB. 
Public housing's role as an agent of social engineering was also evident in the 
promotion of the extended family as part of a national effort to restore desirable 
traditional Asian values. Since the late I 970s the HDB has introduced financial 
incentives and designed schemes to encourage married couples and their parents to 
live together or as neighbours . Priorities were given to extended families in housing 
allocation. Special regulations were made for HDB lessees to exchange flats for the 
purpose of living near his or her parents or children. Incentives were given for 
parents and married children to live within the same dwelling unit; and in 1987 three 
hundred specially designed flats with an attached 'studio' flat for parents or 
grandparents were made available. 
The PAP government's ability and deten-nination in engineering the society is also 
shown in its family planning program. In the early 1960s the rapidly growing 
population threatened to absorb any possible economic growth. To control the rise in 
population, the government designed a policy of 'Two is enough', backed by cheap 
and easily available contraception and abortions, and fiscal disincentives for having 
more children. The program had been so successful that by 1987, the government 
had to change its slogan to 'three is better, in order to maintain the age balance of the 
population. This time families with three children were offered tax rebates, priority 
in children's school registration, and priority in obtaining larger government flats. 
I One recent incentive: a S$50,000 grant from government to young couples buying HDB flats near 
their parents' home (FEER, I August 1996). 
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The control of the population was also about 'quality'. Lee Kuan Yew had strong 
views on the need for an elite 'talent pool' and on the importance of heredity in 
producing such talent. Unfortunately the birth-rate was lowest among educated 
women as indicated by the 1980 census. In an effort to redress this imbalance, the 
government has tried to encourage poorly educated, low-income couples to have less 
children by promising subsides for education and housing if they limit themselves to 
two children. On the other hand, graduates and A-level females have been urged to 
marry and reproduce. The various incentive schemes have included growing better- 
educated mothers priority in registering their children for school, organising virtually 
free tours and parties for well-educated single men and women, so that they could 
meet, with a view to marriage. Although there have been few positive results, the 
government is still pursuing the matter. 
While it is difficult to lead people onto the 'right' track, it is rather easier to prevent 
them from doing wrongs. The remarkable degree of conformity apparent in 
Singapore is to a large extent the result of a barrage of campaigns backed by 
sanctions. In one campaign, against the 'indiscriminate disposal of chewing gum', the 
HDB asked shop owners in some areas to stop selling gum and the government 
banned gum advertisements on TV. Tight regulations and deterrents are especially 
useful to stifle or incorporate the unorganised activities of youth. When breakdancing 
occurred and attracted large teenage crowds in Singapore, the police were used to 
disperse them and stop the dancing, on the grounds that 'things could get out of 
control'. A ban was quickly placed on 'impromptu dancing in busy areas', and 
teenagers were invited instead to dance under the auspices of the Peoples' 
Association (Wilkinson, 1988). 
Some government campaigns were more directly related to the economy. As part of 
an effort to restructure the economy and increase productivity, for example, a 
comprehensive campaign was conducted to persuade Singaporeans of the close 
relation between team work and productivity and of the importance of genial worker- 
employer relationships. The media were important instruments in getting the 
message across, and for a considerable time newspapers, radio and television were 
52 
filled with exhortations to respect the 'spirit of team work'. More concrete methods 
were also adopted, the promotion of company welfarism being the most important. 
Under the new scheme the employer would take over part of the government's 
responsibility for providing welfare benefits for workers. It was reasoned that if 
workers had to look to their company's success for their own benefits, the 
performance of the company would become more important to them, and the bond 
between workers and employer stronger (Rodan, 1989). 
An orderly society has been of special interest to the PAP in recent years because 
they perceive themselves as trying to defend and assert 'Asian values' against a rising 
tide of westernisation. Three decades of an open door policy and western education 
have resulted in an increasing number of westernised Singaporeans who are 
hedonistic, materialistic, and self-centred. In response the government has placed 
particular emphasis on an alternative set of values which can be used to strengthen a 
distinct Singaporean identity. To this end President Wee Kim Wee laid out a 
proposed set of common core values which included 'placing society above self, 
upholding the family as a basic building block of society, resolving major issues 
through consensus instead of contention and stressing religious tolerance and 
harmony' (quoted in Bellows, 1990: 201). The emphasis on group, family and 
consensus is unmistakably Confucian. Nor is this coincidence. 
Confucian Ethics as a subject was introduced in schools in 1984, as one of the six 
options for the moral education programme. According to the text book, the 
perceived relevance to Confucianism in Singapore society is in that'Confucian ethics 
has been introduced to Singapore in an attempt to check the powerful influence of 
materialistic and individualistic values on young Singaporeans. It is hoped that this 
moral persuasion will not only help build strong characters, but will also give our 
young people an understanding of their cultural roots. Moreover, the Confucian 
cultural tradition has much to contribute to Singapore's economic, social and political 
development' (quoted in Kuah, 1990: 3 75). 
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This recent celebration of Confucianism is somewhat ironic, since in the early years 
of independence the PAP government, which consisted largely of an English- 
educated Chinese elite, fought hard against threats from Chinese-educated political 
radicals, trade unionists and secret society leaders. Anything overtly Chinese was 
crushed on the grounds that it could threaten the harmony of a multi-racial, multi- 
cultural society. However, as the perceived threat to social order has shifted from 
Chinese-educated leftists to the westem-inspired decadence, traditional Chinese 
values, and particularly Confucian ethics, have become increasingly useful to the 
government. Confucianism is seen as an important ideological tool for social 
engineering as well as an asset to promote economic development and 
modernisation. Its strategic promotion is manifest not only in the introduction of 
Confucian ethics as a 'moral education' option, but also in the 'Speak Mandarin' 
campaign. 
The promotion of English as Singapore's common language has been government 
policy since 1965. This choice had three advantages: it was acceptable to all ethnic 
groups; it helped international businesses operating in Singapore; and it was 
politically effective in weakening the Chinese-educated opposition. As a result, the 
proportion of children enrolled in English-language elementary schools rose from 
43% in 1965 to 69% in 1975 and 97% in 1985. English was intended to be the 
language of public discourse. But more and more people, especially the Chinese, 
who tended to be better educated, started to speak English at home. Worrying that 
desirable Confucian values might disappear along with its main medium, the 
government launched a 'speak Mandarin' campaign in 1979. In 1988,87% of the 
population could speak Mandarin compared with 76% in 198 1. By 1990, the number 
of primary schools teaching both English and Chinese as first languages had more 
than doubled (The Economist, 18 November, 1992). 
In common with the other East Asian NISs the style of rule in Singapore is 
undoubtedly authoritarian. But it does have a form of democracy: a parliament 
modelled on Westminster and an electoral system. This might explain why its 
politics changes slowly whereas the politics in other NISs are punctuated by crisis 
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and sudden shifts. After opposition parties faded in the 1960s, the PAP government 
enjoyed a political monopoly until 1980, when the first opposition parliamentarian 
was elected. Since then popular support for the ruling party has gradually declined. 
In the 1991 election, the PAP only garnered 61% of valid votes, though they lost 
only four seats in the parliament thanks to the constituency representation system 
(Shee, 1992)2. 
Singapore is now headed by a new generation of leaders. Lee Kuan Yew stepped 
aside in 1990 after 31 years in office, making way for Goh Chok Tong to take over as 
the country's second prime minister. But the emphasis was on continuity. As Goh 
himself put it, 'My mission is clear: to ensure that Singapore thrives and grows after 
Lee Kuan Yew; to find a new group of men and women to help me carry on where he 
and his colleagues left off, and to build a nation of character and grace where people 
live lives of dignity, fulfilment and care for one another' (quoted in Shee, 1991: 173). 
In 1993 the first president with wide veto powers in key areas of national life to act 
as a check on the cabinet, was elected. He was from the PAP. Although the 
opposition has grown in Singapore, effective political power is still firmly in the 
hands of the PAP. The popular protests on the streets, which became part of life in 
South Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s, are yet to be seen in Singapore. 
2.2 Hong Kong 
Among the four societies being studied, Hong Kong has the longest colonial history 
and is still a colony at the moment, though it will be returned to China in 1997. Its 
colonial history started with the rise of Britain as a leading European power and the 
decline of imperial China. The British began trading with China from the late 
eighteenth century. Initially they registered a huge trade deficit because they 
imported large amounts of silk and tea but could offer little in return. The situation 
2 In the 1997 election, the PAP gained another resounding victory, winning all but two seats. The 
prime minister Goh said that the results had shown that voters had rejected western-style liberal 
democracy and freedom and the concept of putting individual rights over that of society (FEER, 16 
Jan 1997). 
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changed when the British started exporting opium to China. Thousands of acres of 
farming land in India were forcibly converted to poppy cultivation, and the amount 
of opium entering China grew by leaps and bounds. Instead of silver pouring from 
the West into China, it now poured out of China to pay for opium. 
The Chinese government tried to ban this dangerous narcotic and limit the opium 
trade. The British responded with gunboats which led to the First Opium War. The 
war produced the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded Hong Kong, a barren island but a 
useful naval base, to Britain. In a second war in 1860, British troops advanced as far 
as the capital, Peking, and hostilities ended with the addition of the Kowloon 
peninsula to the colony of Hong Kong. In June 1898 Britain further secured a 99- 
year lease on the New Territories, which compromise 946 square km of land north of 
Kowloon and 235 small islands. The New Territories make up the largest part of 
Hong Kong's overall territory. It is the end of this lease in 1997 that will eventually 
return Hong Kong's sovereignty to China. 
Hong Kong rapidly developed as an entrepot, and handled some 40% of all China's 
foreign trade at the turn of the century. Although it later established trade with other 
Far Eastern and European countries, its prosperity was very much tied to China, 
relying on trade and immigrants from the mainland. Despite Hong Kong's 
dependence on the entrepot trade, appropriate services such as ship repairing, 
insurance and banking, had been developed. Hong Kong's population in 1900 stood 
at a quarter of a million with the majority population of Chinese immigrants ruled by 
a handful of British. The population subsequently fluctuated along with the situation 
on the Chinese mainland. The Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s resulted in 
mass immigration to Hong Kong. By the end of 1939 its population had reached 1.6 
million. But after the Japanese occupied Hong Kong many Chinese moved back. The 
population in August 1945 was reduced to 600,000 (Cameron, 1978). 
Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese in December 1941. During the War trade 
Eaded into insignificance and Hong Kong deteriorated. When the Japanese finally 
ended their four years of military rule, they left behind a war-damaged pre-industrial 
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society with no evident future. The War had shattered the old social structure. During 
the Japanese occupation, while most Westerners fled, many Chinese stayed on under 
conditions of great hardship. Consequently, although Hong Kong was re-occupied by 
the British on the Japanese surrender, the dominant role that the Chinese had come to 
play in its economic and social life could not be reversed. The influx of new 
immigrants further strengthened the role of the Chinese. About a million Chinese 
refugees flooded into Hong Kong during the civil war in China, and more came after 
the Communist victory in 1949. By 1950 the population of Hong Kong had reached 
2.3 million (Cameron, 1978). 
Among the refugees were many industrialists, especially cotton mill owners from 
Shanghai, who brought with them capital, know-how, and initiative. They were also 
accompanied or followed by skilled workers. In 1947 the first spinning mill was set 
up in Hong Kong. Within three years, the Shanghai industrialists had transferred 
their textile and clothing industry from the mainland to Hong Kong. This new 
industry was equipped with brand new, highly modem machinery. It grew rapidly 
because Southeast Asia was hungry for textiles which could not be produced in 
sufficient quantity locally. 
Despite the rapid development of the textile industry, manufacturing industry was 
still insignificant compared to the entrepot trade in 1950. Only about 10% of Hong 
Kong's exports by value were made in Hong Kong. As trade revived after the War, 
Hong Kong resumed its position as chief entrepot for European and American trade 
with the East. But its economic fortunes are deeply affected by the outbreak of the 
Korean War and the intensified Cold War. In 1951 first the United States imposed an 
embargo on imports from China, then the United Nations passed a resolution 
banning the export of strategic goods to China. Trade was drastically reduced and 
Hong Kong had to deal with a serious economic crisis. 
In contrast to Singapore, there was no concerted effort from the government to save 
Hong Kong from this economic plight. Instead, Chinese immigrants led the new 
economic development process. The newly established textile industry increased its 
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imports of cotton from poor neighbours and exported the finished products to the 
United States, Britain and other rich countries. World demand in the 1950s was high, 
and Hong Kong benefited from preferential tariff treatment by Britain. The 
successful textile industry provided the basis for an even more dynamic clothing 
industry. Within one decade, its employment multiplied twenty-one fold. The growth 
of the textile and clothing industries together, more than compensated for the loss of 
entrepot trade. The 1950s saw Hong Kong's industrial take-off, with annual 
production growth reaching 20%. For the first time, in 1959, the value of industrial 
exports exceeded that of the entrepot trade (Youngson, 1982). 
Hong Kong's success story did not stop there. Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s 
the textile and clothing industry continued to develop and dominate Hong Kong's 
overall economic development. By 1980 it accounted for 40% by value of visible 
exports made in Hong Kong. The road to success, however, was far from easy. The 
expansion of the textile and garment industries met with resistance from British 
home producers as early as 1957. The United States and other European countries 
soon followed suit, which meant that Hong Kong's textile and clothing items have 
since entered their export markets under quotas. But the industry responded by 
moving up-market as it expanded, thus enhancing the value and profits from exports 
while reducing their volume. The quality of cloth improved continuously, and the 
finished garments, with computer assisted design and production, gradually gained a 
stronghold in the world of fashion. In 1973 Hong Kong surpassed Italy to become the 
world's number one wearing apparel exporter (Peebles, 1988). 
Following textiles and clothing, the electronics and electrical industries were the next 
export success. The first electronic plants in Hong Kong could only assemble simple 
radios for Japanese companies. After continuous upgrading efforts however, Hong 
Kong began designing simple integrated circuit in the early 1980s. A similar process 
occurred in the third largest export industry, the manufacture of toys and artificial 
flowers. It started with plastic flowers and toys made in lofts and backyards in the 
late 1950s. But in a short time more and more flowers were made of silk and toys 
became electronic. 
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Thanks to the conspicuous progress of manufacturing industry Hong Kong's 
economy grew at an annual rate of 10% for two decades in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
meant that Hong Kong people were getting richer, and their conditions of life were 
improving, at a rapid pace. The industrial expansion of Hong Kong was based almost 
solely on the growth of exports with 90% of its manufacturing production exported. 
Thus its economic performance was closely linked with the world economy. The first 
oil shock and the following world recession, brought Hong Kong's GDP down to 2% 
in 1974 and 1975. But it rebounded with such vigour that the GDP expanded by 
18.8% in the next year. The fact that Hong Kong enterprises were quick to respond to 
changing conditions and to grasp and capitalise on opportunities was a major 
advantage. 
Like the other East Asian NISs, Hong Kong's economic growth was led by 
manufacturing exports. But unlike the others Hong Kong never went through the 
import-substitution stage. The stress on exports was dictated more by the lack of 
viable options than the result of a well-designed policy. Apart from a fine harbour, 
Hong Kong does not have many natural resources. It has no raw materials, no fuel, 
and not even enough water. Given the size of Hong Kong the domestic market is not 
big enough to support indigenous industry. In addition, the long history of entrepot 
trade had made Hong Kong a free port with no trade restrictions and few tariff 
barriers, which has meant that there was no way to protect domestic industry. Under 
these circumstances Hong Kong had no choice but to trade its products. 
Unlike Singapore, the major players in Hong Kong's export-led industrialisation have 
been local firms. In the early 1980s around 90% of manufacturing exports were 
originated by local companies. Most of them are small. Out of a total of 40,000 
manufacturing establishments in 1980, over 90% employed fewer than 50 workers. 
The number of small businesses actually increased with the expansion of 
manufacturing industry; in 1961 the corresponding figure was 85% (Yip, 1986). 
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The emphasis on small-scale operation in Hong Kong is hardly surprising. As in 
Taiwan, most Hong Kong enterprises were family businesses owned by local 
Chinese. With the exception of the electronics industry, most factories were started 
in a small way with personal savings and money borrowed from family members or 
relatives. Many (about 40% in the late 1970s) were operated from domestic premises, 
taking advantage of cheap public housing and the government's implicit tolerance. 
The employees were very often relatives. The role of small businesses is even more 
important in Hong Kong than in Taiwan because the industrial structure of Hong 
Kong is almost exclusively concentrated on light industry, which does not depend 
too much on operational scale and capital formation. 
The flexibility of small scale local enterprises has been at the core of Hong Kong's 
competitiveness in the world market. Very often small firms are considered 
disadvantaged because of their lack of capital, low technological skills, and few 
business connections. But these disadvantages were of less significance in Hong 
Kong due to the universal subcontracting practice. In 1977 about 75% of 
manufacturing exports were handled by import-export houses which were closely 
connected to the world market and were aware of the newest global trends. Trading 
houses provided successful designing and marketing services to small manufacturers, 
thus enabling them to integrate into the overall process of production. Furthermore, 
with an order from the purchaser small factories could negotiate loans to provide the 
working capital they need to carry the order out. While their disadvantages were 
compensated for by the merchants, the small firms have one important advantage 
over the larger ones, the ability to adapt to the ever-changing market situation. They 
could quickly change course to take advantage of an unexpected market situation or 
enter a newly discovered market with considerable speed. This gave Hong Kong 
enterprises a cutting-edge (Castells et al, 1990). 
The large number of family businesses meant that the function of the family has been 
extended into business life. And this has greatly influenced the style of business 
management, as expressed by the Chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese Bank, Sir 
Chau: 
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The principles of family organisation were applied in the business unit. There 
were those who governed and there were those who were governed, each 
according to his ability but all having an equal interest in the success of the 
operation. Acceptance of the established order, as advocated by the Confucian 
school, made it possible for persons of diverse origins to fit into a family pattern 
(quoted in England & Rear, 1981: 54). 
The relationship between employer and employee in a family-like business 
environment has gone beyond the wage-work exchange. Rather, the workplace is a 
community which provides social and emotional support to workers, and where both 
owners and workers work and play together. In the words of the proprietor of a 
medium-sized firm, 'our relationships with the craftsmen are highly personal. You 
can say that we are quite like one large family. I know many of the workers 
personally and we are quite familiar with their wants and problems' (Ann, 1977: 
325). 
Therefore, industrial relations in Hong Kong have stressed mutual co-operation and 
interdependence rather than conflict and cleavage. Many workers are disinclined to 
engage in confrontations with management because to the Chinese, harmonious 
relationships are valued highly. And since a rapidly expanding economy has made 
job hunting a rather easy task, it is often less stressful to change jobs than to have a 
dispute. Thus it is not surprising that the labour movement has been weak in Hong 
Kong. Few strikes take place and they are mostly on a small scale. 
Peaceful industrial relations has been an important factor contributing to Hong 
Kong's economic growth. An equally, if not more important factor, is the high 
quality of its entrepreneurs and workers, the most strategic of the locally available 
resources. The level of education of small entrepreneurs was high for an 
industrialising country: 65% had secondary education, and an additional 8%, higher 
education. The general quality of labour was also high despite of influx of 
immigrants. In 1975 the adult literacy rate was 90% (Lee, 1991). Better education 
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generated better performances, especially in industries requiring skills. In addition to 
their relatively high level of education, Hong Kong people are also hard working. 
The Chinese are world famous for being industrious, and this is particularly true of 
Hong Kong. Most Hong Kong Chinese are immigrants seeking to compensate for 
denied opportunities. For them being able to work and achieve a better life through 
work is the greatest pleasure in life. 
Throughout the period of rapid industrial expansion, wage increases for 
manufacturing workers in Hong Kong were kept well below productivity increases. 
Even so, the wages of Hong Kong workers were not particular low compared to 
those in other developing countries. They were about twice those of Korean workers 
for example. But Hong Kong entered the world market at an earlier period. For 
instance, although textile and garments are major exports for both Hong Kong and 
South Korea, Hong Kong had already started to produce higher-value-added fashion 
products when Korea first entered the world market. In the process of moving 
upmarket, Hong Kong competed principally with industrialised countries where 
workers earned much more. In this competition the relatively low wages in Hong 
Kong were a substantial advantage. 
It is true that the absence of active unions has limited the bargaining power of labour, 
but an equally important reason is that low wages were compensated for by the Hong 
Kong govenunent through low taxation and large subsidies in services and goods. 
According to a study made by Schiffer (1983), in 1973/74,50.2% of blue-collar 
household expenditure were provided by nonmarket forces, which came in the form 
of subsidised housing, health service, and education. The Hong Kong government 
also regulated the prices of transport, rice, and utilities; and imported foodstuffs and 
raw materials from China at an negotiated low price. A Hong Kong man working in 
the textile industry might earn less than his British counterpart, but his taxation was 
much lower, and he enjoyed subsidised housing and well-developed public transport. 
Although his flat may be less spacious, bus and train services less convenient, he 
could allocate more disposable income to his children's education, dining out, travel, 
and other personal consumption. 
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Cheap basic supplies provided by China have also played an important role in Hong 
Kong's economic development. With only 2% of the economically active population 
working in agriculture, Hong Kong's food supplies depend on imports. Through the 
1960s and the 1970s, about 80% of them were imported from China, at prices 
negotiated between the governments of both sides. On a smaller but still significant 
scale was the importation of raw materials, basic manufactured goods, water and 
fuel. The Chinese interest in maintaining economic prosperity and political stability 
of Hong Kong has meant that strategic resources have been imported at prices lower 
than those in the world market, particularly during inflationary periods. Low and 
stable prices have helped the economic process in two ways: they lower the 
production costs, especially labour costs, and they create a stable business 
environment. 
The provision of public housing, on a scale rarely seen in capitalist economies, also 
needs more discussion. Hong Kong's population rose from I million in 1948 to 5 
million in 1980, mainly as the result of immigrant flows from China. This huge 
influx of people created an urgent demand for houses. Hong Kong's housing 
programme started at the end of 1953 after a disastrous fire blazed through a squatter 
settlement, making 50,000 people homeless overnight. The original resettlement 
programme was carried on and developed into a comprehensive public housing 
programme. In the beginning the accommodation offered by the government was 
only rudimentary. Since the 1970s however, substantial improvements have been 
made, both in terms of construction quality and provision of facilities. Most people 
are tenants. Although rents increased along with the quality of the accommodation, 
the average rent is only 20% of that of private accommodation with similar 
conditions. By 1980 about 40% of Hong Kong people lived in subsidised public 
housing. This figure is rising steadily. Today about half of Hong Kong's population 
live in public housing, paying an average of 7% of their income as rent (Castells et 
al, 1990; HKGIS, 1995). 
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Another contribution to the relatively attractive business environment provided by 
the Hong Kong government is political stability. Until the mid-1980s, the Hong 
Kong goverm-nent operated on a traditional colonial pattern, which was 
undemocratic, unrepresentative and executive-led. Political activities were firmly 
discouraged, and any sign of political protest was fiercely suppressed. The local 
people had no say in either government organisation or the policy-making process. In 
a sense, there was no politics, thus no possibly destabilising confrontations between 
rival political parties. 
But the Hong Kong government could not maintain its control without the 
acceptance of its people and the support of China. When Chinese immigrants came 
to Hong Kong they brought with them the Chinese political tradition which requires 
ordinary people to cede all the responsibilities of rule to the government and to defer 
to authority. Moreover, many of them fled to Hong Kong looking for a haven of 
stability. To be involved in political action was to court the kind of trouble they had 
sought to avoid. The Chinese government across the border has also had a strong 
interest in a stable Hong Kong because of its importance as a link to western 
technology and international trade practices. Nor did they wish to confront extensive 
and well embedded democratic structures when they regain sovereignty in 1997. 
Hong Kong's economy continued to expand in the 198 Os at a rate of 7.1 % every year. 
The basis of its success remained the manufacturing sector. But at the same time it 
had increasingly moved towards a service-based economy. Since the 1970s, 
manufacturing's share of the work force has fallen, from nearly half of the total to 
only 24% in 1992, while the share accruing to tertiary services has grown from 40% 
to 60% over the same period (Segal, 1993). The main factors behind this shift have 
been the rise of Hong Kong as a financial centre and the massive relocation of 
manufacturing industry to China. 
From the 1970s Hong Kong has gradually transformed itself into a major 
international financial centre. Today it is the fourth largest in the world, after New 
York, London and Tokyo. There are more than 400 financial institutions, including 
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75 international banks. Such spectacular development was attributable to its location 
and total flexibility. The rapid economic development of the East Asian region 
demanded an international financial centre in that time zone. Hong Kong happened 
to be in the zone, and its unregulated financial markets enabled financial institutions 
to process capital flows instantly and without control at the global level. Thus more 
and more international financial institutions have been attracted to Hong Kong. 
While Hong Kong was becoming a financial and service centre, its manufacturing 
sector faced a whole set of problems. One was increasingly high production costs. 
Relative prosperity after years of rapid development and the property boom had 
resulted in relatively high wage levels and much higher land costs. Together these 
eroded Hong Kong's competitiveness in manufacturing exports. The squeeze also 
operated from the outside, with growing restrictions in many of Hong Kong's 
markets and stronger competitions from other NISs. Unlike Korea and Taiwan, little 
effort was made to diversify Hong Kong's manufacturing production and exports. Its 
industry was concentrated in sectors vulnerable to protection, particularly textiles and 
apparel. Furthermore, Hong Kong lagged behind the other NISs in technologically 
sophisticated product lines and R&D investment. 
Having realised the seriousness of these problems, the Hong Kong government 
moved away from its stance of 'positive non-interventionism' and tried to steer 
industry through administrative measures. In 1977 an advisory commission for 
diversification was established, which produced a report in 1979 arguing that the 
government should take a more active role in providing the conditions for renewed 
competitiveness for the manufacturing industry and in supporting its development. 
Based on this report, industrial policy took a new direction from the early 1980s. 
Industrial estates were built for qualified firms at substantial discounts. Government 
facilities were hugely expanded to provide information and services to 
manufacturers, in order to help them upgrade the production process and increase 
productivity. Special attention was given to manpower training and R&D 
development. The government set up a number of industrial R&D centres and a new 
University of Science and Technology was created (Youngson, 1982). 
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Hong Kong's industrialists also set out to build a future for themselves. They bought 
new machinery and upgraded product quality. But more importantly, they relocated 
production in lower-cost locations, very much like their Taiwanese counterparts. The 
process of relocation started in the 1970s, with Southeast Asia as the main 
destination. But the massive movement came after China opened up in 1979. China, 
and especially Guangdong province just across the border with easy geographical 
access and a shared culture and dialect, became the favoured place to which Hong 
Kong manufacturers moved their producing operations. Wages there are between 
one-sixth to one-twelfth of Hong Kong's, depending on how far inland the plant is 
(Lui & Chiu, 1994). 
The opening-up of China also led to the re-emergence of Hong Kong as an entrepot 
economy. Companies and capital from all over the world are pouring into China, in 
an attempt to position themselves to best advantage in this huge potential market. 
Most of this process takes place through Hong Kong. Equipped with expertise and 
contacts in dealing with China, Hong Kong provides an ideal base from which 
international companies can enter China or control their operations in China. 
Countries who have no official diplomatic relations with China but are willing to 
trade also find Hong Kong an ideal middleman. Many other economic activities such 
as financial services, tourism and money transfers have flourished because of the 
revival of entrepot trade. Together, they have reinforced the role of Hong Kong as an 
international financial and business service centre. I 
After the signing of the Sino-British Agreement in 1984 the colony entered a new 
stage of economic prosperity. But in June 1989, when Chinese troops opened fire on 
students in Tiananmen Square, Hong Kong began to slide into another crisis. Initially 
the crisis seemed to be more political than economic. Economic ties with China 
continued to flourish, and overseas investment in Hong Kong continued to rise. After 
the economy achieved 7% growth in 1988, it slid to a still-respectable rate of 5% in 
1989. 
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However, the political uncertainty was bound to have some impacts on the Hong 
Kong economy. One was the investment diversification of British firms. Half the 
colony's 529 listed firms are now domiciled in Bermuda, following the lead of the 
British Conglomerate, Jardine Matheson, the biggest, most stylish and aristocratic 
company in Hong Kong. After moving its domicile to the Bahamas in 1984, it 
switched its main public listing to the London stock exchange in 1991. Jardine and 
its five blue-chip subsidiaries make up more than 10% of Hong Kong's local market 
capitalisation. Its retreat from Hong Kong dealt a severe blow to business confidence. 
Another move with no less an impact on Hong Kong's economy came from the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the de facto central bank of Hong Kong. 
After taking over the Midland Bank of Britain, it has gradually transferred its assets 
to London with the intention that the bank in the future will be a UK-based 
international banking group (Mushkat, 1990; The Sunday Times, 25 June 1995). 
The other major impact of the continuing political uncertainty surrounding the 1997 
hand-over is the brain drain from Hong Kong. There has always been a steady stream 
of emigrants from Hong Kong, but it accelerated in the late 1980s. The figure for 
emigration rose steeply from 20,000 a year in the early 1980s to 60,000 in 1991. 
More than one third were professionals and experienced administrative personnel. 
Without the trained support staff of lawyers, accountants, doctors, computer 
specialists and engineers, the success of Hong Kong as a business centre will fade. 
Some emigrants, having fulfilled residence requirements in their adoptive country, 
have returned to Hong Kong to work and live, safe in the possession of a foreign 
3 passport. But as of now this is only a small portion (Baker, 1993) . 
In spite of the Tiananmen massacre and later problems over the issue of political 
reform, the Hong Kong economy has gained momentum through closer integration 
with the fast growing economy of the mainland. Hong Kong manufacturers have 
continued to move their businesses across the border to take advantage of cheap land 
and labour. An estimated five million people are employed in the Pearl River Delta 
by Hong Kong manufacturing enterprises. China has become the most important 
3 The return rate of emigrants rose quickly in 1995 and 1996, to 20% to 30% (FEER, I May 1997). 
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trading partner of Hong Kong. According to the figures for 1992, China was the 
largest source of Hong Kong's imports with 37% of the total. It also had the second 
largest share of Hong Kong's domestic exports, and the largest share of re-exports 
(UNCTAD, 1994). 
Cross investments between Hong Kong and the mainland have also proliferated. 
Hong Kong, as the number one foreign investor, has accounted for 64% of the direct 
foreign investment committed to China since 1979. China in turn has become the 
largest investor in Hong Kong, injecting an estimated US$20 billion into the territory 
in 1992. To facilitate this trend, new regulations were passed in June 1993 permitting 
Chinese companies to be listed on the Hong Kong exchange. Now the Hang Seng 
Index reflects perceptions of risk in both China and Hong Kong. As the 
interdependence of the Hong Kong and Chinese economies has grown, entrepreneurs 
in the territory have sought to reduce investment risk and increase opportunities by 
allying themselves with government and party officials in China. Economically, 
Hong Kong is already a part of China (Walsh, 1994; RMRB, 25 January 1995). 
Although business interests are pressing for closer ties with the mainland, the 
political development of Hong Kong has prompted more and more battles between 
the British (Hong Kong) and Chinese government. Until 1984 the constitutional 
position of Hong Kong had remained virtually the same as when it was created in 
1843, mainly as a result of the intentions of both the Hong Kong authorities and the 
British government to keep tight control of the colony. But it was also in accordance 
with a significant section of public opinion which favoured maintaining the 
traditional system. Hong Kong was a place built by refugees who came to find a 
temporary shelter but were forced to stay by situations beyond their control. These 
people, either fleeing the tyranny of the Qing Dynasty, the civil war, or the harshness 
of life in Mao's China, chose Hong Kong with the clear knowledge of its 
authoritarian colonial rule. Their interests lay primarily in commercial opportunities, 
not in national pride or political freedom and democracy. They tolerated 
unrepresentative colonial rule as long as it allowed them to pursue their economic 
goals. 
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However, the economic prosperity brought about by the hard work of the refugees 
has produced a new group of people, the young middle class, who are the major 
internal force altering the course of Hong Kong politics. Being bom in Hong Kong, 
they identify the territory as their 'home'. They are well-educated, having learned the 
ideals of democracy in university. As their number has increased and their power has 
strengthened, they have demanded more political participation. 
Their demands developed into a concerted effort to press for democratisation in the 
1980s due to the uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong's future brought about by the 
Sino-British talks. The prospect of the retrocession of Hong Kong endangered the 
interests of the new middle class who are trained in a British education system and 
gained their professional competence under British regulations. They felt a sense of 
urgency to push for democratic reforms so that a representative government would be 
firmly in place before the Communists assume control. Democratisation became a 
means to protect them from the interference of China in their daily affairs (So & 
Kwitko, 1990). 
The democratic movement however, faced strong opposition from both Beijing and 
the business class in Hong Kong. Initially the new middle class also had difficulties 
in enlisting support from an apolitical general public. However, the Chinese student 
democratic movement and its tragic ending in June 1989 provided an unlooked for 
impetus. Since Hong Kong people believed that'today's China is tomorrow's Hong 
Kong', two million of them attended street demonstrations in support of the mainland 
students. At the centre of the leadership were middle class political activists. The 
Tianarimen massacre shattered the Hong Kong people's hope for a more democratic 
China. While large numbers of people chose to leave, many others became more 
determined to press for political reforms and take the responsibility for Hong Kong's 
fate into their own hands (Hook, 1993). 
After signing the Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong authorities also proceeded with a 
cautious gradualist expansion of democracy. Political reforms were introduced partly 
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in response to local pressure, but more important was the British assumption that a 
local government with its authority firmly rooted in Hong Kong would be the best 
way to safeguard British interests after 1997. Under the influence of both the British 
and Chinese goverm-nent everything went smoothly, albeit at a slow pace, until 1992, 
when the new Governor, Chris Patten, announced proposals to speed up the process 
of democratisation. Patten's plan to extend the franchise in the 1994 and 1995 
elections was in sharp contrast with the executive-led government conceived by the 
Chinese government, and led to a bitter conflict between China and Britain. 
The response of the Hong Kong people was divided. In contrast to the stance of the 
new middle class, the business community seems to believe that avoidance of 
confrontation and the promotion of business are a better guarantee for the future than 
the promotion of democracy. For them, there is little perceived need to create a major 
crisis over political representation so long as Beijing remains committed to economic 
reforms. The Hong Kong elites have also followed a long line of modem capitalist 
elites in arguing that at the present stage of Hong Kong's political development, 
ordinary people who are inexperienced and not sufficiently educated can easily be 
manipulated by self-seeking politicians. Therefore, direct elections may not 
necessarily produce a fair and true representation of the opinions and interests 
(Wilson, 1990). 
Certainly, there is evidence of considerable popular apathy towards the electoral 
process. In the three consecutive Urban Council and District Board elections in the 
1980s, the electoral turnout wavered between 17.6% and 3 8%. Even in the first direct 
elections for the Legislative Council (Legco) in 1991, held against the background of 
the 1989 crisis, only 39% of registered voters participated. The low turnout seemed 
to signify political apathy and an unwillingness to confront China with a contentious 
issue. In a survey conducted in October 1993,78.6% of respondents agreed that 
Hong Kong people needed to stand up for democracy. Yet in the same survey, 56.6% 
thought the governor should not implement the reforms in the absence of an 
agreement with China. Other polls conducted in the same period also indicated that a 
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better relationship with China was valued more than democracy or political reform 
(Bums, 1994). 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
Many factors have contributed to the rapid economic growth of Singapore and Hong 
Kong. The most important is the role of state. In Singapore the government has 
provided fiscal and financial incentives, established its own enterprises, and 
intervened extensively in the labour market. In Hong Kong, the goverm-nent is not 
interventionist in the classic sense. But it has provided subsidised housing and 
regulated the prices of essential living materials. This has lowered wages, thus 
lowering production costs and increasing competitiveness. Another important factor 
is the people who have spearheaded growth. In Singapore they are the skilled 
English-speaking workers. In Hong Kong they are the entrepreneurs and workers 
who have worked extremely long hours under poor conditions. Unquestionably both 
Singapore and Hong Kong have adopted highly effective growth-inducing policies, 
but it is their engaged governments and hard-working people that have made those 
policies work. 
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Chapter 3 
The Distinctive Features of East Asian Capitalist 
Development 
3.1 Situational Factors 
While the credit for East Asian economic development ultimately rests with the East 
Asians themselves, most observers argue that foreign powers have played an 
important role. It was the Japanese occupation of Korea and Taiwan and British 
colonialism in Singapore and Hong Kong that laid the foundations for their modem 
economies. As described in earlier chapters, the Japanese made heavy investments in 
Korean and Taiwanese agriculture in order to supply their home demands. This 
resulted in a relatively well-developed agricultural sector in each economy. To 
prepare for territorial expansion and war, they also made concerted efforts to 
industrialise the two economies. These efforts transformed overall structures, shifting 
them from a mainly agrarian to a moderately industrialised mode. In addition, the 
Japanese invested heavily in education and infrastructure, sections which were to 
become key building blocks for later economic take-off. Efficient central government 
organisation and Japanese styled corporations also provided influential models both 
for Korea's future government and for business owners, although the impact was less 
strong in Taiwan because its government was transplanted directly from the 
mainland. 
While Korean and Taiwanese industrialisation really only gathered speed during the 
twentieth century, Singapore and Hong Kong developed rather earlier as a result of 
their role as important centres of entrepot trade under the British empire. Between 
1871 and 1902, Singapore's trade grew six-fold, from an annual average of S$ 67 
million to S$431 million. During the next 25 years, there was a further four-fold 
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increase comprised primarily of the trades in rubber, tin, petroleum, and other 
commodities and manufactured products (Miline & Mauzy, 1990). Similar 
developments occurred in Hong Kong, where the tax-free policy until the beginning 
of World War 11 helped to maintain the buoyancy of the economy. The first bank 
opened in 1845 and was soon joined by others, among them the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1864. By 1898,11,000 ships with a total tonnage 
of over 13 million cleared Hong Kong harbour, and the colony's total trade was in the 
region of five million pounds sterling. By the 1950s both Singapore and Hong Kong 
had already reached a relatively high standard of living (Endacott, 1964). 
Since the end of World War 11 however, the dominant international player in East 
Asia has unquestionably been the United States. In an effort to prevent communist 
expansion in the region the US sought to establish its hegemony over the whole of 
East Asia, and South Korea and Taiwan in particular. In the process the US poured 
disproportionately large shares of its foreign aid budget into the two places: $12.6 
billion to South Korea, and $5.6 billion to Taiwan between 1946 and 1976 (Woo, 
1991). On a per capita basis, aid to Taiwan was the highest given to any country in 
the world. Arguably however, even more important than the financial aid was the 
influx of American experts who taught East Asians modem technology and 
management. It was the American advisers that pushed and backed Korea and 
Taiwan to adopt export oriented industrialisation strategies in the face of widespread 
pessimism that manufactured exports could be expanded only slowly. 
Hong Kong and Singapore in contrast, received less direct American aid and had few 
American advisers. Nevertheless, they benefited from the stimulus their economies 
received from the demand for services to the allied troops during the Korean and 
Vietnam wars. Together with Korea and Taiwan, they also enjoyed an open 
American market for their cheap labour-intensive exports without the US demanding 
reciprocity. Since then the US has been the number one recipient of the East Asian 
NISs'exports. 
73 
3.2 The Export Orientation of the East Asian NISs 
Perhaps the most discussed feature of East Asian development is the fact that their 
industrial expansion has been accompanied by a rapid growth of relatively labour- 
intensive manufactured exports. A common measure of an economy's export 
orientation is the share of exports in GDP. As shown in Table 3.1, by the late 1980s, 
nearly half of Korea's output was being exported while exports of goods and services 
accounted for less than 10% of its GDP in 1965. In the case of Taiwan, the share of 
exports in GDP more than tripled from 19% in 1965 to nearly 60% in 1987. The 
figures for Hong Kong and Singapore are much affected by the tradition of the 
entrepot trade. They already had high export-GDP ratios at the beginning of the 
period and the importation of inputs for processing to export even raised the ratio 
above 100%. Even so, they increased their exported output, though to a lesser extent. 
The performances of the East Asian NISs appear quite staggering compared with 
developing countries as an overall group. 
Table 3.1 Exports of goods and services (% GDP). 
1965 1980 1990 
Korea 9 34 32 
Taiwan 19 53 46 
Singapore 123 205 190 
Hong Kong 71 88 137 
Developing market 
economies 
16(l) 26 24 
Sources: UNCTAD, various issues. 
Note: (1) 1960 figure. 
The East Asian NISs have also increased their collective share in world exports. With 
only 1.45% of the world's population, the four East Asian economies accounted for 
7.6% of world exports in 1989, a very rapid rise from the meagre figure of 1.6% in 
1965. This occurred despite the slowdown in world trade and the increases in the 
74 
protectionist barriers erected by developed countries. This suggests that the resilience 
of the East Asian NISs lies in their ability to exploit world markets and their capacity 
to increase the supply of exports. Internal factors, particularly the presence of 
political leaderships committed to growth, also appear to be important in affecting a 
country's external trade and economic growth. 
The major sector in East Asian export expansion is manufacturing. This accounted 
for almost 90% of all East Asian NISs' exports in 1989. In terms of the total world 
manufacturing market, the four economies produced nearly 9% of all exports, which 
is over half of the total figure for developing countries as a whole. This is all the 
more remarkable given that the East Asian NISs began their export drive from a very 
moderate base. In 1960, primary goods, mainly agricultural commodities, accounted 
for 86% of Korea's exports and 73% of Taiwan's. The performance of Singapore is 
also quite remarkable since its share of manufactures in merchandise exports was 
only 26% in 1965. The role of manufactures in Hong Kong's merchandise exports, 
however, has declined recently. This trend is consistent with the mass relocation of 
manufacturing industry to mainland China. 
Given the strong export orientation of these economies and the predominance of 
manufactured goods in exports, many scholars have labelled the growth pattern of 
East Asia as 'export-led industrialisation'. It has become commonplace to understand 
the economic growth of the East Asian NISs as export-driven. Neo-classical 
economists in particular present it as a perfect illustration of their case that a 
commitment to free trade is the central institutional ingredient which ensures 
economic success. 
The expansion of manufactured exports has undoubtedly proved to be an essential 
part of successful industrialisation in East Asia. However, as noted in the previous 
chapters, none of the East Asian NISs chose to concentrate on exports because they 
felt that it was the most appropriate development strategy in the long-term. Rather, 
their economic policies have tended to be pragmatic and incremental, responding to 
immediate crises and short-term dilemmas rather than to long-range plans and 
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comprehensive schemes for change. Export-oriented policies were adopted because 
their domestic markets were not large enough to support an effective scale of 
industrial production and they suffered acute problems of foreign exchange shortage. 
Only later did these related incremental decisions became established as de, facto 
longer-term development strategies. 
Moreover, whether incremental or systematic, a commitment to exports is ultimately 
a political decision which presupposes the existence of a strong government with the 
ability to withstand pressures from domestic business groups, to channel limited 
resources into selected strategic industries, to maintain wages at competitive levels, 
and to implement stable and predictable macroeconomic policies. 
3.3 The Role of the State 
In varying forms and to varying degrees, the East Asian NISs have all developed 
powerful states which have enjoyed an exceptional degree of relative autonomy from 
other major power holding sectors of society. In Korea, Park Chung Hee gained 
power through military coup, which enabled him to free his rule from entangling 
personal and economic connections with groups in civil society. In Taiwan, the fact 
that the whole government was transplanted from the mainland produced a high 
degree of independence from local pressure groups. In Singapore, Lee Kuan-yew 
emerged as a charismatic leader of the early anticolonial struggles and was therefore 
not beholden to the local business community. And in Hong Kong, colonial rule was 
not overly concerned with local opinion. 
With the partial exception of Hong Kong, the respective governments of the East 
Asian NISs have all been genuinely committed to economic development and have 
intervened actively to promote and guide export-oriented industrial expansion. They 
have set the overall direction of their economies and encouraged the growth of some 
specifically chosen industries. To achieve their targets, they have controlled access to 
finance as a key source of both incentives and discipline, created elite bureaucracies 
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to insulate policy making from pressure groups, and contained labour demands to 
maintain competitive prices for exported products. Even in Hong Kong, the 
government has invested heavily in the public sector, particularly public housing, and 
regulated the prices of basic goods and services in order to keep wages low. 
The principle instrument of governmental intervention in the East Asian NISs has 
been control over capital. By this means the governments are able to discriminate 
between industrial sectors, to discipline private enterprises, and to check the 
influence of transnational corporations. In Korea, the government created the 
chaebols by encouraging private companies to maximise economies of scale in order 
to compete with large companies in international markets. The chaebols depended 
heavily on bank credit for financing, and since the commercial banks and other 
financial institutions were owned by the government, it had the power to subsidise 
their growth or to check them. The Korean government, in addition, regulated foreign 
investment and trade, controlled access to raw materials, selectively provided 
infrastructural services to industries and strategic regions, and invested heavily in 
education and skill development. 
Taiwan took on the attributes of an entrepreneurial state by setting up state-owned 
enterprises in strategic industries. The government owned one of the biggest public 
enterprise sectors in the non-communist world and monopolised it by severely 
limiting investment from foreign companies. Controls over the financial system also 
enabled it to direct private investment into selected industries through incentives and 
concessional credit. Moreover, the Taiwanese government used subsidises to 
encourage selected industries competing in the international market and protected 
nominated domestic industries from foreign competition by setting high tariffs. 
In Singapore, the government invested heavily in social and physical infrastructure to 
create an attractive business environment. It provided numerous fiscal and monetary 
incentives and generous tax exemptions in preferred areas of production. More 
importantly, it engaged directly in economic activities to initiate and manage a host 
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of vital business enterprises. As mentioned in Chapter Two, state-owned enterprises 
are the major player among local businesses. 
The other important area of government invention has been the control of labour. The 
East Asian NISs are poorly endowed with natural resources. The major development 
resource available to them is therefore their workforces, and the competitive 
advantage their exports enjoy on the international market is based on low labour 
costs. To maintain this advantage, their respective governments have intervened 
extensively to keep wage increases below increases in labour productivity. In Korea, 
labour laws which consistently favoured employers over workers have been 
rigorously enforced and backed by police coercion. In Taiwan, martial law and the 
comprehensive suppression of opposition silenced dissent in early years. Until 
recently trade unions in both societies had never been allowed into political parties, 
and strikes and other labour activities had been illegal. 
In Singapore, the initially militant, communist-led unions were effectively 
incorporated into the state decision making process. By the 1960s labour had become 
responsive to state policy, leaving workers to respond individually to the changing 
market situation rather than through collective action. Singapore and Hong Kong 
could also manipulate the flow of immigrants from neighbouring countries as a 
means of countering rising wages. And both used public housing and welfare 
services to subsidise labour costs. 
The states in the East Asian NISs have been able to play a positive role in economic 
development because they have enjoyed an unusually high degree of autonomy and 
have effectively used this autonomy. They have also been able to avoid the 
debilitating rent-seeking and other nondevelopmental state-economy relations 
typically found in other developing countries because the implicit bargain they have 
reached with their people is to develop their economies in return for political 
quiescence. 
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We have noted earlier that the new governments established after World War 11 in the 
East Asian NISs were less beholden to traditional elites. They were able to make 
policy decisions without entering into extensive bargaining with major interest 
groups. This was made easier by the fact that powerful rural based landed interests 
were largely absent in the initial period of industrial expansion and the capitalist class 
was relatively small and weak. In Hong Kong and Singapore traditional rural elites 
did not exit at all, and in Korea and Taiwan their power bases were severely 
undermined by land reform. Indigenous capitalist enterprises mostly started on a 
small scale, and were often family based, with the exception of the Korean chaebols, 
which were in a sense created and managed by the Park government. 
Another important source of state autonomy in the East Asian NISs however, is their 
common culture, Confucianism. Both the Chinese and the Koreans have had a long 
history of being governed by a centralised bureaucracy which is essentially 
authoritarian in nature and is allowed to formulate policy goals independently of 
particular groups. The Confucian culture reveres hierarchy, accepting gradations of 
rank and merit as natural. Traditionally governments in East Asia were the 
unquestioned dominant institutions in the society. All segments of the society were 
expected to yield to the govemrnent as the guiding force of the collectivity. In 
modem East Asian societies Confucianism still provides powerful ideological 
support for their strong, authoritarian governments. 
The same cultural factor also helps to explain why government did not fail in East 
Asia. People defer to the government not only because it is the legal authority, but 
also because in return for their allegiance, it is expected to be responsible for their 
livelihood and well-being. The strong ethical-moral basis of government within the 
Confucian tradition requires authority to act to ensure this outcome. Providing this 
bargain is kept, authoritarian practices are often accepted as appropriate by East 
Asians. However, if the government fails to provide an acceptable quality of life or 
appears weak and indecisive, the people have an ideological licence to protest and 
oppose. Therefore the necessity for the East Asian governments to ensure economic 
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prosperity is rooted in the morally binding power of the reciprocal relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled. 
3.4 The Quality of Human Resources 
East Asians are famous for being industrious and highly committed to work. These 
characteristic are clearly exemplified by the long working hours that characterise the 
'dragon' economies (see Table 3.2). In recent years these have ranged from 54 hours 
to 45 hours per week. While people's attitudes towards work vary from place to 
place, the common underlying work ethic can be linked to prevailing cultural values. 
The Confucian ethic requires diligence and hard work not only as a desirable habit 
but as an essential quality leading to personal success. 
Table 3.2 Hours of work per week in manufacturing. 
1980 1991 
Korea 53.1 49.9 
Taiwan 44.0 46.4 
Singapore 48.0 48.7 
Hong Kong 49.1 45.2 
Gennany 
- 
41.6 39.2 
US 
r t 
39.7 40.7 
Sources: ILO; CEPD. 
The strength of the work ethic in East Asia may be inferred from the maintenance of 
long hours of work despite growing affluence and rapidly rising real wages. Usually 
rising affluence is accompanied by a steady decline in working hours as the demand 
for leisure increases and unions are able to successfully negotiate a shorter working 
week. This inverse relationship between affluence and working hours is clearly 
absent in East Asia as Table 3.2 shows. This is more readily understandable if we 
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remember that the working hours shown in the table are not simply the hours 
negotiated between employers and employees, but include voluntary overtime. When 
people work hard because it is the 'right' thing to do, they do not stop when they 
become rich. 
One important measurement of the quality of human resources is the level of 
education. It is widely accepted that an investment in education and human capital 
promotes economic growth through its contribution to the enhanced productivity of 
the labour force. Miller (1967) further argues that given a normal life expectancy of 
60 years, investment in education is more durable than investment in other kinds of 
resources. The East Asian NISs have achieved a relatively high standard of education 
with full primary school registration and near 100% adult literacy rates. Compared to 
other countries with similar or even higher living standard, their workforces are 
unusually literate and well-trained. As can be seen from Table 3.3, improvements in 
secondary and tertiary education have been substantial, with Korea registering the 
most progress. As a whole, the NISs have higher enrolment rates than Brazil, another 
much analysed newly industrialising country. The difference in secondary education 
is particularly striking with the average figure double that of Brazil. Even so, Korea's 
performance stands out among the NISs. Its secondary enrolment ratio has risen from 
27% to 94% while the relevant figure is below 80% for the other Asian NISs. In 
terms of enrolment ratios in higher education, Korea's achievement of 32% is again 
the best performance, compared to the lowest, 12%, in Singapore. Furthermore, 
while achievements in enrolment ratios in secondary and higher education in other 
East Asian NISs still lagged behind the UK, the oldest industrial society, Korea's 
record by 1985 was considerably better. 
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Table 3.3 Secondary and tertiary education enrolment ratios. 
Secondary Tertiary 
1960 1985 1960 1985 
Korea 27 94 5 32 
Taiwan 30 76 3 22 
Singapore 32 71 6 12 
Hong Kong 20 69 4 13 
Brazil 11 36 2 11 
UK 66 84 9 22 
Sources: Chowdhury and Islam (1993: 152), Sakong (1993: 236). 
It is clear that the NISs have done well in terms of education with Korea leading the 
way and Hong Kong and Singapore lagging somewhat behind. This general pattern 
of rapid expansion is not particularly surprising since an emphasis on education has 
been one of the most prominent features of Confucian culture, although in Singapore 
and Hong Kong, the British tradition of elite schooling has cut across the Confucian 
conception of meritocratic education, and has arguably contributed to their relatively 
poor performances among the East Asian NISs. Zeal for education comes not only 
from parents, teachers and students. Governments too have devoted considerable 
resources to the expansion of their education systems. Central government 
expenditure on education in all four East Asian NISs in 1990 was over 17% of total 
government expenditure, compared to a corresponding figure of 3.2% of Britain. In 
Taiwan, it is written into the constitution that government expenditure on education 
should not constitute less than 15% of total expenditure. 
3.5 Peaceful Industrial Relations 
Another much commented upon quality of labour forces in East Asia is their 
obedience. Before the democratisation movements of the mid-1980s, the number of 
82 
0 
strikes was very low in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Korea had more frequent and 
more militant strikes, but its record was still better than that of most other developing 
countries. For instance, the average number of strikes and lockouts per year during 
the 1960s was 18.4 for Korea and 99.3 for Mexico (ILO, various issues). The figure 
for the 1970s was 80.0 for Korea and 422.4 for Mexico. In Korea the major chaebols 
brought together large numbers of serniprotected male workers, inadvertently 
producing volatile conditions for labour militancy. In Singapore although worker 
days lost through strikes remained high during the period of the independence 
movement, the incidence of industrial stoppages has been negligible since the late 
1960s. Indeed, the number of strikes and worker days lost actually reached zero in 
1978 (Leggett, 1993). 
Several factors have contributed to the relative industrial peace in the East Asian 
NISs. The most obvious is the presence of repressive labour legislation. All East 
Asian governments have tried to control the labour movement, but the Singaporean 
government has been the most successful. Because its development strategy 
emphasised foreign investment and international competitiveness, stable industrial 
relations had a special importance to Singapore. In 1967, strikes and lockouts in 
essential services were banned in the name of protecting the public interest. After a 
sweeping victory in 1968, the PAP proceeded to enforce even stricter labour 
discipline. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill restricted the range of issues 
on which unions could negotiate and gave employers the right to decide the length of 
the working week, retrenchment, retirement, and other fringe benefits. In the same 
year, the Employment Act enshrined in legislation the principle that wage 
negotiations should be based on economic growth and efficiency, rather than on 
abstract notions of justice. This was consistent with the then current 'ideology of 
survival' which demanded the subordination of individual or class interests to a 
national interest identified with the ultimate goal of economic growth. 
The management of compliance is an ongoing process in Singapore. After the 
militant labour movement was subdued, the government started to promote company 
loyalty, team spirit, and the 'will to productivity' in the workforce. In 1980, Lee Kuan 
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Yew identified the Japanese system of industrial relations, characterised by a close 
co-operative spirit between employer and employee, as a suitable model for 
Singapore to emulate. Following his speech, an intense campaign was waged to 
promote the close association between team work and productivity and the 
fundamental importance of developing worker/employer relations. At the same time, 
the NTUC proceeded to restructure affiliated unions and committed them more 
firmly to non-confrontational stances on industrial relations. In 1982, the Trade 
Unions (Amendment) Act defined the role of trade unions as being to promote good 
industrial relations between employees and employers, to improve working 
conditions, and to raise productivity for the mutual benefit of employees, employers, 
and the nation. 
Another factor contributing to the relatively untroubled industrial relations in East 
Asia, which applies especially to Taiwan and Hong Kong, is the prevalence of small 
and medium-sized local businesses in the manufacturing industry. In 1980, more than 
90% of companies in manufacturing sector belonged to this category in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Very often the owners of these finus are former employees who started 
their businesses with personal savings. And the hard core of the workers are family 
members. Therefore effective and direct communication between workers and 
owners is easily achieved. If there are labour disputes, they tend to be settled 
informally. Open confrontations are avoided. Also, because of the large number of 
establishments in any given industry and the small number of workers in a given 
establishment, strong union structures are difficult to develop and labour militancy 
finds it difficult to take root. 
Finally it can be argued that industrial relations in contemporary East Asian societies 
are underpined by the tradition of paternalist relations between employers and 
employees. In these societies the company exists as a social group and the workers 
have a strong sense of belonging. While the company devotes a considerable amount 
of time and money to the employees' social well-being, they, in turn, feel obligated to 
further the interest of the company. Many companies provide free or subsidised 
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meals, free transport to work, subsidised accommodation, free medical treatment, and 
various kinds of free entertainment. These firms are also less likely than the TNCs to 
release workers in recession, but more likely to give lower pay and ask workers to 
work long or irregular hours. When workers look to the company for their medical 
and welfare benefits and enjoy a certain job security, they see the success of the 
company as important. Therefore they are less likely to perceive conflicts between 
their interests and those of their employers. 
In their study of industrial relations in Hong Kong, England and Rear quote a letter 
from the managing director of a large industrial concern which perfectly catches the 
ethos of industrial paternalism; 
The relationship we have with our employees is rather paternal and we de- 
emphasise the subject of contracts and, as a rule, we offer financial assistance to 
employees of good standing if the need of such assistance is legitimate. As a 
whole, we find the labour relationship to be a happy one, and we certainly have 
not indulged in any collective bargaining and we hope there will not be any 
necessity for this in future (England & Rear, 1981: 90). 
The company is often likened to the family. 'When asked about employee relations a 
frequent response from these employers is that there should be no conflict and that a 
firm is like a family where the head must look after the others' (England & Rear, 
1981: 85). This belief is shared by the workers. In a survey which covered a sample 
of 1000 workers, 63% were found to believe that'the employer of a firm should look 
after the interests of his workers like the head of a large family' (Turner et al., 1980: 
198). 
Janelli's study of corporate culture in a South Korean chaebol confinns this point. He 
found that the chaebol personnel were frequently represented as a family. 
The conglomerate's chairman opened his New Year's address to a gathering of its 
directors by addressing them as 'Taesong family members'. An employee 
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contributing an essay to the company's magazine introduced himself by saying, 'I 
became a member of the Taesong family in 1975. ... A managing director wrote 
in the chaebol's magazine that the proper management of subordinates was like 
the proper education of children (1993: 118). 
Therefore, in many ways employer/employee relations in the East Asian companies 
follow the general Confucian view of appropriate authority relations based on the 
model of family. 
3.6 The High Rate of Saving 
One further distinctive feature of the East Asian NISs is their very high rate of 
domestic savings (Table 3.4). Growth and industrialisation require investment and 
the level of investment depends in large part on the availability of savings. Sufficient 
amounts of savings help to keep inflation low and to reduce the amount of foreign 
borrowing, thereby helping to overcome two of the common problems in developing 
countries. 
Table 3.4 Gross domestic savings (% GDP) 
1960 1965 1970 1970s 1981-90 
Korea 1 8 15 22.6 31.8 
Taiwan 13 22 26 31.4 32.9 
Singapore -3 10 21 28.6 42.3 
Hong Kong 6 29 25 19.2 30.5 
Sources: Chowdhury and Islam (1993: Table 8.1); World Bank; Asian Development 
Bank 
During their periods of rapid growth all four East Asian societies had above-average 
rates of investment which were, in turn, linked to their very high rate of domestic 
savings. In the 1950s both Korea and Taiwan financed well over half their 
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investment from foreign aid. This initial dynamic of aid-financed growth enabled 
them to finance later investment without aid. Beginning in the 1960s their levels of 
domestic savings increased dramatically. Although Korea continued to benefit from 
foreign capital, it financed about two-thirds of its investment out of domestic savings, 
the remainder being financed by capital imports. Taiwan eliminated its reliance on 
foreign capital altogether, and even became a major exporter of capital by 1984 
(Papanek, 1988). 
Throughout its recent history, Singapore has relied heavily on foreign capital, in the 
form of both investment and borrowing. But more importantly it has been able to 
mobilise domestic savings to finance investment. By combining an exceptional rate 
of domestic savings with an equally exceptional rate of foreign savings inflow, 
Singapore has been able to generate substantial and efficient capital investment for 
economic growth. In Hong Kong, the savings rate increased from 6% to 29% over 
the five years from 1960 to 1965. In the critical period of the economic take-off 
therefore, Hong Kong financed its investment largely from its own savings. 
The widely accepted consensus in economic theory explains high savings as the 
consequence of economic growth. And high savings, in turn, provide a basis for high 
investment, which facilitates high growth, thereby creating a virtuous cycle. But this 
theory cannot explain why the East Asian NISs have had much higher rates of saving 
than other countries at similar levels of development. 
Of the available explanations, the most often advanced are: (i) the insufficiency of 
social security benefits, which forces people to save for their old age; and (ii) the 
limited availability of consumer credit and mortgage loans, which renders it difficult 
for people without accumulated savings to purchase major items (Scitovsky, 1990). 
Government policies are also said to have played an important role. In Singapore 
particularly, about 64% of gross national savings came from the surpluses of the 
statutory boards and the government budget surplus in 1984. And this figure does not 
include compulsory savings in the form of the Central Provident Fund, which 
contributed a further 30% of gross national savings (Lim et al., 1988). 
87 
Apart from the case of Singapore however, household savings are the major 
component of domestic savings in the East Asian NISs. Scitovsky (1990) has studied 
the possible determinants of household savings in an effort to account for the 
economic performance of Taiwan and Korea. In addition to the inadequacy of social 
security benefits and the limited availability of consumer credit and mortgage loans, 
he cites the need for savings to establish independent businesses or to enlarge 
existing businesses, the existence of a bonus component in the wages system, and 
high real interest rates on deposits as among the possible reasons for high household 
savings rates. 
But one factor that is often neglected by economists is the fact that the East Asian 
NISs are Confucian societies The Confuciaft ethic extols prudence and frugality, 
demands sacrifice for future enjoyment, and condemns parents who fail to provide 
for their offspring. The emphasis on prudence and frugality provides a strong moral 
basis for an accumulation of savings. By the same token, borrowing is disapproved of 
and often associated with the inability of someone to work and save by themselves. 
This is clearly shown in the style of setting up private businesses in the East Asian 
NISs, where people tend to start in a small way by using their savings, sometimes 
helped with money borrowed from relatives. 
East Asian people are also willing to forego current spending on personal enjoyment 
in order to invest in the future of their children. To have successful children is one of 
the biggest achievements an East Asian can hope for. And to achieve this they have 
to save for their children's education. As mentioned before, the governments have 
already invested heavily on education. But education is so highly valued and the 
competition to enter university is so intense that parents will also buy their children 
numerous private lessons. If the children succeed, more money has to be saved to pay 
for their higher education. 
I Although there is no comprehensive study on the relationship between the Confucian ethic and the 
saving behaviour in the Far East, Horioka, in a literature survey, cites numerous analysts who propose 
that the Japanese people's tendency to save 'is due in large part to their Confucian heritage' 
(1990: 56). 
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In western industrial societies people borrow. In Confucian societies people save. 
This disposition comes from deeply ingrained habits of frugality, and from the desire 
to save for the continuity of the family. 
3.7 Income Distribution 
The final important feature associated with the economic development of the East 
Asian NISs is the relatively equitable distribution of income. While their rates of 
economic growth are the highest among developing countries, their degree of income 
inequality is among the lowest (Figure 3.1). Moreover all four narrowed their income 
gap over most of the period of rapid economic development. 
Figure 3.1 Income inequality and growth of GDP per capita, 1965-89 
8 
7 
a 
0 6 
CL 
(1) 5 r-L 
a- 
04 
(D 
4- 
03 
-I-- '5 0 22 (9 
1 
0 
0 
South K6rea 
00 
------ Taiwafý --- OSingapme ---------- ------------ 
OHond Kong 
------------- ------------- ------------ 4 ------------ 
, PChina 
------------- -------------------------- ------------ OlEgypt Malaysia 
0 OTIýailand 0 
------------- ------------- ------------ ------------ Indonesia 
dMauritius 
-------------- ------------- ------------- ------------ 0 Morocca 6. Mexico 
--------------------------- L ------------ ------------ 0 Uruguaýo Posta Rica 
-------------- ------------- ------------- ------------ OChile 
OArgenti. na 
5 10 15 20 
Income inequality* 
#Multiple of the income of the richest 20% to the income of the poorest 20%. 
Source: The Economist, 16 November 1991. 
89 
According to Kuznets' U-curve hypothesis (1955), during the course of a nation's 
development, income distribution gets worse before it gets better. Table 3.5 shows 
income distribution in the East Asian NISs during the rapid development period. 
Contrary to his prediction, rapid growth in Taiwan is found to be accompanied by a 
sharp fall rather than a rise in inequality. To a lesser extent this is also the case in 
Hong Kong and Singapore. In Korea, in contrast, income distribution appears to have 
remained fairly constant despite very rapid growth. 
As can be seen from the Table 3.5, Taiwan has outperformed the other three in 
reducing income inequality. In fact, the decline of Taiwan's Gini coefficient from 
0.44 to 0.32 in only two decades is probably the largest decline in any non-socialist 
nation in modem history. Both Hong Kong and Singapore have been less successful 
in reducing income inequality and their Gini coefficients have been high after an 
initial decline in the early 1970s. Their governments, however, have carried out 
various social construction programmes to help low-income families raise their living 
standards. The most obvious is public housing, which redistributes social wealth by 
using government revenues to assist poorer families. If this is taken into account, the 
real gap in living standards between rich and poor is almost certainly smaller than 
that reflected by the Gini coefficient. 
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Table 3.5 Household income distribution, percentages 
lower 20% upper 20% Gini coefficient (1) 
1965 5.9 41.8 0.344 
1970 7.3 41.6 0.332 
Korea 1976 5.7 45.3 0.391 
1980 5.1 45.4 0.389 
1985 6.1 42.7 0.345 
1960 5.6 50.9 0.440(2) 
1964 7.7 41.1 0.360 
Taiwan 1970 8.4 38.7 0.321 
1974 8.8 38.6 0.319 
1980 8.8 36.8 0.303 
1985 0.317 
1965 5.3 57.7 0.467(3) 
Hong Kong 1971 5.3 52.6 0.409 
1980 5.4 47.0 0.453(4) 
1966 (5) 0.498 
Singapore 1975 0.448 
1982-83 5.5 48.9 0.443(4) 
Sources: Sakong (1993: 17); Chowdhury & Islam (1993: 25); Haggard (1990: 226); 
Papanek (1988: 58); World Bank. 
Notes: (1) The Gini coefficient is a measure of relative income distribution that 
theoretically can vary between zero (perfect equality of income) and one (all income 
accruing to one person or household). In reality Gini coefficients of 0.3 or below 
reflect low levels of inequality, those above 0.5 high inequality. 
(2) 1961 figure 
(3) 1966 figure 
(4) 1981 figure 
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(5) The World Bank provides data on successive quintile shares of total disposable 
household income for seven of the East Asian countries. Singapore is not included. 
Another measure of income distribution is the share of national income enjoyed by 
various income groups. Consistent with the remarkable decline in its Gini coefficient, 
the share of the poorest 20% in Taiwan rose from 5.6% in 1960 to 8.8% in 1980, far 
higher than in comparable countries. In Hong Kong the share of poorest 20% was 
relatively stable. But the share of the richest 20% declined sharply, thus producing 
gains for middle income groups. In Korea however, the share of the poorest 20% 
dropped and that of the richest 20% increased. This occurred at the time when Korea 
changed its economic strategy to place greater emphasis on capital- and skill- 
intensive industries. 
It is important to note however, that the pattern of income distribution in the city 
states of Hong Kong and Singapore has been strongly affected by the influx of 
refugees and immigrants, which is why they have a relatively poor record within the 
group of East Asian NISs. Lin (1985) has noted that in Hong Kong the deterioration 
of overall inequality during 1976-81 coincided with a sudden influx of over 300,000 
refugees. Given their uncertain residential status and lack of familiarity with and 
experience in the Hong Kong labour market, one would expect the majority of 
refugees to seek and find employment in the low income segment. This would stretch 
the lower tail of the income distribution curve and contribute to worsening 
inequality. 
In the case of Singapore, Islam and Kirkpatrick (1986) have argued that the 
introduction of foreign workers contributed to worsening inequality between 1979 
and 1983 through the segmentation of labour markets. According to government 
policy, low-skilled foreign workers are paid at a lower rate than comparable 
Singaporean workers. One the other hand, skilled professionals from abroad are 
offered salaries in line with those prevailing in comparable occupations in the 
industrialised countries. These two policies combined to produce a 'stretching' of the 
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wage structure at both the upper and lower end of the occupational scale, thereby 
exacerbating income inequality. 
Regardless of the specific variations in income distribution in individual East Asian 
NISs, their development overall has been significantly more egalitarian than many 
other developing countries. Most scholars have attributed this feature to the asset 
redistribution which took place shortly after World War 11 and to the subsequent 
emphasis on labour-intensive manufactured exports. 
In both South Korea and Taiwan, early land reforms played an important role in 
generating a relatively equitable distribution of income in the initial stages of rapid 
economic growth. The impact of land reforms was especially strong because the 
majority of their populations at that time were involved in agriculture. The 
magnitude of its effect can be illustrated by the share of income accruing to the 
poorest 20% in Taiwan, which jumped dramatically between 1953 and 1964, from 
3.0% to 7.7%. As a result, both societies showed relatively egalitarian distributions 
of income by the 1960s. 
However, while land reform in South Korea and Taiwan explains low income 
inequality in the early stages of their rapid economic growth, one has also to consider 
more durable factors in explaining long-term trends in income distribution. A 
widening gap in income and wealth can occur quite quickly, even with a distribution 
that is initially egalitarian. 
One relevant factor is the large number of unskilled and semiskilled workers in the 
labour-intensive manufacturing sector. All four East Asian NISs are characterised by 
labour-intensive industrialisation fostered by an export-oriented development 
strategy. This has provided the opportunity to utilise the only resource that is in 
plentiful supply: semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Given that such workers are 
concentrated in poorer groups, their increased purchasing power has helped to reduce 
overall income inequality. A meritocratic education system is another factor 
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dampening income inequalities through expanded access to education, which 
equalises human capital resources and narrows wage differentials. 
A final factor is the effort of governments to ensure a more equitable income 
distribution. As mentioned before, Confucian governments are expected to provide a 
'good life' for their people in return for their obedience. While the criteria for a 'good 
life' obviously varies according to the individual, everybody feels that they deserve at 
least a share in the fruits of economic development. The governments of the East 
Asian NISs are therefore very conscious of the need to promote a reasonably 
equitable distribution of economic rewards in order not to break the unwritten 
cultural contract and alienate popular support. The high degree of state autonomy 
noted earlier enables them to influence income distribution with less concerted 
opposition than in other state structures. They have, for example, implemented land 
reform, subsidised the agricultural sector, provided social services to the poor, 
invested heavily in training and education, and set wage levels, all of which devices 
have had an impact on income distribution. 
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Chapter 4 
Contending Approaches to the East Asian Success 
The literature on the East Asian NISs is already voluminous and continues to grow at 
a rapid rate with regard to the sources of economic growth and the role of 
government in its promotion. Nevertheless, one can discern two major competing 
paradigms: the neo-classical approach, which interprets the East Asian economic 
'miracle' as the outcome of market-oriented economic policies; and the statist 
perspective which draws attention to the central role of government in guiding 
economic development. In addition, some analysts attribute rapid economic growth 
to the cultural background common to these societies I. 
4.1 The Neo-classical Approach 
Within the existing body of literature, most writers to date have adopted some 
version of the neo-classical perspective which asserts that free markets, trade and 
minimal state intervention are the primary basis for rapid economic growth. More 
particularly, neo-classical economists have attributed a major share of the success of 
the East Asian NISs to outward-oriented policies in trade and industry which have 
actively promoted production for export and do not discriminate between the 
purchase of domestic goods and foreign goods. It is argued that full participation in 
international trade is beneficial because it promotes both allocative and dynamic 
I Some analyses fall outside of the major paradigms discussed in this chapter. For example, Ranis 
(1989) has emphasised the role of institutional/organisational changes; Gulati (1992) has argued that 
the fast pace of economic growth is the result of certain unique historical and geo-political factors; 
and Nolan (1990) has explained it as the result of a combination of favourable situational factors and 
a form of'market socialism'. 
95 
efficiency. By concentrating on certain selected manufacturing products, resources 
are allocated according to the principle of comparative advantage so that maximum 
gains are attained from any given level of production capacity. The implementation 
of export-oriented policies, it is argued, also enables small-sized East Asian NISs to 
capture economies of scale by producing for a wider market. It is further claimed that 
the strategy generates higher savings which in turn provide an additional boost to 
economic growth. In addition, free international trade is seen to encourage 
competition, efficiency and technology transfer (see Balassa, 1981; Krueger, 1984; 
Lal & Rajapatirana, 1987; Linder, 1986; Little, 1981). 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted by neo-classical proponents in 
an effort to substantiate their arguments. Among them Bela Balassa has carried out 
considerable research on trade regimes. He claims that: 'The evidence is quite 
conclusive: countries applying outward-oriented development strategies had a 
superior performance in terms of exports, economic growth, and employment, 
whereas countries with continued inward orientation encountered increasing 
economic difficulties' (Balassa, 1981: 16-17). Similarly, Little has concluded from 
his study of Asia's four NISs that: 'The major lesson is that labour-intensive, export- 
oriented policies, which amounted to almost free trade conditions for exporters, were 
the prime cause of an extremely rapid and labour-intensive industrialisation' (Little, 
1981: 42)2. 
For neo-classical economists outward orientation is taken to be more or less 
synonymous with free trade. They consider the adoption of an outward-looking 
strategy as a product of rational economic practices that conform to the requirements 
of markets. In line with this reasoning, they claim that the explanation for the 
dynamic economic growth of East Asian NISs lies primarily with their reliance on 
free markets. It is 'the free market environment' that 'provides the necessary 
mechanism to gear the economies towards their optimal points on the production 
possibilities frontier' (Chen, 1979: 185). Because they believe that the market 
2Their conclusions, however, are challenged by many scholars, both theoretically and empirically. 
For details, refer to Gereffi (1989). 
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provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating production factors, neo- 
classical economists tend to disapprove of government interventions in the 
marketplace. They point out that such interference often distort price signals and 
result in a suboptimal allocation of production resources. Therefore they argue that 
the East Asian NISs have been able to minimise government failure so common in 
other developing countries only by relying on the private sector and free trade. 
Not all neo-classical economists have ignored the role of government, however. 
Bhagwati (1988), Das (1992) and Krause (1989), for example, have all recognised 
the positive role of extensive state intervention in their respective studies of the East 
Asian NISs. For Bhagwati, government intervention is tolerable if it is used to 
support an export promotion strategy. 'The Far Eastern economies (with the 
exception of Hong Kong) and others that have come close to the export promotion 
strategy have been characterised by considerable government activity in the 
economic system. In my judgement, such intervention can be of great value, and 
almost certainly has been so, in making the export promotion strategy work 
successfully' (Bhagwati, 1988: 33). Referring to the Singaporean case, Krause argued 
that, 'The purpose of this government activity is not to replace the market but to make 
the market work better and faster' (Krause, 1989: 112). Das came to a similar 
conclusion in his analysis of Korean state intervention. 'The end result was that it 
worked in a market-sustaining rather than a market-repressing manner' (Das, 1992: 
158). 
For these scholars, what the state has done is to create the structural conditions 
necessary for market-led economic growth. These include building physical and 
social infrastructures; correcting proven market failure through subsidies and 
incentives; promoting science and technology in industry; and providing a stable and 
predictable macroeconomic environment through the appropriate co-ordination of 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. The important point is that the state 
intervenes to 'get prices right', where 'right' means that domestic prices are in line 
with international prices, thereby facilitating economic activity without distorting the 
market. 
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During the Reagan-Bush era, when America was preaching liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation and the policies of the powerful international financial 
institutions celebrated the market determination of prices and market-driven growth, 
neo-classical theory established itself as a dominant paradigm in development 
economics. Against this background it is not surprising that it has been common 
place to explain the economic growth of the East Asian NISs according to this 
theory. This tendency is exemplified by a recent World Bank report entitled The East 
Asian Miracle 3(1993). The report acknowledges that 'some selective interventions' 
by governments have contributed to growth but emphasises that the reasons for East 
Asia's phenomenal success are attributable to a combination of. a high level of 
savings; quality of the labour force; support for entrepreneurial efforts in a 
competitive setting; emphasis on exports; the willingness to import knowledge and 
technology; and relative macroeconomic stability. In a word, East Asia has 
succeeded because it has followed the logic of the market. 
The neo-classical position explains the rapid growth of the East Asian NISs as the 
product of policies which depend on freely functioning markets to allocate resources 
efficiently, including the closer integration of domestic product markets into 
international markets. How and why such policies have been adopted is explained in 
terms of policy-makers exercising rational choices. However, this analysis plays 
down the social, political and historical factors which condition both the 
opportunities and the abilities of policy-makers to adopt certain strategies and 
measures. 
In particular, it avoids the issue of the state's relationship to society and how that 
influences the government's policies and its ability to implement them. Even when 
state intervention is considered, the analysis focuses on economic intervention and 
fails to take into account those social and political functions performed by the state 
which have important economic effects. Consequently, although the neo-classical 
3Wade (1996) has looked in detail at the compilation of this report and has revealed how power 
politics had affected the factors that were eventually stressed. 
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approach can plausibly point to the rationality of the policies carried out by the 
govermuents of the East Asian NISs, it cannot tell us why they have chosen to adopt 
these policies or how they have been able to implement them effectively while 
govemments elsewhere fail. 
4.2 The Statist Approach 
In an effort to address the problems ignored by neo-classical economists a number of 
scholars have adopted a different perspective. This approach argues that the 'miracle' 
of the East Asian NISs is the result of state intervention in both the economy and the 
society. Supporters of this position have used a range of theories, from orthodox 
Marxism to the New Left perspective, on different aspects of the situation, from 
internal politics or labour relations to the international division of labour. But they 
have one thing in common, they all emphasise the developmental role of strong states 
in fostering and guiding rapid economic growth. At the centre of their models are 
powerful governmental agencies that intervene directly in economic affairs, guiding 
investment into priority industries, establishing direct ownership or control in 
strategic sectors, and using their political power in harnessing national and 
international forces to orchestrate an accelerated industrialisation (Amsden, 1979 and 
1989; Castells et al, 1990; Deyo, 1989b; Gold, 1986; Johnson, 1982 and 1987; 
Haggard, 1988 and 1990; Rodan, 1989; Wade, 1990). 
Chalmers Johnson (1982 and 1988) has sketched a model of the 'capitalist 
developmental state', based on the institutional arrangements in Japan and later 
applied to the high-growth East Asian capitalist countries. According to him, the 
developmental state assigns priority to promoting economic growth rather than 
providing welfare. It is committed to the market but at the same time guides it with 
instruments formulated by an elite economic bureaucracy staffed by the best 
managerial talent in the system. The bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take 
policy initiatives, which are arrived at and implemented through close co-operation 
with the private sector. The power of the state results from a virtual monopoly of 
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political power and relative insulation from societal pressures. In a sense, Johnson's 
'developmental state' is more of a description of government activities than an 
analytical account of their impact on economic development. But it provides a basis 
from which to study the role of government in the economic development process. 
Robert Wade (1990) goes further, contending that the governments of the East Asian 
NISs have done more than guide the market. They actually govern it. He has 
identified several major policy initiatives that have contributed to the superiority of 
East Asian economic performance: very high levels of productive investment, 
making for the faster transfer of newer techniques into actual production; more 
investment in certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of 
government intervention; and the exposure of many industries to international 
competition. The important point is that they are themselves the result of active 
government interventions. Using incentives, controls, and mechanisms to spread risk, 
the government is able to regulate market processes of resource allocation so as to 
produce different production and investment outcomes than would have occurred 
under free market conditions. Furthermore, govenunent interventions have been 
permitted or supported by a particular kind of organised relation between the state 
and the private sector. 
Alice Amsden (1989 and 1993) has coined the phrase 'late industrialisation' to 
describe the industrialisation process in Korea and Taiwan. Late industrialisation is 
different from the First or Second Industrial Revolutions in that it occurs on the basis 
of learning which involves borrowing, adapting, and improving upon foreign 
designs. Industrialisation was late in coming to some countries because they were too 
weak to mobilise the forces necessary to inaugurate economic development and to 
fend off the wave of foreign aggression begun in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. For them to catch up in the twentieth century has required even more 
direction from government because the gap between the developed and developing 
countries has been greater. 
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The inherent conflicts of the market apply to all users, but they are sharpest among 
the least well endowed. Countries with low productivity require low interest rates to 
stimulate investment, and high interest rates to induce people to save. They need 
undervalued exchange rates to boost exports, and overvalued exchange rates to 
minimise the cost of foreign debt repayment and of imports. They must protect their 
new industries from foreign competition, but they require free trade to meet their 
import needs. Under such disequilibrating conditions, the state has to intervene to 
address the needs of both savers and investors, and of both exporters and importers, 
by creating multiple prices. 
Therefore, it is argued, in successful cases of late industrialisation, instead of market 
mechanisms allocating resources and guiding private entrepreneurship, the 
government makes most of the pivotal investment decisions. Instead of firms 
operating in a competitive market structure, they each operate with an extraordinary 
degree of market control, protected from foreign competition. Even more important, 
the economy operates with a set of 'wrong' prices deliberately set by the government 
in order to create profitable investment opportunities. 
Thomas Gold (1986) has applied the triple alliance model of Brazilian dependent 
development and the concept of autonomous state to Taiwan's development. He 
asserts that it must be modified for the Taiwan case. While the triple alliance in 
Brazil is characterised by the dominant role of the multinationals and the weak 
position of the state, the state in Taiwan plays the dominant role. Hence, although the 
internationalisation of the market economy has provided opportunities for Taiwan 
because of its competitive capacity, such competitiveness largely stems from the 
deliberate strategy planned, engineered, and implemented by the state. 
Garry Rodan (1989) has explored the economic success story of Singapore within 
both the international and national contexts. His main argument is that the socio- 
historical circumstances of Singapore have precipitated the formation of a powerful 
and development-oriented political state, which in turn has facilitated Singapore's 
successful incorporation into the new international division of labour. Rodan 
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maintains that the PAP government in Singapore has played a critical role in 
fostering the industrialisation process not only through subsidies and incentives, but 
also by creating extra-economic conditions favourable to the implementation of 
economic policies. In particular, the institutional control over organised labour and 
the general taming or elimination of political opponents have contributed to the 
creation of a disciplined labour force with reduced bargaining capacity. In this way, 
the state has contributed towards lower wage costs and the fullest exploitation of 
labour. Therefore the state has actually created Singapore's comparative advantage 
within the new international division of labour. 
The institutionalised subordination and co-option of labour in the East Asian NISs is 
detailed by Frederic Deyo (1989b) and explained as a necessary condition for their 
success. It claims that rapid industrialisation in these societies has reflected the 
overwhelming priority given to economic expansion and the needs of capital, with a 
corresponding neglect of the redistributional and welfare demands of workers and 
farmers. At their economic take-off stage, the competitive international position of 
East Asian economics was predicated on the maintenance of low labour costs, 
industrial peace, and worker reliability and productivity was explicitly recognised in 
state planning. Authoritarian governments across all four East Asian NISs have 
powerfully constrained labour movements and their capacity to influence enterprise 
or governmental decision making. This tight control of labour has encouraged rapid 
capital accumulation and economic growth. 
Stephan Haggard (1988 and 1990) has concentrated his analysis on the policy shifts 
from import substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation in the 
East Asian NISs. He has recognised the influence of international political conditions 
on their development process, especially the role of the United States in providing 
security and economic aid and in formulating a development strategy. But he 
believes that the state's role in providing the political prerequisites for export oriented 
industrialisation has been fundamental. Moreover, the state has been able to provide 
the political and economic conditions necessary for economic success because it 
enjoys a significant degree of relative autonomy from either domestic or international 
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forces. Economic policyrnaking is in all cases centralised in agencies with a strong 
'technocratic' cast that can rely on relatively efficient, meritocratic bureaucracies for 
policy implementation. More importantly, policy decisions are given firm backing by 
political elites for whom economic performance is a central component of political 
legitimation. In contrast to the strength of the East Asian states, the political power 
and organisational resources of key social groups are weak. Labour movements have 
been controlled or repressed. The peasantry has been integrated into the system 
through land reform. And a relatively brief period of import-substitution has 
prevented the development of strong protectionist business interests. As a result, the 
economic policy-making process has been relatively insulated from direct political 
pressures and the need to compromise. The state could therefore shift policy from 
import substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation with relative 
ease. 
Most of the analysts who point to the centrality of the state in the success of the new 
industrialisation consider Hong Kong an exception. Castells et al (1990), however, 
have proposed that it is also a case of state-led economic development. Basing their 
analysis on the state's role in public housing, and in the process of collective 
consumption, production and capital accumulation more generally, they argue that 
the Hong Kong government intervenes extensively in the economy and the society, 
though in a very subtle way. And these interventions provide the basis for some of 
the key elements underpining the process of economic growth in Hong Kong. 
The main arena of intervention is identified as collective consumption, with the 
centre being located in the public housing programme. Government-supported 
housing, health, education, transportation, and subsidies of foodstuffs and basic daily 
consumption items, have been crucial elements in ensuring a proper production and 
reproduction of labour, in making labour cheaper without lowering its quality, in 
providing a safety net that has enabled an entrepreneurial population to take risks by 
investing and creating businesses, and in providing the basis for social stability. 
Furthermore, selling land has generated key financial resources for the Hong Kong 
goverment, so that it can create the necessary infrastructure for growth without 
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having to resort to heavy direct taxation that would have undermined the business 
climate. 
A. J. Youngson (1982) has also argued that Hong Kong has a mixed economy in 
which the government plays a decisive role. Apart from citing the role of the state in 
providing public education, housing, and land, he points to two other features. First, 
the government is the biggest employer of labour in Hong Kong which means that 
wage increases in the public sector are sometimes taken as setting the pace for wages 
throughout the territory. Secondly, and even more significantly, the government is 
the biggest investor in Hong Kong. Government investment plays a large and 
increasingly important part in determining the long term rate of economic growth. 
The overall theme common to all these various studies is how the East Asian NIS 
states have facilitated economic growth. The argument is, in effect, that 
interventionist political states have been essential to their societies' success. In these 
economies, it is argued, the politically determined goals of national development 
have overridden the claims of specific interests, including those of big businesses4. 
By focusing on the role of the state and its relationship to external political and social 
constraints, the statist approach seems more capable of explaining why the 
development of the East Asian NISs and other developing countries took place at 
different rates and in different forms. It is also likely to provide more valid 
explanations as to why the states of the East Asian NISs have been more effective 
than others in carrying out state intervention. However, this approach has largely 
ignored the cultural factors underlying market exchanges and institutional 
arrangements. It therefore throws little light on the question of how and why East 
Asian people have been mobilised to comply with various development policies. In 
order to understand the cultural-psychological forces behind development dynamism 
we have to turn to another group of scholars who have been trying to establish links 
between Confucianism and the economic performances of the East Asian NISs. 
4For a good summary of these studies and a detailed analysis of how the states have been able to 
override the claims of other interest groups, see Douglass (1994). 
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4.3 The Cultural Explanation 
Herman Kahn is widely recognised as the first western scholar to speculate on the 
possible influence of Confucianism on economic development. He suggested that the 
key determinants of economic growth in East Asia are a set of cultural values, and 
that 'societies based upon the Confucian ethic may in many ways superior to the 
West in the pursuit of industrialisation, affluence, and modernisation' (Kahn, 1979: 
121). 
Among the early writings on Confucianism and economic development in modem 
East Asia, Roderick MacFarquhar's (1980) has been particularly influential. He 
coined the now widely used term 'post-Confucian' to describe societies which bear 
the obvious hallmarks of a Confucian legacy which has been significantly altered by 
the accretion of new elements. These post-Confucian characteristics have been 
identified as: self-confidence, social cohesion, subordination of the individual, 
education for action, bureaucratic tradition and moralising certitude. They are 
regarded as a particularly potent combination for development purposes. For 
instance, high educational attainment has produced the principal asset of the East 
Asian NISs, people, whilst Confucianism's strength as a'social cement' has brought 
individuals together to work for a common goal, economic development. 
MacFarquhar claims that'if western individualism was appropriate for the pioneering 
period of industrialisation, perhaps post-Confucian "collectivism" is better suited to 
the age of mass industrialisation' (MacFarquhar, 1980: 7 1). 
It was not until the late 1980s, however, that scholars began to deal with the cultural 
forces behind the East Asian development dynamism more systematically and 
thoroughly. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (1988), for example, believes that the 
economic dynamism of the East Asian NISs is based on a combination of favourable 
world system timing, a special geopolitical position, and culturally rooted social- 
behaviour patterns. He points out that the East Asian NISs entered the international 
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market at the time when the world system had been expanding and the capitalist 
countries enjoyed a great degree of overall economic growth. They were also in a 
better position to exploit this favourable timing because, in the era of post-war 
American hegemony East Asia was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet communism 
within the US containment strategy. Multifaceted economic and military support was 
therefore given and a certain degree of national autonomy, especially in the economic 
field, was tolerated in exchange for their anti-Communist stance. 
In his analysis of cultural factors, however, instead of giving definite answers, Hsiao 
proposes a set of possible directions for further study. He suggests that some 
popularly practised cultural traits have helped the economic success of the East Asian 
NISs, and that the most relevant among them are Confucian-derived ethics and 
values toward work, family and organisational authority. These cultural factors 
should not be interpreted as individual traits. Rather they constitute a set of 
institutionalised cultural arrangements operating at the societal level. From this point 
of view, one can establish plausible links between national policyrnaking and cultural 
behaviour. For example, the explanation for the making and implementing of 
successful economic policies could well begin with an analysis of their resonance 
with common sense cultural understanding and practices. In general, Hsiao sees 
cultural factors as a 'comparative advantage', which has allowed the economy to take 
off at the right moment. 
William J. O'Malley (1988) has tried to find a correlation between Confucian culture 
and the economic development pattern which he described as export-oriented, 
government-guided and corporation-led. He finds the evidence in the perfect fit 
between important aspects of Confucian culture and the style of institutional 
arrangements underlying the rapid economic progress of Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea, in particular the functioning of governments and companies and the 
relationship between the two. 
According to his analysis, govermnents in these societies constitute powerful and 
remote bureaucratic structures. They can formulate policy goals independently of 
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particular groups, change group or class behaviour, and even change the structure of 
society. Companies are important social as well as economic institutions. Ideally they 
are organised in community-like, almost family-like ways, with a strong emphasis on 
team spirit and mutual respect. The relationship between government and corporate 
interests, which has been a crucial element in these societies' economic success, is 
co-operative and reciprocal. It is based on the mutual realisation that the state needs 
the market and private enterprise needs the state. 
Once these aspects of government and private enterprises, and the relation between 
them are highlighted and juxtaposed with the ideals and values embodied in 
important Confucian institutions, the fit is unmistakable. The concepts of service, 
respect, and mutual co-operation permeate both. Obedience towards authority and 
deference towards superiors are fostered by Confucianism and are intrinsic to the 
workings of the major institutions behind the economic success in those societies. A 
willingness to subordinate the interests of individuals to those of the group, a trait 
inculcated by Confucian teachings, has been at heart of the co-operative social effort 
that has supported this East Asian style of growth. Given this striking fit, O'Malley 
cautiously maintains that the possibility of some exercise of Confucian cultural 
influence on economic development exists. 
Lucian Pye (1988) has approached the problem of Confucianism and economic 
development by studying the Confucian characteristic of East Asian political systems 
(excluding Hong Kong) and their influence on economic activities. For Pye, these 
systems are a particular combination of Confucianism and advanced capitalism, 
which can be dubbed paternalistic authoritarianism. They are authoritarian, but they 
also recognise merit, extol technocratic skills, encourage national development, and 
generally press for modemisation and egalitarian economic development. 
Pye has traced the transformation of traditional East Asian Confucian states into their 
present capitalist authoritarian forms. The arrival of the more technologically 
advanced West forced the traditional Confucian group-oriented perspective to move 
beyond the family and the clan to include the nation. It gave rise to a powerful sense 
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of nationalism which took the form of a 'search for wealth and power' to counter the 
West. This served to shift the rationale of legitimacy away from the traditional 
Confucian view of rule by moral example to a more utilitarian obligation of the state 
to encourage economic development. 
As the result, governments in East Asia were considering questions of economic 
development and nation-building at an early stage. They therefore had a substantial 
head start over the rest of the non-western world in striving for economic growth. But 
it was a second major shock that shattered the traditional Confucian sense of cultural 
superiority and made genuine learning from the outside world possible. For Taiwan it 
was the humiliating defeat of the KMT and for Korea the devastating civil war. 
As to how the Confucian orientation of the East Asian governments have influenced 
their economic activities, Pye has argued that nationalism has produced an awareness 
of the boundary lines between 'us' and 'foreigners'. Therefore, 'Governments and 
citizens automatically agree that it is more honourable to sell abroad than to import. 
In these countries people do not have to be told to buy domestic products' (Pye, 1988: 
90). 
In Pye's account, paternalism is displayed in the forms of patronage involved in 
economic development. The government provide patronage and guidance to those in 
the private sector found to be worthy. The spirit of paternalism, when fuelled by 
anxieties about possible national failure, has made the East Asian governments ready 
to shelter businessmen from economic failures. They have nationalised risks and 
made entrepreneurs more dependent than is normal in a capitalist system. 
Because the state has assumed the responsibility for making enterprises 
internationally competitive, government policies have been designed to insure 
harmonious industrial relations while keeping wages in check. In return for pressures 
on labour to keep wage demands low, governments have insisted that employers 
should provide paternalistic security for their workers. Relative social tranquillity has 
been achieved on the basis of traditional respect for hierarchy and deference to 
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authority coupled with pragmatic calculation. People choose to follow government 
policies in exchange for the economic improvement provided by authority. In the 
process, both entrepreneurs and labour are made dependent on the government. It is 
this sense of dependency, Pye argues, that makes the Confucian tradition of 
paternalistic authority so effective in working for the collective goal of national 
economic development. 
Based on his studies of Hong Kong, Siu-lun Wong (1989) proposes that Chinese 
culture is more capable of assimilating industrial capitalism than others. He discerns 
four major Chinese cultural elements which facilitate the adoption of industrial 
capitalism - incorporative cosmology, high achievement motivation, pervasive 
familism, and utilitarian discipline. While Chinese culture is not identical to 
Confucianism, those major Chinese cultural elements discerned by Wong are 
unmistakably Confucian. 
According to Wong, the inherent eclecticism of Chinese cosmology enables the 
Chinese to become adept borrowers of foreign practices. They can blend western 
elements with their own tradition with apparent ease. He also gave examples to show 
that most Hong Kong people hold flexible and positive views toward technological 
innovation. One such example was the words of a spinner: 
In Hong Kong, we have a lot of information about new textile machines. We 
know their merits and drawbacks. So we choose the suitable parts and assemble 
them. But in our neighbouring countries, they usually order the complete set 
from one company, down to the last screw. That's why we are a step ahead of 
them (Wong, 1989: 171). 
High achievement motivation is believed to derive from the Chinese philosophy that 
men are 'naturally equal'. Social inequalities and stratification appear because of 
differences in the efforts that individuals devote to their work and because of 
differences in education. No status is regarded as intrinsically beyond the reach of an 
individual. In modern Hong Kong ambitions for betterment have shown in that a 
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common goal among Chinese is self-employment, to be the owner of a company. 
This explains why entrepreneurs are in abundant supply in Hong Kong but are 
relatively scarce in other non-Chinese cultural areas. 
Universal familism reflects itself in paternalistic management. Wong's research on 
the cotton spinners has shown that business leaders tend to be patriarchal. They 
confer welfare benefits on their employees as favours, take a personal interest in their 
subordinates' non-job related activities, and disapprove of trade union activities. 
Paternalism can be beneficial to economic development because it inhibits the 
growth of class consciousness through the formation of patron-client relations 
between owners (managers) and their staff. In Hong Kong group actions by 
employees, such as collective bargaining and confrontation, happen rarely. Conflicts 
are manifest mostly in individual actions. 
One feature of Hong Kong enterprises which is directly related to universal familism 
is the pervasive family mode of ownership. Wong's survey suggests that nearly 60% 
of the small scale factories in 1978 were family owned. A much stronger measure of 
trust exists among family members than among unrelated business partners. 
Consensus is easier to attain. This enables family firms to be more adaptable in their 
operations. As a result, they are well-suited to survive and flourish in volatile 
situations such as Hong Kong. 
Utilitarian discipline is used by Wong to denote a tendency among the Chinese to be 
keenly aware of cost and benefit calculations in both monetary and human 
investments. It derives from the fact that the fertility rates among Hong Kong people 
have shown a rapid decline since the 1960s, which has helped economic 
development. People with utilitarian discipline are prepared to adopt a long-term 
strategy to enhance the welfare of their families by deferring immediate gratification. 
Wong does not believe that cultural factors alone can account for Hong Kong's 
economic performance. He asserts that several situational factors in Hong Kong 
society have pushed cultural values in the direction of economic growth. The first is 
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the large component of refugees in Hong Kong's post-war population. They have 
brought not just industrial experience and capital but also a refugee mentality 
suffused with deep anxiety parallel to that experienced by Weber's early Calvinists. 
Secondly, the colonial character of Hong Kong has created a pattern of social 
stratification different from that of traditional China. In the past, social status was 
determined more by office than by wealth. With the official route to social ascent 
blocked by the British colonial government, wealth has become the major marker of 
achievement and social honour for the Chinese. Two other situational factors derive 
from the physical condition of Hong Kong. Being urban 'by default' and without a 
hinterland, a feeling of solidarity and a common orientation toward economic 
achievement is easier to achieve. And its tiny size means that it is easier to manage. 
Some of the studies mentioned above have raised the question of Confucianism's role 
in facilitating the East Asian NISs' economic development without providing 
sustained theoretical argument or mobilising detailed empirical support. Others have 
concentrated on specific issues such as particular aspects of Confucianism or have 
looked at Confucianism in certain societies. Ezra F. Vogel (1991), however, has 
analysed the economic development process of each East Asian NISs and the factors 
contributing to it and argued that their success has resulted from the combination of 
favourable situational factors and 'industrial neo-Confacianism' - Confucianism 
adapted to the needs of modem industrial societies. 
The situational factors are: the massive amount of US aid, the destruction of the old 
order, a sense of political and economic urgency, an eager and plentiful labour force, 
and familiarity with the Japanese model of success. Together, it is argued, they give a 
powerful advantage to the East Asian societies. Although some other societies share 
some of these factors, none of them came close to East Asia in possessing so many. 
This listing of situational factors does not provide an explanation however. 
Industrialisation requires high levels of co-ordination, precise timing, and 
predictability. As 'late comers', even higher levels of co-ordination and teamwork, 
deeper understanding of science, technology and management skills, and far greater 
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knowledge of world markets are required than in earlier eras. The ability of present 
generation East Asians to achieve the needed complex levels of organisation cannot 
be separated from the institutional practices and underlying attitudes that they 
absorbed in growing up in their culture. 
Vogel has identified four sets of institutions and cultural practices which he believes 
contribute to the capacity of the East Asian NISs to industrialise. These are: the 
meritocratic elite, a competitive entrance examination system, the importance of the 
group, and self-cultivation. These he groups under the term of 'neo-Confucianism' 
because they are rooted in the Confucian tradition but have adapted to the needs of an 
industrial society. 
In Confucian societies the bureaucrat is selected on the basis of merit. In modem East 
Asian societies, the basis of merit has shifted from the possession of good moral 
standards and knowledge of the classics to knowledge of modem science and 
technology and the ability to deliver economic gains. However, as in earlier times, 
modem bureaucrats still play a very important role in decision making, and have a 
sense of responsibility for the overall welfare of society. This bureaucratic system in 
its modem form has played a critical role in East Asian industrialisation. It provides 
well-trained personnel chosen from the ablest people, who are not only responsible 
for expertise and decision making but are also dedicated to overall public goals. 
Meritocratic selection of these functionaries gives a substantial measure of 
legitimacy to goveniment. 
Traditionally, entrance examinations were the gateway to officialdom. Nowadays the 
traditional content of examinations, Confucian teachings and stylised essays, has 
been replaced by knowledge of foreign languages, modem history, economics, 
science, and mathematics. The use of exams has also been expanded so that specific 
links are formed between good exam marks and good jobs. The extension of the 
exam system is crucial in overcoming feudal favouritism so that all members of the 
society have a chance to attain high positions. The examination system also 
encourages competition and habits of hard work. 
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The importance of the group over the individual has been central to Confucian 
teaching. While the group is still paramount, its definition has changed to incorporate 
companies, nations, even international communities. The responsiveness of people to 
group demands helps the economic organisation and social control system to work 
smoothly. The fact that the family and the local community have accepted substantial 
responsibility for the welfare of their members provides a safety net for individuals 
when government does not have sufficient money to fund a substantial national 
welfare system. 
In the old days, self-cultivation was driven by a desire for more perfect control over 
one's emotions, and consequently it required study and reflection more than activism. 
Today it has taken an active purposive form, manifested in the effort to advance 
work-related skills. This helps create a well motivated and ambitious workforce. 
Similarly, Hung-Chao Tai (1989) has proposed a hypothesis on the relationship 
between culture and economy in five East Asian societies: Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. According to him, there is an Oriental model of 
economic development that emphasises human emotional bonds, group orientation, 
and harmony. This stands as an alternative to the more established western model of 
development that stresses efficiency, individualism, and dynamism. 
Tai has analysed the impact of Oriental culture in several key areas of the economy: 
business organisation, employee behaviour, the work ethic, and human resource 
development. According to him, the Oriental company functions not only as an 
economic enterprise but also as a social entity. The relationship between the 
employers and the employees, which operates both inside and outside the company, 
is paternalistic. It is built upon common familial activities such as marriages, 
birthdays and funerals. These activities are a vital part of the company's social 
investment and help to give the Oriental workforce its special characteristics of 
industriousness and compliance. These characteristics in turn provide East Asian 
societies with a significant advantage in competition with the West. 
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Employee behaviour, argues Tai, has been shaped and controlled through social 
means. The Oriental company actively encourages its employees to share their 
feelings, emotions, and concerns through company organised social activities. It 
considers loyalty and dependability rather than creativity and skill as the primary 
criteria by which employee performance is evaluated. The company also devotes a 
considerable amount of money and time to the employees' personal welfare. As a 
result, the Oriental company possesses a far greater capacity than its western 
counterparts to influence employee behaviour to achieve company objectives. 
Tai has also identified personal traits such as diligence, frugality, and the tendency to 
save as important factors contributing to economic development in East Asia. These 
traits are considered logical consequences of East Asians' views toward the natural 
world and their concept of human life. Without a compulsion to conquer the natural 
world, they believe that they can make the best use of scarce natural resources by 
exerting their relatively abundant labour. Formerly, as they lived in a subsistence 
economy, they deemed diligence not only a desirable habit but an attitude essential to 
survival. This attitude persists today, and becomes the work habit. With their 
concerns focused on 'this world', East Asians consider that life finds its primary 
meaning in the continuity of the family. Therefore they must live frugally to assure 
their family members the necessary means to live on. Diligence in work and frugality 
in life lead to an accumulation of savings. Large domestic savings help restrain 
inflation and reduce the cost of capital borrowing, leading to an increase in business 
investment. The diligent and frugal behaviour of East Asians enabled them to launch 
successfully a labour-intensive industry in the early stage of industrialisation. 
Subsequently, with a large reservoir of savings, they were able to shift from a labour- 
intensive to a capital-intensive economy. 
Tai believes that the emphasis on the development of human resources in 
contemporary East Asia is another important aspect of Confucian influence. Central 
to Confucian thinking is a belief in the perfectibility and educability of human 
beings. Aspiring individuals saw studying and learning as a major means for the few 
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to rise above the many. This Confucian tradition is today carried over to every East 
Asian society, considerably facilitating the process of economic modemisation. 
For Tai, the Oriental model failed to initiate industrialism. But after borrowing 
technology from the West, and mating the technology with a human-centred culture, 
the Orient was able to achieve an almost unparalleled economic performance in the 
world. Therefore, Tai shares MacFarquhar's opinion that the Confucianism informed 
pattern of development is more suited to the age of mass industrialisation. 
Not all analysts of the possible links between Confucianism and capitalist 
development in East Asia however, are convinced that they are either as strong or as 
central as some commentators have argued. One of the most influential sceptics is 
the Korean scholar, Kim Kyong-Dong (19 8 8: 1994). His objections rest on three 
main points. Firstly, he argues that that since the legacy of Confucianism is far from 
'pure', any influence it might have is inextricably bound up with other frameworks of 
thought and value. Secondly, working with a'modified modernisation theory' he 
maintains that the present wave of capitalist development in East Asia originated as a 
response to the global push towards 'modernisation' initiated by the major western 
powers in the post-war period, by which time Confucianism had already ceased to 
play a central role in either official ideology or everyday life. Thirdly, he suggests 
that where elements of Confucianism did continue to exert some influence, they were 
as likely to inhibit as to advance capitalist development. Let us take these points in 
tum. 
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Kim's is correct to emphasise the 'impurity' of the Conftician tradition, but wrong to 
see this adulteration as springing mainly from East Asia's confrontation with other 
cultures at the beginning of the present century. The Confucian heritage has never 
been 'pure'. Indeed , arguably, it has survived precisely because it has been able to 
adapt to foreign environments, absorb and assimilate elements from other cultural 
systems, and co-exist with other value systems. Because it is a moral system not a 
religion there is no immutable definition of doxa. Differences of opinion over the 
interpretation of key texts and the application of core principles can be negotiated 
without producing the schisms generated by concepts of heresy. However, if we 
accept flexibility and permeability as basic features of Conficianism's career, doesn't 
this confirm Kim's argument that its supposed influence in the contemporary period 
is as much and perhaps more, to do with other cultural and conjunctural factors. He 
offers the example of 'this-wordliness'. This is certainly central to Confucianism, 
but as he points out, it is also a prominent feature of several other belief systems with 
strong roots in East Asia, including, Taoism, Shintoism and Mahayana Buddism. 
However, as the detailed analysis in Chapter Five shows, although any particular 
element may not be unique to Confucianism, the overall combination of elements is. 
We need to think of Confucianism not as a collection or list of discrete traits or 
values but as a working system of interactions and reinforcements. 
At first sight, Kim seems to be on rather stronger ground when he argues that the 
choice of a model "of strong central government with an authoritarian principle of 
organisation" had less to do with the legacy of Confucianism and rather more to do 
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with the governments of the East Asian NISs pragmatic realisation that this was 
likely to be the most effective framework for a rapid push to nation-building and 
economic growth. However, even if we accept the assertion of pragmatism in its 
strongest form - that elements of Confucianism were mobilised by post-war East 
Asian governments in order to invest their actions with a degree of legitimacy - we 
still have to explain why so many of their citizens appear to have consented to this . 
Both Kim and his opponents (who argue a strong case for the influence of 
Confucianism on capitalist development) work with a view of Confucianism which 
is both schematic and abstract. They offer a generalised characterisation but fail to 
anchor it in everyday discourse. In order to pursue the argument as to 
Confucianism's influence (or lack of it) further, we need to look in detail at how it 
was represented and mobilised on a day-to-day basis, and at how official 
constructions intersected with grounded, vernacular, systems of thought and value. 
This thesis takes a first step in this direction by examining the representation and 
negotiation of Confucianism in one of the main arenas of public culture- the daily 
press. And by taking two societies- Taiwan and Hong Kong- with contrasted press- 
state relations, and by looking at shifting patterns through time, it explores the 
contextual variations in this process, as well as the continuities and commonalties. 
This work also allows us to address Kim's strong assertion that Confucianism was 
it already defunct and inoperative in the contemporary context" (1994: 99). If this was 
the case, we would expect to see very little coverage of Confucian tenets and themes 
in the press. 
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Kim however, is by no means consistent in his argument, since he concedes that 
some values inherited from the Confucian tradition have continued to exert an 
influence in the post-war period. For example, he argues that 'status orientation' has 
been "one of the most resilient and important factors motivating Korean people to 
achieve growth" (1994: 102). He sees this orientation as strongly rooted in 
Confucianism's traditional emphasis on education as the principle channel for 
upward mobility. 
At the same time, he points out that the high valuation of education might also have 
exerted a negative influence on capitalist development since it may have lead "many 
of the more able individuals to pursue non-business careers in the legal, medical and 
other professional fields" (1994: 102). But contradictory outcomes do not, in 
themselves, undermine the case for seeing. Confucianism as one of the central forces 
shaping the forms of economic development in the East Asian NICs. Unintended 
consequences are still consequences. 
Kim is absolutely right however, to emphasise the need to explore the influence of 
Confucianism against the background of the specific histories and conjunctures that 
have shaped the development of particular societies. That is why we have opened 
this thesis with a basic resume of the recent histories of the four major East Asian 
NICs under analysis. 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
Most studies of the East Asian NISs favour one of two major starting points in 
explaining their economic success: the state or the market5. While some scholars 
have insisted on the pre-eminent role of either the market or the state, as we have 
seen, the majority emphasise the interplay between the two. The market needs the 
state and the state needs the market. The differences in their arguments revolve 
around which is regarded as the most important. 
The neo-classical approach has made a substantial contribution to our understanding 
of the East Asian situation by identifying workable development strategies and 
economic policies. But it is not sufficient to explain why the East Asian NISs have 
chosen workable policies and have been able to implement them successfully while 
some other developing countries have either chosen the 'wrong' strategies or have 
been unable to make the right ones work. The statist approach, on the other hand, has 
studied the policy and political processes that underpin successful development 
strategies. In doing so it has exposed the partial and selective nature of the more 
strident and uncritical neo-classical interpretations of East Asian economic success. 
Both approaches, however, have ignored the role of the East Asian people themselves 
in staging their unprecedented rapid economic growth. When the characteristics of 
the East Asian labour force - well-educated, hard-working, and compliant - are 
mentioned, they are treated as static human endowments rather than disposition that 
have to be continually reproduced and reinforced. While the state is depicted as 
powerful and developmental, it is left largely unexplained why a government 
relatively unconstrained by any other forces in society would still commit itself to 
overall public goals. 
5 There are signs, however, that more and more studies are taking account of social and cultural 
factors when analysing the East Asian economic development process. For example, Campos and 
Root (1996), while emphasising the role of state, have further analysed the cultural specific systems 
for ensuring accountability and consensus building and East Asian leadership's commitment to shared 
growth. 
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Recognising these shortcomings, some scholars, as we have seen, have tried to 
pinpoint the role of culture, especially of Confucianism, in the East Asian NISs' 
economic development. Most have treated Confucianism as a dynamic force 
interactive with other historical, political and economic forces. These forces, it is 
argued, have modified Confucianism into 'post-Confucianism' or 'neo-Confucianism' 
which in turn has helped to shape the course of political and economic development. 
This reconstituted Confucianism works on two levels. At the individual level, 
cultural traits such as discipline, diligence, high motivation help form a work ethic 
which is highly functional for economic activities. At the societal level, 
institutionalised cultural arrangements based on Confucian values have moulded the 
nature and style of political, bureaucratic and corporate practices, and defined the 
governments' relationships to private enterprises and to the citizenry, enabling them 
relatively free to make or change policies and implement them smoothly. 
Most writers on Confucianism and economic development in East Asia are 
concerned to avoid cultural determinism. Though they emphasise the important role 
of culture in economic development and try to specify how central cultural traits 
impact on economic performance, they also acknowledge the role of the market, the 
state and situational factors. By combining studies of markets, states, and culture, we 
might hopefully move towards a more complete picture of the East Asian NISs' 
economic achievement. 
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Chapter 5 
Popular Confucianism: Traditions and Transitions 
Confucianism is primarily concerned with the behaviour and attitudes of people in 
the context of their interactions within daily life. It is a sacred code of social 
behaviour with spiritual and political content. It was shaped and transmitted by a 
cultural elite but gained almost universal acceptance from ordinary people. It 
originated in China but gradually became a manifestation of East Asian spirituality 
more generally. As succinctly put by Tu, 'Confucianism is not a religion limited to a 
particular culture, race, or nationality. It is a dynamic force that flows, has different 
currents, and has the capacity to interact with other traditions in a pluralistic context' 
(Tu, 1992: 10). 
For over one thousand years, Confticianism has given enduring expression to many 
of the values that have animated East Asian culture, to the organisational principles 
underlying their governments, and to core traditions of social life. For a considerable 
time, however, Confucianism was equated with an obsolete past. Relentless global 
modernisation and westernisation seemed to be displacing more and more Confucian 
values and practices. While those aspects of Confucianism which were specifically 
rooted in the practices of feudal agricultural societies did cease to function in 
industrial societies, Confucianism as a general system of belief was not eradicated. 
Indeed, in the process of interaction with modem values some elements were 
reasserted and others were modified to produce a system that could be deployed to 
guide modernisation. 
Due to the enormous change Confticianism has undergone in the past one hundred 
years or so, many scholars tend to address Confucianism in modem East Asia as neo- 
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Confucianism or post-Confucianism. But the word Confucianism itself embodies the 
dynamics of change and the ability to adapt. Even though today's change is more 
pronounced, our analysis shows that Confucianism still represents the dominant set 
of values and behaviour patterns in modem East Asia. Although many values and 
institutional characteristics such as diligence, family emphasis or paternalistic 
government are not unique to Confucianism, the simultaneous presence of them all, 
and the history of their coexistence are um-nistakably Confucian. 
Originally Confucianism was based on the classical texts, and was therefore mostly 
associated with the educated literati and the ruling elite. Later through literati-led 
preaching and state regulations, its values and practices, especially those related to 
the family and to social relations, spread widely among the population at large. This 
popularisation produced a Little Tradition alongside the Great Tradition. In modem 
East Asia officials and intellectuals no longer excel in the Confucian classics and 
these texts are no longer part of the core educational curriculum. While the support 
for the Great Tradition has long gone, the Little Tradition, the popular version of 
Confucianism, has remained the major source of the core social and cultural values, 
and has withstood the impact of western influence. It still structures people's 
behaviour today in a number of important ways. 
5.1 The Confucian Tradition 
Confucianism grew out of the writings of Confucius, the Chinese philosopher and 
educator bom in the 6th century BC. He was writing against a background of rapid 
social and economic change which also saw a steady growth of the whole Chinese 
cultural area. At this time, which was contemporary with the heyday of classical 
Greek philosophy and of Indian religious thought, many different schools of Chinese 
thought - Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism and the Hundred 
Flower School- 
blossomed. However, in sharp contrast to the emphasis on the divine and the other- 
worldly within other systems, Chinese philosophical interest centred primarily on 
this world, the world of man. Confucianism in particular focused on the living, 
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concrete human being embedded in the material and social worlds. Man is the focal 
point of Confucianism and the central measure of everything. 
The original teachings of Confucius were reinterpreted and further developed by his 
followers, especially Mencius and Xun Zi. Confucian thought was also enriched by 
assimilating ideas from its rivals. By the 2nd century BC it had emerged as a major 
intellectual tradition, and had became predominant in China's social, political and 
cultural life. It also gradually entered three other cultural areas: Korea, Japan and 
Vietnam. Of these, Korea was the most Confucianised. During the Yi Dynasty, from 
the 14th century to the early 20th century, there was a conscious attempt by the 
political elite to Confucianise Korean society. 
Confucianism developed and reached the peripheral countries at various stages of its 
development. The major development of Confucianism occurred in the Song dynasty 
(AD 960 - 1279) when leading Confucian scholars of the time called for a more 
accurate reading of the classics and for a reformulation of Confucian rituals to 
counter the growth of Buddhism. These neo-Confucianists were also concerned with 
extending Confucian practices beyond the elite. Unprecedented government efforts 
were devoted to regulating people's behaviour and shaping their ideas, through mass 
education, punishment and rewards. As a result, Confucianism took a strong hold 
among commoners. Although the specific contents changed in the process of 
development, its basic concerns with authority, family, service to society, 
harmonious human relationship, education, and individual self-cultivation persisted. 
The essence of Confucianism is the belief in the Way, a great natural order which 
exists in its own right without design. Balance and harmony in the Way serve as a 
model for human society, which can reach perfection only when it functions in 
accordance with an order characterised by harmony, balance and tranquillity. Neither 
the natural nor the social order is conceived of as created by some divine power. 
Rather, the linkages between natural and human society make man and the world of 
man the centre of Confucianism. 
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Confucian society is characterised by explicit social hierarchies. The underlying 
justification for social stratification comes from the assumption that the ideal society 
has a natural order and that men, endowed with different capacities by nature, have 
different positions within that order. Its hierarchical foundations are expressed in 
terms of three main bonds: father-son, husband-wife, and ruler-ruled. On this basis 
the structural core of society was built around the 'five cardinal relations': relations 
between ruler and ruled; parents and children; husband and wife; brother and brother; 
and friend and friend. 
Looking at the idea of a naturally hierarchic society from the western point of view, 
it is tempting to conclude that Confucianism assumes that all men are born unequal. 
However, social inequality in the Confucian sense reflects conformity to a natural 
order of things. Rather than holding that all men are of equal value, Confucianism 
stresses that all men are infinitely perfectible, since man can always adjust himself to 
the Way so as to reach the perfect state. Moreover, no matter how different people's 
social positions are, there is no necessary conflict of interests because they share the 
same goal - to conform to the natural harmonious order. 
The most important institution in a Confucian society is the family. A great deal of 
Confucianism is concerned with proposing rational justifications or theoretical 
expressions for this core social institution. Hýnce Confucian society can be seen in 
many ways, as the extension of the family, and Confucian virtues as extensions of the 
familial virtues. Of the five cardinal relationships, three are determined directly by 
kinship, and the other two can also be conceived of in terms of family. Thus the 
relationship between ruler and ruled can be viewed as analogous to that between 
father and son, and that between friend and friend as similar to that between elder and 
younger brother. 
Within the Confucian family, the father is the source of authority, and the elders are 
to be respected. Family relationships are governed by filial piety, which is considered 
the root of all Confucian virtues. It requires that children should obey and confonn to 
the rules set by the father, showing reverence and respect to him, and be absolutely 
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submissive. However, far from being a one-way obligation, it is considered as a 
natural response to the father's love, concern and care, as manifest by his 
responsibility for his children's well-being and education. By the same rule, younger 
members of the family are required to pay loyalty and obedience to elder ones, and 
the wife to her husband. 
The essence of the Confucian family system is its continuity. The maintenance of this 
geneality rests on the belief that original relationships remain in force despite the 
death of a senior, hence the development of ancestor worship. This practice is 
confined to the kinship group and plays an indispensable role in reinforcing the 
cohesion of family and clan. Ancestor worship is conducted through rites (D) which 
consist mainly of mourning observances and continuing sacrifices. These rites were 
originally wrapped around with superstition and mythology. For commoners, 
deceased seniors possessed even more spiritual power than they had enjoyed in life. 
By showing their continuing love and remembrance through the rites, they expected 
to receive blessings sent by the ancestors. But within revised interpretations of the 
Confucianists, these aspects were purged. 
The explicit rationalising of the rites of the ancestral cult was the work especially of 
Xun Zi. This is illustrated in his discussion of sacrifice, 
Sacrifice is the expression of man's emotions produced by affectionate longing. 
It represents the height of piety and faithfulness, of love and respect. It 
represents also the completion of propriety and refinement. ... The sage plainly 
understands it; the scholar and superior man accordingly perform it. It becomes 
the routine of the official; it becomes an established custom of the people. 
Among superior men it is considered to be human activity; among the common 
people it is considered to be serving the spirits (Xun Zi, Book 19). 
Next to the family stands government. As the social institution charged with keeping 
harmony and order, it inevitably receives special attention in Confucian thought. 
Fundamental to the Confucian theory of government is the concept of the Mandate of 
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Heaven, which proposes that the emperor holds his office by virtue of a commission 
from Heaven, though not himself a divinity. This Mandate however is conditional 
and can be withdrawn from a ruler if he fails to live up to expectations. The ruler is 
the Son of Heaven, and just as there cannot be two suns in the sky, so there cannot be 
two Sons of Heaven on earth. Therefore all power comes from one supreme ruler 
who is both the natural focal point of loyalty and sole source of authority. In order 
not to lose his mandate the ruler must bring benefits to the people and guarantee them 
a secure livelihood. As formulated by Mencius: 'Heaven sees as the people see. 
Heaven hears as the people hear' (Mencius, Book 7). Thus the acquiescence of those 
who are governed legitimates the governing power. Conversely, Confucianism also 
provides a justification for overthrowing a ruler. 
Because the Confucian ruler is seen as the co-ordinating link between nature and 
man, and the leader in man's effort to conform to the Way, his ascendancy is moral, 
not social. The expectations a ruler has to fulfil are summarised in the Confucian 
classic the Doctrine of the Mean: 
Only the perfect sage in the world has quickness of apprehension, intelligence, 
insight, and wisdom, which enable him to embrace all men; vigour, strength, 
firmness, and resolution, which enable him to maintain a firm hold; orderliness, 
seriousness, adherence to the Mean, and correctness, which enable him to be 
reverent; pattern, order, refinement, and penetration, which enable him to 
exercise discrimination. All embracing and extensive, and deep and unceasingly 
springing, these virtues come forth at all times. All embracing and extensive as 
heaven and deep and unceasingly springing as an abyss! He appears and all 
people respect him, speaks and all people believe him, acts and all people are 
pleased with him. Consequently his fame spreads overflowingly over the Middle 
Kingdom and extends to barbarous tribes. Wherever the heavens overshadow 
and the earth sustains, wherever the sun and moon shine, and wherever frosts 
and dew fall, all who have blood and breath honour and love him. Therefore we 
say that he is a counterpart of Heaven (Chan, 1963: 98). 
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Thus the ruler is required to be the most learned, the most virtuous, and the one who 
conforms best to the Way. Even though the ruler has to deal with mundane policy 
issues, his main duty is to set a good example which people will wish to emulate. 
Similarly, government is made up of virtuous scholars, and its main task is to 
maintain the peace, unity and continuity required by the Way. 
The Confucian belief in the perfectibility of man calls upon people's devotion and 
knowledge to achieve the fullest measure of their potential. Confucians however 
never assume that people can achieve perfection without effort; and effort means 
education. The Confucian theory of education is succinctly set forth in the Doctrine 
of the Mean: 'What Nature imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our 
nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called education' (Chan, 1963: 112). 
Education, in other words, is self-cultivation and self-realisation. The corollary is that 
the main task of education is the cultivation of moral character and the development 
of virtues, rather than the learning of specialised skills. 
The desired result of self-cultivation is usually described in terms of certain virtues. 
Much space in Confucian texts is given to the five constant virtues: Ren 
(benevolence), Yi (righteousness), Li (propriety), Zhi (wisdom) and Xin 
(faithfulness). Ren means 'love with distinctions', that is, love graded outwards from 
the family and focused particularly on the virtuous. It is considered to be a universal 
cosmic virtue which in effect generates all the other virtues. Yi can be seen as a 
unifying and ordering principle and a standard for moral judgement. Simply stated, it 
is knowing what to do and what not to do. Li gives structure and concrete expression 
to Ren. Zhi, from a Confucian stand-point, is the only kind of knowledge worth 
pssession. It is defined as knowledge of filial piety and fraternal submission, as a 
feeling of approving and disapproving, and as the ability to recognise human talent. 
Xin, good faith, is usually expressed in combination with other values such as 
loyalty, reciprocity and sincerity. 
In Confucianism, Li conveys a broad range of ideas. It can mean rules of social 
conduct which regulate human behaviour in all social circumstances. It can also 
126 
mean ceremonies and rituals, extending from the most weighty religious observances 
to the trivialities of daily etiquette. In this sense, the Li provide refinement and 
purification to man's emotions and distinguish culture from nature. As a personal 
virtue, Li requires people to behave according to the Li or to observe the Li carefully. 
The Li were originally only applicable to the nobility. But with the ascendancy of 
Confucianism, much of the thinking around Li and the practice of the Li became 
accepted by commoners, and was further reinforced during the neo-Confacianism 
movement. The emphasis on the Li has made daily life in a Confucian society highly 
ceremonial and people's relationships full of formality. 
From the above description we can generalise some basic characteristic of 
Confucianism. Firstly, although the Way is the ultimate order for Confucianism, its 
emphasis is on the human being. Attention is accordingly focused upon the real 
world, the world of men. Confucian problems are the problems of men living in 
society - not as social equals, but in hierarchical relationships. Confucius had stressed 
that the task of a man is to first discipline himself, after that to regulate his family, 
then to govern the state, and finally to lead the world into peace. Similarly, as a 
theory, Confucianism is about the self-cultivation of individuals, the ethics of the 
family, the rules of government, and the guidelines for a harmonious order of the 
world. 
Secondly, even though it has been the dominant ideology for over a thousand years in 
the Far East, Confucianism has always coexisted with other ideas. Incorporating what 
it needed from its adversaries, or what it could not overcome, it became with time 
both richer and more accommodating. As a result of their mutual influence on each 
other, Confucianist, Taoist and Buddhist systems used more or less same kind of 
language, which became so pervasive that even the rhetoric of peasant rebellions 
throughout Chinese history has been informed by it. 
Thirdly, because of the Confucian emphasis on human world, morality is considered 
more important than capability. Morality reflects the relationship between human 
beings, whilst capability reflects the relationship between human beings and the 
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material world. Since human relationships are the focus point of Confucianism, being 
moral is more highly valued than being capable. The essential mark of a superior 
person is therefore to be found in his or her moral excellence, regardless of birth or 
status. Thence, the primary obligation of every individual is to perfect oneself as a 
moral being within the human relationships that bind one to society. 
5.2 The Modern Transformation of Confucianism 
Beginning with the Opium War in 1840, imperial China had a series of encounters 
with the western powers and suffered humiliating defeats. As a result, more and more 
people began to acknowledge western superiority and favoured the adoption of 
western ways in order to strengthen and modemise the nation. The May Fourth 
Movement in 1919 marked the fundamental renunciation of Confucianism in China. 
It called for a radical break from the past, replacing Confucian values with a 
commitment to 'science and democracy. ' Almost simultaneously, Koreans also turned 
against Confucianism. Not only was it perceived as an obstacle to modem 
development, it was also viewed as an external tradition imposed by the Chinese and 
as such inconsistent with the mounting support for nationalisml. 
Since then, East Asian societies have experienced dramatic social changes. And 
Confucianism, though retaining many of its essential attributes, has inevitably been 
altered and adapted. The transformation is manifest in almost every aspects of 
Confucianism. For example, although the primary responsibility of government is 
still seen as looking after the people, its basis of legitimacy is no longer grounded 
exclusively in the high moral standards of officials. Similarly, although the zeal for 
education remains, its contents are no longer Confucian teachings. We also see how 
the central rules governing family relations have extended to many other modem 
organisations while the size and the role of the family itself are gradually diminishing 
with the movement from extended to nuclear forms. But the biggest change is in 
1 It is worth noting that during the same period the Japanese in Korea had been mobilising 
Confucianism in an effort to demonstrate that they and the Korean shared common cultural roots. 
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attitudes towards money, which was traditionally considered the source of evil. 
Nowadays it has become the universal standard of success, and an ambitious person 
is encouraged to aspire to material accumulation. 
Traditionally, Confucian rulers had absolute power over people's lives. They had the 
Mandate of Heaven and held the high grounds of morality and knowledge. Prior to 
the democratisation movement and with the possible exception of Hong Kong, 
governments in the modem East Asian societies still held the unchallenged, supreme 
position, were staffed by highly educated bureaucrats, and regulated almost every 
aspects of people's lives. But things have changed. While the principle of 
meritocracy dominates, moral supremacy is no longer claimed in the same way. 
Instead, it is the extraordinary pace of economic progress that has maintained a broad 
pragmatic base of popular acquiescence. Furthermore, Mencius's warning to 
traditional rulers, that Heaven sees what people see and Heaven hears what people 
hear, is becoming a reality. Modem governments are no longer omnipotent. More 
than ever, their authority is based on the reciprocal ground, which requires them to 
deliver economic gains in exchange for political obedience. 
In a Confucian family one is taught to subordinate one's own interests for the benefit 
of the family. In modem East Asia, this concept has been extended so that one is 
required to put public or national interests above personal goals. As the late President 
Park Chung-hee of South Korea argued: 
Just as a home is a small collective body, so the state is a larger community.... 
One who does not maintain a wholesome family order cannot be expected to 
show strong devotion to his state.... A society that puts the national interest 
above the interests of the individual develops faster than one which does not. 
(quoted in MacFarquhar, 1980: 70) 
Similar expressions are found in the newspaper stories discussed later in this chapter. 
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In East Asian societies decision-making is strongly centralised within the 
government. No group can exert the same degree of influence on policy-making 
process. Confucius urged every learned moral person to strive for a governing 
position so that people could benefit from his knowledge and morality. Today, 
government service has continued to be a prime goal for the educated elite. It is 
characterised by a strong executive whose officials are expected to decide what the 
people should have and to deliver it as their wisdom dictates. Since officials are 
assumed to know best, the concepts of loyal opposition and open debate on policy are 
not widely accepted by those in power. On the contrary, political opponents tend to 
be viewed as troublemakers and subversives. 
These governments are also highly regulative. Apart from their involvement in the 
process of economic development, they define national goals and assume a central 
regulatory role in nearly every sphere of society. They also direct the education of the 
populace and guide social interaction. As we noted earlier, the most comprehensive 
manifestation of this impetus to moral regulation is in Singapore. Other East Asian 
societies, notable Taiwan, have also pursued it, though on a lesser scale. 
Traditionally, the primary basis of legitimacy was the demonstration of high moral 
standards coupled with an extensive knowledge of Conftician classics. Today, the 
principle of meritocracy dominates, with government officials obtaining higher 
degrees in subjects of modem sciences. This is not surprising since no East Asian 
government has been able to lay plausible claim moral supremacy in the same way. 
The governments of both Taiwan and south Korea during the economic take-off 
period were headed by the military generals. Their only credentials were their ability 
to maintain political stability and to improve people's living standards2. In Hong 
Kong, people accept 'immoral' colonial rule for economic prosperity. 
From the analysis in previous chapters, we see that the East Asian NIS goverm-nents 
are committed to economic development. They have pushed industrialists to move 
into certain designated industries while promising to protect them against 
2 One evidence is that Park's rule of south Korea ended when his HCI initiative failed him. 
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competition or the risk of failure. They have also assumed responsibility for 
disciplining labour, in order to ensure smooth production. Furthermore, these 
governments have adopted various measure to ensure that the fruits of economic 
growth are relatively equally distributed. Not only have the East Asian NISs enjoyed 
relatively equitable distributions of income, but public housing, education, health and 
medical services, transportation, and basic food supplies are heavily subsidised, 
mostly to the benefit of lower-income groups. While handing out relatively small 
amounts of welfare payments themselves, governments have also urged companies to 
take responsibility for the welfare of their employees. As a result, most people have 
seen their quality of life improve along with the growth of economy. 
The cardinal social institution in Confucian thought, the family, remains basic to the 
life of modem East Asians. In rural areas, the traditional extended family is still 
common, and many activities such as ancestor worship, weddings and funerals 
continue to be carried out inside the clan. In the cities, although the nuclear family is 
becoming the norm, family relationships and responsibilities are still important. One 
survey conducted by Lau and Kuan (1989: 59), for example, revealed that filial piety 
still occupies an important position in the minds of the Hong Kong Chinese. 87.6% 
of respondents agreed with the statement that the first thing to do in order to build a 
good society was to have everyone practising filial piety. Support for this ideal as a 
social virtue even leads the Hong Kong Chinese to support legalisation making its 
non-observance a punishable 'crime'. 77.1% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that the government should enact laws to punish children who failed to take care of 
their elderly parents. Evidence from Singapore shows that filial piety is not only a 
prevailing attitude, but also an everyday practice. As recently as the early 1980s, 
about 75% of old people who had children lived with them. Considering Singapore's 
physical constitution as a modem city, this percentage is high. 
The family, therefore, has played an important role as the site of social welfare and 
service delivery. It has been argued that the 'East Asian social welfare regimes' are 
characterised by a system of family welfare that negates much of the need for state 
welfare. If we look at welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP, East Asian 
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societies appear to spend much less than some of their Europe counterparts, about 
50% of the UK level, 35% of the Swedish (Goodman & Peng, 1996). While these 
European 'welfare states' are encountering severe problems of escalating cost of 
pensions and social security, the relatively low amount of government spending in 
these areas in the East Asian NISs has freed up public money for more direct 
investment in mechanisms designed to achieve economic growth. 
Within the family children are expected to respect and obey their parents who in turn, 
are supposed to know and want the best for them. This continues even when the 
children grow up. One example is marriage. Traditionally, marriages were arranged 
between the families of the prospective bride and groom with little or no regard for 
the couple's wishes. Nowadays, although young people can find partners on the basis 
of mutual emotional attachment, the approval of both families remains essential. 
Many marriages are still arranged by the family, but not without the young couple's 
consent. Moreover, the lavish wedding is often conducted at the expense of the 
parents. 
However, while the size of family is becoming smaller and the practice of ancestor 
worship less popular, part of the influence the family formerly enjoyed has been 
projected onto other groupings based on common local origin, shared school 
experience, and the workplace. People within such groups have a strong sense of 
shared identity and mutual responsibility, which is not unlike the ties operating 
within the extended family. In a society where personal relationships take precedence 
over regulations, such groups are an essential source of sympathetic support in times 
of need. 
But the most important new function of the family, especially in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, is its extension into economic life. As documented in the previous chapters, 
the family constitutes the basic unit of productive organisation in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Businessmen participate in the market not as individuals, but as members of 
families. The goal is not individual advancement, but the prosperity of the family. 
Family savings help to finance new businesses and family members provide labour 
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willing to work for long, flexible hours in adverse conditions. Again, the survey 
conducted by Lau and Kuan (1989: 60-61) provides support. 74.6% of respondents 
agreed that they had a responsibility to help relatives in financial need, and 77.4% 
claimed that they would do so heartily. Also, when Hong Kong Chinese are in 
trouble, they tend to be more willing to accept help from relatives than from the 
government. 70.9% of respondents said they would opt for their families when in 
economic straits, only 6.3% selected the government. 
While the family has transformed into the family business, the Confucian code 
governing the family still applies. The head is able to exercise a large amount of 
decision-making power without consultation as well as to direct the organisation 
toward change if need be, although as with a father, this power is accompanied by an 
obligation to show a benevolent concern for the welfare of subordinates. The other 
positions in the organisation are staffed by relatives and people who are loyal and 
obedient (Redding, 1996). Even in large corporations as in South Korea, heads tend 
to exercise 'Confucian patriarchal authority and privilege in their actual business 
management' (Kim, 1996). As we mentioned in Chapter 3, employees in response 
tend to identify themselves as members of a company family, such as the Hyundai 
family, the Samsung family, or the Daewoo family. 
In a traditional Confucian culture knowledge was highly valued and educated people 
highly respected. Both the Confucian classics and Confucian practice established 
scholarship as the principal route to fame and for-tune. This respect for education and 
knowledge has continued in modem East Asian NISs. As one 1990 survey in Taiwan 
shows, only 38% of respondents were satisfied with their own educational 
achievement, and 80% would like to increase their knowledge (Chu, 1994). While 
this may seem odd given the already high general educational attainment in Taiwan, 
it is readily understandable when one realises that education is the key to success in 
modem East Asian NISs. It brings both wealth and fame. Very often, good positions 
in government and business require a college degree from a prestigious university, 
which in turn requires students to pass rigorous exams as a condition of entry. 
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One indicator of the importance of the education is the high esteem accorded to the 
academic establishment. In South Korea, for example, many marriages are conducted 
by professors. Professors also frequently contribute to newspapers, often using their 
relatively unassailable position (compared to staff reporters) to snipe at government 
policies. In Hong Kong, as a recent opinion poll revealed, about a third of the young 
people polled felt that the votes of intellectuals should have more weight than others 
(Wilson, 1990). 
One ftirther fact strengthens the link between education and Confucian culture. In 
Singapore there is a considerable educational performance gap between the Chinese 
and the other major ethnic groups. Singapore has a streaming system in which the 
best students are directed into bilingual superschools that will help them rise to the 
top, and the rest are placed in monolingual, vocationally oriented schools geared to 
producing a skilled and competent work force. As the figures show, 20% of Indians 
drift into the lower streams, while the average percentage for the population as a 
whole is 12%. The performance of the Malays is even worse. They make up a 
disproportionately large proportion of the lower stream and suffer high exam failure 
rates. Although constituting 15% of the population, Malays account for only 1.5% of 
university graduates, despite provisions allowing qualified Malays a free university 
education (Milne & Mauzy, 1990). 
While one can plausibly attribute the value placed on education in the East Asian 
NISs to Confucianism, the contents of curricula are determined more by the needs of 
technology oriented modem societies. Traditionally Confucian classics were the only 
knowledge deemed desirable. Nowadays degrees in engineering, business 
administration, economics, are sought after. Moreover, many people obtained their 
degrees from western universities. In South Korea, for instance, the alumni of 
American and Japanese universities have dominated the ministries and boardrooms. 
Half the chairmen of the top 30 business groups have been educated at American 
universities, and another quarter at Japanese ones (The Economist, 3 June 1995). 
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Finally, the transformation of Confucianism is manifested in interpersonal 
relationship and personal values. Many elements, such as the emphasis on 
hierarchical relationship, collective interests and harmony, remain unchanged. Some 
virtues such as diligence and frugality have been accentuated, and yet some others 
have been discarded. As mentioned earlier however, the most pronounced change of 
all, is in attitudes towards money. Long gone is the traditional view that wealth is 
irrelevant to a person's success. 
Deriving from the family relationship, interpersonal relations outside the family are 
characterised by hierarchies. For centuries East Asians have been conditioned to 
accept a society divided into carefully prescribed ranks. This is still of vital 
importance today. High esteem remains closely related to authority, to age and to 
learning, but the possession of money has now been added to this list of criteria. 
Childhood training in a Confucian family produces personalities which are 
disciplined and dutifU13. The observation of one's role in a hierarchical family 
subordinates the individual to the group. Despite the infusion of western ideas, East 
Asians are still more comfortable identifying with collectives rather than 
individuality. Closely related to this disposition is the importance placed on 
harmonious relationships. Since a collective can function properly only when 
harmony is achieved, conflicts are solved through interpersonal accommodation and 
mutual adjustment. Confrontations are avoided. The modem business management in 
East Asia is based on the notion of harmony, as exemplified by the famous Japanese 
model. 
Of all Confucian traits, the one that is most clearly displayed and strengthened, is 
perhaps diligence. During the economic take-off period the people in the East Asian 
NISs, both entrepreneurs and workers alike, worked incredible long hours under 
adverse working conditions. In Hong Kong, many people take two jobs, and working 
from 5 am in the morning till II pm at night is not unusual. Not only does Confucian 
teaching ask people to work hard, but hard work is also the most important way 
for 
3 As shown in the 1990 Social Attitude-opinion Survey of Taiwan (Chu, 1994), only 25.5% of the 
respondents agree with the statement that 'sufficient freedom is good for development of children'. 
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immigrants from humble origin to achieve wealth and success. In South Korea, until 
mid-1980s, both employers and employees worked six days a week, 12 hours a day. 
The founder of the Daewoo industrial group, Kim Woo Choong, never took a day off 
until 1990 when his son was killed in a car accident (The Economist, 3 June, 1995). 
To fully understand the ways Confucianism has adapted to the conditions in the 
modem East Asian NISs, one has to pay particular attention to the change of attitude 
towards money. In Hong Kong especially, people's unashamed attachment to money 
is probably without parallel in any other part of the world. As noted above, 
traditionally Confucianism concentrates on the moral-political dimensions of the 
society. Economic activities are secondary. At the individual level, aggressive 
money-making is considered ungentlemanly. However, a major section of Confucian 
societies is made up of peasants. The traditional Confucian expectation of them is 
fairly low: as long as they work hard to produce, serve their parents well, and support 
their wives, they are following the path to good (Mencius, book 3). Therefore, the 
major task of a peasant is to provide his family with a comfortable life. 
In the case of Singapore and Hong Kong, the Chinese population is largely made up 
of either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who come mainly from a 
peasant background with a mission of money-making. The emphasis on material 
values within the Chinese community is hardly surprising. The capitalist system has 
further enhanced the role of money. Nowadays personal wealth has become an 
important measure of social esteem, though not necessarily displacing traditional 
indicators of education, government service and family background. In Hong Kong, 
the love for money has been further reinforced by the restricted opportunities for 
political mobility. Unlike traditional or modem China, where political power is 
theoretically obtainable by everybody, the highest political offices have been beyond 
the grasp of the Hong Kong Chinese. Therefore they have turned more to economic 
activity for fulfilment. 
In Taiwan and South Korea, however, the strong presence of a scholar-bureaucratic 
class made transition of in attitudes towards money-making a slightly different story. 
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On the one hand, the peasants-turned-workers in South Korea had little inhibition in 
pursuing money. For the Taiwanese entrepreneurs who were mostly descendants of 
early immigrants from the mainland, the accumulation of wealth doubled as both an 
essential activity to ensure the continuation of the family and the principal means to 
rise with a society under Japanese and the KMT rule. On the other hand, the leaders 
and literati who have inherited the high Confucianism had to proceed to build a 
strong nation through economic development. When economic development is 
designated as the highest value of society, all other values are relegated to a 
secondary position. Within this context, money is sanctioned and encouraged. 
Therefore, an individual's pursuit of money is justified for its contribution to nation 
building. 
5.3 Popular Confucianism - Tales From Two Newspapers 
As we have argued, social and economic changes in modem East Asia have brought 
about an unprecedented transformation in Confucianism. Traditionally the carriers of 
Confucianism were the intellectual elite and state bureaucrats, and the major means 
of ensuring its continued ascendancy was through Confucian education and state 
regulation. Nowadays, however, East Asian governments are no longer staffed by 
intellectuals familiar with the Confucian classics, there are relatively few explicit 
state regulations designed to implement Confucianism, and Confucian teachings and 
values jostle for attention with a range of other thought systems in the school 
curriculum. The Confucianism at work in the current situation then is a popular form 
which has penetrated the lives of ordinary people, who might never have read a 
Confucian classic. 
To understand how popular Confucianism functions in ordinary people's daily life, 
one needs to examine the ways Confucian ideas are communicated on a day-to-day 
basis in the major institutions of public culture. The press provides a particularly 
productive focus for such an exploration because it is a public space in which a range 
of speakers and discourses compete for attention and credibility. Market 
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considerations also mean that these discourses have to be 'translated' into popular 
forms in order to mobilise readerships with different interests and different levels of 
education. This section presents an analysis of some stories from two newspapers, 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao from Taiwan and Ming Bao from Hong Kong, in order to 
provide an illustration of contemporary Confucianism in action in everyday popular 
discourse in East Asian societieS4. 
Although logistical problems in assembling the sample dictated that the newspapers 
studied came from only two societies, they are selected to represent the two main 
groupings of East Asian NISs: Singapore and Hong Kong; and Taiwan and South 
Korea. Both Singapore and Hong Kong are city states made up of immigrants, 
predominantly Chinese. Because of their geographical position, both developed as 
entrepots, with Singapore serving South-East Asia and Hong Kong China. Even 
though both societies have achieved great success in developing manufacture 
industries, trade continues to play an important role in their economies. They also 
serve as regional financial and service centres. Furthermore, they share a historical 
background as British colonies. While Singapore is ruled by British-educated 
officials under a parliamentary system copied from Britain, Hong Kong was still 
under the British rule at the time the present study was done. In the absence of a 
Confucian elite and government officials who could officially safeguard and promote 
Confucianism (until the mid-1980s in Singapore), Confucian culture was transmitted 
mainly through Chinese families and social customs. 98% of Hong Kong's 
population and 76% of Singapore's are Chinese, and all Chinese have inherited a 
Confucian legacy to some degree. 
On the other hand, both Taiwan and Korea possess a decent size economy with a 
population more than most European countries. They both started the process of 
industrialisation with a sizeable agricultural sector and succeeded in transforming the 
economic structure into a manufacturing-based system. During this process, both 
governments protected their domestic industries, and directly intervened in economic 
4 For a detailed explanation of content analysis design and the quantitative analysis, please refer to 
Chapter Six. 
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activities. They also share the legacy of being Japanese colonies. The Japanese not 
only left them with an improved infrastructure and better educated labour, but also 
provided them a model for economic development. In addition, both societies have a 
long history under Confucian influence, which is officially recognised as part of their 
heritage today. The birthdays of Confucius and other prominent Confucians are 
celebrated nation wide. There are also many government supported organisations 
devoted to the study and propagation of Confucianism, and its moral teachings are 
incorporated into every part of the curriculum from kindergarten to high school 
(Meyer, 1988). 
Although Taiwan and Hong Kong share a similar basis for economic development, 
with a preponderance of small, mostly family-owned, firms, their political situations 
are very different. The implications of these differences for popular representations 
and uses of Confucianism will be explored in detail in the next chapter. The purpose 
of the present discussion is to see how core Confucian tenets and values shared in 
common by the East Asian NISs have been transformed and translated into public 
discourse. The emphasis therefore is on common elements. 
The Stories 
Confucianism itself was a consistent and frequent topic of the stories, with most 
adopting a positive attitude towards it. One good example is a news story covering 
the inauguration ceremony of the Temple of Confucius. The story, which was on the 
front page of Zhong Yang Ri Bao (26 January 1975, hereafter ZYRB), devoted more 
than 70% of its space to a written speech by Chen, the president of The Institute of 
Confucianism in Taiwan. The story proclaimed that; 
Confucianism, a part of Chinese culture, is the true path leading all the people in 
the world to coexist and develop peacefully. ... 
(This is because) widely applied capitalism emphasises profits rather than 
morality, and destructive communism values materials rather than human 
beings. Both lead to an imbalance in people's life and chaos in society. 
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Chen was not the only one to assign a central role to Confucianism as the 
philosophical basis for a 'new world order'. A similar sentiment was expressed in an 
essay in which the author argued that there would soon be a global culture. As to 
what it might be, he went on to say, 
Nowadays there are three major cultures in the world: the Hebrew culture 
represented by Christianity, Greek culture represented by scientific reasoning 
and Chinese culture represented by Confucianism. Which of them can 
incorporate the others to become the culture of the world? The 'Crusades'? Or 
4nuclear power'? History has showed that the only choice is Confucianism. It has 
absorbed the thoughts of Taoism, Legalism and Buddhism and has become the 
leading current of thought which develops along with time. We Chinese must 
take the responsibility to assimilate foreign cultures in order to lead the world 
trend (19 May 1976, ZYRB). 
This statement goes beyond pride in Confucianism to a degree of smugness, but it is 
entirely in line with traditional Confucian thinking that China is the centre of the 
world and that Confucianism is the pre-eminent world philosophy. 
Not only Confucianists and columnists but also academics articulated the superiority 
of Confucianism. One long article written by a law professor analysed different 
theories of modem civil law and Confucius' sayings on law. He concluded that 
'despite the two thousand years between them, they showed remarkable similarities, 
which demonstrated the long-standing greatness of Confucian thoughts' (18 January 
1975, ZYRB). Another long article on economic activities and society started by 
saying, 'modem people constantly seek pleasure. This leads to profit centred 
business. While the desire for profits goes higher and higher, the methods used to 
gain them becomes more and more unscrupulous. Thus there are more and more 
crimes in the economic field. ' The way to solve the problem, proposed the author, 
was to apply Confucian ethics to business, so that spiritual values and especially Ren 
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and Yi were sought after rather than money. Then 'the society would be peaceftil and 
people happy'(7 October 1985, ZYRB). 
Not all commentators looked on Confucianism with admiration however. One essay 
in Ming Bao (18 February 1992, hereafter MB) examined the economic performances 
of Hong Kong and the overseas Chinese and came to the conclusion that they were 
able to do well because they were free from the 'burden' of Confucianism. This 
conclusion conveniently assumed that there was no Confucian influence in Hong 
Kong and among overseas Chinese, and ignored other economically successful 
Confucian societies. Nevertheless, the essay made it very clear that in the writer's 
view Confucianism is harmful to economic development. 
However, none of the items criticising Confucianism could compare with those 
promoting it in terms of the extent of their analysis, their frequent references to 
Confucius and Confucian classics, or their enthusiasm and assertiveness. Most were 
short, concentrating on a narrow point, and employing rather vague and general terms 
such as 'Chinese', 'tradition' or 'society'. The example below was one of the 
harshest criticism of Confucianism in the sample: 
Individualism is popular in the West. Although it is not perfect, and extreme 
individualism can be bad, it has thousands of merits comparing to the no- 
individual Chinese tradition. ... The oppression 
(of the individual in Chinese 
society) has killed countless creative thinkers. Some people are simply destroyed 
by group pressure. I believe that if individuals could have some more freedom, 
our society will benefit from it in the end (14 February 1992, MB). 
The interesting point to note about this argument is that the author's support for 
individualism was based on its supposed benefits to the society- Hence, we could 
argue that the importance of the collective interest, one of the core Confucian 
doctrines, was deeply embedded in his reasoning despite his overtly critical stance. 
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Another important focus of the stories sampled, the value of Chinese culture and 
tradition, have close connections with Confucianism. Though many articles went to 
great lengths to celebrate its virtues, the phrase 'Chinese culture' was never precisely 
defined. It could mean variously: Chinese art, literature, philosophy, custom, 
tradition, or simply, Confucianism. In their rhetoric and enthusiasm they were similar 
in many ways to those arguing the greatness of Confucianism. One article claimed 
that Chinese culture was the culture best suited to the creation of a better world. 
According to the author, 
Chinese culture, the exemplar of oriental culture, is based on moral values. It 
promotes humanity, benevolence and compassion. Although there were many 
wars in Chinese history, in the end they could often turn hostility into friendship, 
bring about a mixture of different races, and reach great harmony under one rule. 
This eternal peace and harmony is also the ultimate goal of mankind. The more 
advanced a society is, the more glorious and paramount is this goal. Therefore 
Chinese culture, which leads human beings towards peace and harmony, should 
be enhanced and made known to the world (3 October 1985, ZYRB). 
One well known intellectual, Yang Jinzhu, made the same point by arguing that 
Chinese culture is superior to western culture. According to him, the western value 
system is based on Christianity. From the birth of Darwinism to Nietzsche's 
declaration that 'God is dead', Christianity had suffered severe attacks from modem 
science and philosophy. The foundations of western culture have therefore been 
destroyed. The individual has lost himself and is unable to deal with his relationships 
with people and society. By comparison, the fundamental theme of Chinese culture 
is 
of people living with others in society. Life in this world is the source of ultimate 
happiness. This idea is valid and applicable to daily life as long as one has to deal 
with other people. Chinese culture is therefore an ideal counter to compensate 
for the 
declining morality in the West (8 February 1985, MB). 
Since Chinese culture is defined as 'great', many writers urged its promotion to the 
world. Most items in this theme talked about the need to do this. 
A few also 
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considered how to do it. Among them were proposals for developing closer 
associations with the Americans. One article even set up some 'principles to 
propagate Chinese culture'. Firstly it argued that ordinary people rather than scholars 
should be targeted, and that the words should be simple, easy to understand, and 
touching, so as to reach the people and move them. Secondly the word 'tradition' 
should be avoided, because it is almost synonymous with 'old fashioned'. Thirdly 
Chinese culture needs to embrace innovation, such as using laser beams for 
acupuncture instead of needles or translating the Classics into computer language. 
(I I October 1985, ZYRB) 
In accordance with the sense of pride in Chinese culture, there was also a sense of 
pride in being Chinese, as evidenced in the headline of a news item, 'Let the young 
generation be proud of being Chinese'. The story concerned the compilation of a text 
book for overseas Chinese. The major concern was to write it in such a way that 
'overseas Chinese children can be influenced by Chinese culture through learning the 
Chinese language'. (7 January 1993, ZYRB). The effort involved in this could be 
justified by the words of an overseas Chinese mother from another article: 'the 
children who received Chinese education know filial piety, benevolence and 
kindness. The children who received foreign education only think of their own 
interests' (23 January 1985, ZYRB). 
Themes referring to government and officials also featured frequently in the sample. 
Most of them appeared in Zhong Yang Ri Bao, especially around the time of the split 
in the KMT. In 1993 seven KMT members left the party to set up a new one. 
Although this kind of action may be normal in the West, it was unprecedented in 
Taiwan. When these members first announced their intention of establishing a new 
party, the attitude of the party leader was 'to try everything to talk them back'. 
President Li asked the party members to 'deal with their reckless action with 
generosity and benevolence. It is like a child who has left his home under an impulse. 
When it happens, the parents and the seniors should be patient and use kind words to 
tell him what is wrong and what is right. Criticism does not help much. Whatever 
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happens in the end we should not treat these party members as enemies' (8 August 
1993, ZYRB). 
After the new party was set up, however, criticisms were poured over them. One long 
front page editorial categorised their action as immoral. It argued that, 'Chinese 
people are educated under Confucianism. They behave according to the rules of 
loyalty, filial piety, and propriety. Disregarding their wrongs in political terms, their 
behaviour is unacceptable for true gentlemen. They are "brought up" by the KMT. 
Without the party they could not have today's fame and public support. Now they 
just desert it. This cannot be justified by any means'. At the end of the article, since 
the new party had already been set up, the author asked them to behave well from 
now on. 'Everyone who acknowledges the basic rules of human behaviour hopes that 
you will behave like good children of Chinese people, not ones forgetting the rules of 
filial piety. These are words from the bottom of our hearts, expressed by a painful 
pen. The good or bad things you do affect not just several people around you, they 
affect the whole of Taiwan and China. We hope that you have achieved what you 
wanted, but please remember, while seeking your happiness, do not bring damage to 
your colleagues and brothers' (12 August 1993, ZYRB). 
The new party could not be tolerated because, to a certain extent, it destroyed the 
myth of a stable and peaceful environment, the dream for all Chinese rulers. 
Historically, stability was seen as the most important condition for a society's 
prosperity. The government in Taiwan was no exception in believing it. The prime 
minister had explained the ultimate aim of his government as 'a stable nation, 
wealthy people, and fair society' (3 Jan. 1993, ZYRB). More dramatically it appeared 
in the headline: 'The most important thing for a nation is stability! stability! and 
stability! ' The headline introduced an interview with an experienced politician, Yu, 
in which he expressed the view that the basic and the most important task of a 
government is to serve its people, and that in order to achieve this it has to maintain a 
stable environment so that the people can enjoy their lives without being disturbed 
(12 January 1993, ZYRB). 
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In the political arena of Taiwan, democracy is a relatively new concept imported 
from the West. Since the political reforms, however, the government of Taiwan has 
constantly claimed that it is democratic. As to what democracy means in this context, 
President Li argued in a speech to the KMT that, 'Democracy is to allow everybody 
to express their opinions, and to be respected. But it is not saying whatever you want 
to say. That is anarchy. It does not work at all. What should be done is to unite 
different opinions into one under a certain mechanism. That is the meaning of 
democracy. It is true for a society and a party. ... Regulation and discipline are the 
life of a party' (24 August 1993, ZYRB). 
There were not many articles dealing with politics in Ming Bao. Those that did 
mention rulers or leaders tended to focus either on historic figures or on the current 
leaders in China. One example was an essay about the late Chinese premier Zhou 
Enlai. Among Chinese Zhou is universally recognised as an example of a 'good 
official' because of his devotion to work and his care for people. The author wrote 
that Zhou 'is the product of the Chinese land, the Chinese people, and the Chinese 
culture. He knew how much he owed to China and sacrificed himself to serve China. 
For him there were only nation and people, not himself' (8 February 1976). Zhou 
was highly praised because he had displayed an essential quality of a good official, to 
work for the interest of the people. The essay also expressed the idea that individual 
interests are subordinate to those of the collective. 
In Confucian thought, the individual exists as part of a whole and is a representative 
of that whole. This tenet is well illustrated by an article about the life of a Taiwanese 
student in the United States. The author talked about why she took care to dress 
herself properly every day. It was because, 'little things like this not only show the 
personality of an individual, they also affect the image of the race and the nation the 
individual represents' (6 January 1985, ZYRB). Similarly, in an article criticising 
noisy Taiwanese tourists, the author wrote, 'we should think of the honour of our 
nation in every circumstances and do everything to win credit for our motherland. 
We should never let foreigners look down upon us' (8 January 1985, ZYRB). 
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As to how much the collective can demand from the individual, it is well illustrated 
by a news item from Zhong Yang Ri Bao. The headline was in big bold characters: 
'Locally produced fresh milk is good and cheap, drink more to keep yourself 
healthy'. In the text, Xie, the party chairman of Taiwan province, 
appealed to the public to eat less rice, more vegetables and fruits; more locally 
produced fresh milk, less imported milk powder. It helps the country save 
foreign exchange. He said, rice is in great demand in the international market. 
Our people normally eat too much rice, but not enough vegetables and fruits. 
From now on people might try to eat less rice but more vegetables and fruits 
which are cheaper and healthier. It is not only good for health, but also increases 
our foreign exchange reserves . ...... 
Chairman Me said, we can produce plenty of fresh milk to meet domestic 
demands. Its quality surpasses imported milk powder. He hoped that the public 
would nurture the habit of drinking fresh milk. It will reduce the burden of 
importation and contribute to the economic development of Taiwan (7 January 
1975, ZYRB). 
Not long after this, another news story appeared advising people to drink more tea 
and less coffee. The rationale was the same, to save foreign exchange and contribute 
to economic development (17 January 1975, ZYRB). 
The collective became less demanding in Taiwan when the economy became more 
successful and politics more liberal, especially in the 1990s. Often portrayed in 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao, President Li proclaimed that Taiwan is a society respecting the 
free will of individuals. But he never forgot to add that, 'at the same time, we should 
not forget our nation and the collective interest. It would otherwise be individualism. 
Human beings cannot live without associating with others. Everyone should respect 
other people's interests while pursuing his own. This is the ideal of the Taiwan 
citizen' (4 August 1993). 
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President Li's words were echoed by many others. In an interview the winners of 'the 
outstanding business women of the year' award made statements like, 'First I want to 
thank is my country. If I were born in Ethiopia or some other countries in war and 
famine, I would not have succeeded. I would suffer like the people there. ' or 'When I 
learned that I was given the award, my first thought was to thank God for being in a 
peaceful and stable society. ' or 'There is no family without society, and there is no 
individual without family. ' All in all, the point was succinctly put in the headline, 
'Establish public opinion centred around the collective' (15 January 1993, ZYRB). 
As noted earlier, the subordination of an individual to a group has its roots in the 
structure of the Confucian family. In modem East Asian societies the family is 
experiencing rapid changes. The traditional extended family is being replaced by the 
nuclear family, or even the single parent family. The divorcing rate is increasing and 
pre-marital or ex-marital sex is becoming common. As noted by the president of the 
Judicial Yuan of Taiwan, 'the function of the family, which includes bearing children, 
pursuing economic activities, educating, protecting, worshipping and entertaining, is 
shrinking because of the change of family structures' (31 August 1993, ZYRB). 
But Confucian family ideals have not disappeared altogether. Indeed, the idea of the 
harmonious extended family was felt to be so attractive that it was even used to sell 
houses. One piece of news in Zhong Yang Ri Bao bore the title 'three generations 
under one roof enjoying family life', and the subtitle added that experts had suggested 
a special policy for selling council houses so as to facilitate Chinese ethics (14 
January 1985). The full story, however, revealed that the proposal was motivated 
more by a desire to sell unwanted houses than a real concern for family ethics. 
Nevertheless it illustrates the belief of experts in the popular appeal of the Confucian 
ethic of family. 
Stable marriage, which is essential to the Confucian family ideal, often seems 
unachievable or even undesirable in a modem society. The results of a survey 
appeared in Ming Bao, however, showed a different picture. Replying to the 
question, 'would you prefer an uninteresting but long lasting marriage or exciting but 
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short lived true love', twice as many respondents chose the former (19 February 
1992, MB). This figure is especially intriguing because all the respondents were 
eighteen years old, the age of dreaming of love rather than planning a family. 
In line with government efforts to promote Confucianism, stable marriage is 
officially promoted in Taiwan. One example was the 65th wedding anniversary of 
Mr. and Mrs. Lin, an ordinary country couple. Local officials and celebrities paid 
generous tributes to them. An article in Zhong Yang Ri Bao, accompanied by a 
photograph, gave a detailed account of the affectionate and happy life of the couple 
over the past sixty-five years. It also emphasised that because Mr. Lin managed his 
big family so well, he was highly respected in the village. 'The presence of Mr Lin 
can always turn a big problem into a small one and a small problem into nothing' (21 
October 1985). 
Another good example is the award given to the film, The second spring of Lao Mo. 
At the award ceremony, the organiser said, 
Marriage has been important in China since ancient times. It is holy and 
protected by traditional morality and Confucian ethics. Now the social structure 
has changed. In modem life, both the marriage rate and the divorce rate are 
getting higher and higher. Material interests are valued more than spiritual 
wealth. The second spring ofLao Mo has exhibited the skill of film making. But 
its main merit is that it shows the value of the love of the family and the 
friendship of human beings. The natural and humorous story telling revealed that 
the impossibly um-natched marriage between an old man and a young girl 
reached almost perfect harmony and happiness (5 January 1985, ZYRB). 
There were also awards for people who observed the rule of filial piety in Taiwan, 
with annual awards for filial children and model mothers sponsored by the 
government. In 1976 the provincial governor of Taiwan attended the award 
ceremony. He called for everybody to 'understand how much the parents have done 
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for the children. While the parents are still alive, children should fulfil the filial duty, 
and repay the debts they owe to the parents' (10 May 1976, ZYRB). 
The award winners, who often sacrificed themselves to serve their parents, were 
introduced in long feature articles. Luo, a 26 years old part-time university student 
for example, had looked after his paralysed father for ten years, stayed next to him 
day and night, fed and bathed him. What is more, 'Luo nursed his father with love 
and affection. He never showed any weariness or dissatisfaction but a kind and 
pleasant countenance'. Another good son, Lin, was a policeman. He was brought up 
by his mother alone after his father died at an early age. Because of the sudden death 
of her other son, Lin's mother lost her memory, and later suffered from 
schizophrenia. In order to take care of his mother wholeheartedly, Lin left his 
girlfriend and devoted all his spare time to his mother (19 January. 1993, ZYRB). 
Taking care of bed-ridden parents for many years also featured frequently among the 
deeds of other award winners. 
In Hong Kong, in contrast, models of conduct were often supplied by film stars and 
celebrities. Many stories could be found to show how they have respected and looked 
after their parents according to the rule of filial piety. One story about the actress Li, 
quoted her aunt's words, 'My brother is so lucky to have a famous and filial daughter. 
She always heeds what her parents say'. The author commented, 'All the parents in 
the world love their children and want the best for their children. The children should 
therefore understand and listen to the parents' opinion. Li has set up a good example 
for us' (8 February 1992, MB). 
The story of another Li provides a particularly good illustration of the concept of 
family and marriage prevailing in Taiwan. Li was forced to serve in the Japanese 
army during the Second World War. After he was taken to Indonesia he fled into the 
uninhabited forests. After thirty years, in January 1975, he was found and sent back 
to Taiwan. In the sample of Zhong Yang Ri Bao from this period, articles about him 
were found in the news, editorial, essay, and other sections almost everyday. He was 
praised for his hatred of war and his ability to endure hardship in the forest. Above 
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all, what attracted many commentators' attention was that 'his first words were to 
express his wish to go home, and at the same time, he said the person he missed most 
is his mother. This is clear proof of the enduring culture identity of a Chinese. It has 
showed the superiority of a Chinese culture based on ethics' (7 January 1975). 
Most stories, though, revolved around Li's family life. At the time he left home, he 
was married with a baby. When he came back, his wife was remarried to another 
man, Huang. Li was angry to hear the news and refused to meet his wife. The 
government officials and the media showed sympathy to Li and demanded that his 
wife come back to him. Their argument was that she had not fulfilled the 
responsibilities of a wife which require her to dedicate to her husband no matter what 
has happened to him. Her second marriage is understandable since Li could have died 
in those 'lost' years and it was very difficult for her to raise a child alone. But it was 
not morally right. Since Huang has children from a previous marriage and Li has 
nobody, Li's wife should go back to her first husband. But Li wanted to live with his 
son, not his wife. Then attention shifted from Li's wife to Li himself. He was blamed 
for not giving his wife a chance to compensate for her mistake and his son a chance 
to fulfil his filial duty to both of his parents. The public demanded that Li be reunited 
with his family. Ii received many letters since he came back. About seventy percent 
of them expressed the wish to see him reconcile with his wife' (19 January 1975, 
ZYRB). Finally the wife moved out of her home of twenty years to join Li and 
observers expressed satisfaction that the Confucian way of family life had been 
observed. 
During the whole process, nobody ever asked if Li and his wife still loved each other, 
or advocated leaving Li's family matters to himself. It was unimaginable to solve the 
problem by letting the wife choose which husband she preferred to live with. For 
both the public and officials, although it was a private matter of Li and his family, 
they had the responsibility to help and ensure that Li did the right thing as decided by 
the Confucian rule, that the bond of family cannot be broken. 
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The above story also throws light on the position of women in Confucian society. 
Traditionally women were confined to the house, being dependants of their husbands 
or sons. Any physical contact between men and women who were not married to 
each other was strictly prohibited. In the second half of the twentieth century, one 
would expect that women in Hong Kong and Taiwan would have acquire equal status 
with men and that both would be free to look for love. But as the analysis of the 
newspapers sample revealed, old customs die hard. 
One news story in Ming Bao concerned a Taiwanese woman and her campaign to 
have a female lifeguard appointed at the county swimming pool. Her daughter had 
died in the pool because the male lifeguards did not dare to carry out the mouth to 
mouth artificial respiration necessary to save her life. 'They were afraid of being 
criticised by others'. It was also mentioned that the mayor of the county was very 
concerned about the matter and that a female lifeguard would soon be appointed (I 
September 1976). Several hundred years ago, a girl would have had to commit 
suicide if she had been touched by a man rather her husband. But this was 1976, a 
time when sex had become a kind of entertainment activity for many people, in many 
parts of the world. It seemed inconceivable that a lifeguard would not to save 
somebody because of an old, and seemingly outmoded custom. Moreover, neither the 
woman who lost her daughter nor the author of the story questioned the behaviour of 
the lifeguards. They simply accepted that avoiding 'mouth to mouth' contact was a 
sufficient reason not to save lives. 
This kind of story, with its uncritical acceptance of tradition, never appeared again in 
the sample. Over the time period covered by the sample, more women were educated 
and more worked outside the home. They could even kiss a man in public. At the 
same time, more criticisms on these 'unconventional behaviours' appeared in the 
press. One famous columnist argued in his column that it was a waste of public funds 
to give women higher education because most of them did not work. As to why 
women should not work, it was because 'in most of families, men are bread-winners. 
If a job is taken by a woman who does not have to support a family, the men who 
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have to take care of his wife and children will have less job opportunities' (12 
February 1976, MB). 
His ideal of responsible men and dependent women was exactly the one advocated 
by traditional Confucianism. Its echoes could be found scattered across other modem 
East Asian societies. For example the president of the Judicial Yuan of Taiwan 
government expressed a similar idea in a different disguise. According to him, 
Nowadays women have acquired knowledge and skill they could not have 
before. They can earn their own money. Their social status has also increased. 
However, the equality between men and women is worse than Confucian 
inequality. Because of the emancipation of women, marriage has become 
unstable. It wrecks the life of the couple and children. ... Women should retain 
fine oriental virtues, so that the married couple will respect each other, and the 
family will be happy (31 August 1993, Zhong Yang Ri Bao). 
One essential Confucian value for both men and women is hard work. Its importance 
was shown by the fact that it was the most frequently occurring single theme of all. 
In the sample there were many stories about how ordinary people had succeed 
through hard work. One featured Dr. Ou, who came from a poor family. All through 
his student life he had had to work part-time. Even when he gained a scholarship, he 
had to work to support his family. He also lived a very frugal life. The room he 
rented was so small that 'after putting in a single bed and a small desk, the door can 
hardly open. In summer it was unbearably hot and in winter cold wind kept him 
awake. ' 'During the vacations when his friends went on holiday, he stayed in the 
library. His life consisted of the most basic food, very little sleep and lots of work. 
Everyday was like this. It may be simple and boring, but he was rich spiritually' (I 
October 1985, ZYRB). Hard work rewarded Ou with a PhD degree and a good job in 
the government. 
Hard work was also essential for the successful businessmen in Hong Kong. This 
was shown clearly in the mottoes: 'hard-work, honesty, and the ability to endure 
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hardship make somebody able to achieve what the others cannot' (Chen, 17 February 
1992, MB); and, 'Diligence, perseverance, and stamina' (Jiang, 7 February 1992 
MB). The publicised life stories of rich Hong Kong businessmen strongly resemble 
the career of Dr. Ou. One billionaire was born into a poor family. At the age of five, 
he got up at four o'clock in the morning to help his mother buy goods. And after 
school, he helped his mother to tend the stall. At the age of 17, he started his own 
business. Since then'he never slept more than four hours in a day'. His hard work and 
determination brought him wealth and respect (5 February 1985, MB). 
Hard work was valued because it was considered not only important to personal 
achievement but also to the success of society. A front page editorial titled 'Do not 
learn from the British', argued strongly that the British economy was declining 
because of its trade Unions. 'British workers do not want to work hard, but they ask 
for salary increases all the time. ... In Hong Kong we 
have a prosperous economy 
because all the Hong Kong people work hard. British politicians criticise our 
underdeveloped labour unions and ill treatment of workers. What they do not know is 
that we are catching up with them quickly. Although our life is not ideal at the 
moment, if we keep the momentum of the rapid development, our life will get better 
every year' (20 September 1976, MB). 
But hard work was not the only element required for success. Another important 
fator was education, as already shown in the story of Dr. Ou. Many other stories 
underlined the lesson that knowledge can lead to wealth. One was set in a remote 
Taiwanese village where farmer Yang had worked for years and years 'from early 
morning when the sky was filled with stars until late night when the moon was 
high 
above'. Even so, he could barely support his family until his son graduated from 
high 
school. The young man, who 'knew that knowledge is power', 'bought all the 
books 
on agriculture technology available in the book store and read them thoroughly'. 
He 
then 'went to the city to ask for advice from the experts' and 'experimented with new 
ideas' on a small scale. Four years later, his now high-yielding crops 
brought his 
family a new house and his sister a handsome dowry (17 January 1975, ZYRB). 
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Similar stories featured frequently. One electrical appliance factory had filled the 
same order for a long time and one day found itself being pushed out of the market. 
In order to save the factory, the manager, Zhang, went to a university seeking co- 
operation in developing new products. 'He went there a thousand times. Finally the 
professors were moved by his determination and sincerity and agreed to help. ... 
Zhang and his best engineers lived in the university, and they worked at night after 
the professors went horne. ' Needless to say, a new product was successfully 
developed and the factory made profits. 'This experience has made Zhang realise 
how important it is to learn new technology. ... Since then he has established a solid 
co-operative relationship with the professors and regularly sent his staff back to 
university to master the new technologies' (19 October 19 8 5, ZYRB). 
Another often mentioned secret of business success is the maintenance of good 
relationships between employers and workers. Ming Bao (28 June 1992) carried a 
long story about Zeng Xianzi, the 'King of Ties' of Hong Kong. Zeng went to Hong 
Kong as an poor immigrant and built a huge business empire from scratch. In 
common with others, he worked hard. But more importantly, he had devoted workers 
working for him. He treated his workers 'not as employees but brothers'. When his 
business was still relatively small, he 'operated the sewing machine together with 
them' and 'knew everyone by their first names'. He also attended banquets for the 
babies born to his workers and the funerals of their seniors. When a rush order came 
in, 'he could always count on his workers to work day and night' for him because he 
would send some managerial staff to visit their families and make sure all the 
problems are taken care of. 'When his business grew so big that it was not possible 
for him to know every worker in person, he would require every manager to do so'. 
Li, the chief executive of a state-owned cargo service station in Taiwan, displayed a 
similar style of paternalistic management (7 January 1985, ZYRB). The station was 
publicised because it handled three times more rail freight than other stations of its 
size. When asked about how they had achieved this, Li said, 'Because the managers 
help the workers with all their hearts, the workers work to the best of their abilities'. 
His 'guiding principle' was that 'the aim of management is not to restrict people, but 
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to liberate people, so that they take initiatives at work, and they are proud of a 
thriving station and ashamed of a declining one'. To translate Li's principle into 
action, the station had built apartments for its workers, hired their disabled children, 
bought health insurance, life insurance and household insurance for them, and 
organised sports tournaments and concerts. 
While the above stories serve as vernacular illustrations of our previous analysis, the 
following example from an editorial in Zhong Yang Ri Bao (12 August 1993) 
succinctly summarises the Confucian elements in modern business operations. The 
article was titled 'Who is a "Confucian Merchant"T. It started by explaining that the 
phrase 'Confucian merchant' was relatively new and was fast becoming a popular 
self-label for business people. In a quest to define the term, the author identified three 
criteria of Confucianism as applied to modern business practice. The first was a 
'people-centred' philosophy, because 'if all the employers and employees can 
communicate freely and work in harmony, the business will naturally become 
disciplined, co-operative and efficient'. The second was to have a goal of serving 
people. 'The modem businessmen should not think only in terms of profits. They 
should devote their lives and businesses to serving others. They can only serve their 
customers well when they sincerely serve the society'. The last was to have the virtue 
of 'thinking of morals when seeing profits', which means that although it is 
acceptable for people to love money and wealth, they should always make their 
fortune 'through moral ways'. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Over more than two thousand years of development, Confucianism has functioned as 
a philosophy for intellectuals, a code of ethics for commoners, and a political 
ideology for officials. In order to understand the influence of Confucianism in 
modem East Asian societies, we have tried to sketch its basic ideas as a set of ethical 
rules intended to govern the functioning of society and regulate the behaviour of 
individuals. In this sense, a government in an ideal Confucian society would have 
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absolute power over both the public and private lives of people, which would be used 
to work for their welfare. In return, the people would give the government their full 
trust. In such a society, an individual's behaviour would be conditioned by his or her 
position in a strictly stratified social hierarchy. He or she would listen attentively to 
seniors and accept responsibility for guiding juniors. They would also work hard for 
their family and the whole society. Personal interests would be subordinated to those 
of the collective. The ultimate success for an individual would be to pass the 
examinations to become an official, because in that position they could best serve the 
society. 
In the modem East Asian NISs, different aspects of the Confucian tradition are 
manifest to different degrees in different societies. The family is still the most 
important institution in society. In rural areas of South Korea and Taiwan, and to 
some extend in Singapore, the extended family and the clan still have considerable 
power to regulate individuals' behaviour. In the cities, however, the size of the 
family is shrinking and its functions are gradually being extended to other groups in 
society. The most significant component of this shift is the participation of the family 
in economic activities, a trend which is most pronounced in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
In Hong Kong especially, where a colonial government does not fulfil the Confucian 
ideal, it is the family that has been the main carrier of Confucian precepts and 
practices. 
In terms of government, all the East Asian NISs except Hong Kong, have 
authoritarian administrations which take leading roles in the political, economic and 
social arenas. But they are not Confucian governments in the full sense. The South 
Korean military government in particular suffered from a lack of moral legitimacy, 
and faced constant protests. The government of Taiwan could not claim omnipotence 
as a government-in-exile. In fact, in all the East Asian NISs, the legitimacy of rule is 
based on their government's commitment to economic development and their ability 
to deliver increasing living standards. In typical Confucian fashion, an unwritten 
reciprocal rule was established whereby people would comply with government 
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policies in exchange for the government's commitment to improve their living 
standards and quality of life. 
Formal education is accorded high prestige in all East Asian NISs, in line with the 
long Confucian tradition. But its emphasis has changed from Confucian ethics to 
scientific knowledge. Many officials and managers hold advanced degrees from 
American or Japanese universities. Other Confucian traits, such as the emphasis on 
hierarchical and harmonious relationship, and the highly regarded virtues of filial 
piety, diligence and frugality, can still be observed. But the attitude towards money 
has changed entirely. While it was viewed as a source of evil in the past, it now 
elicits respect from virtually everyone in the East Asian NISs. The combination of a 
strong government committed to people's well-being, a family system that 
participates in economic activities as a team, and a well-educated, hard-working and 
co-operative workforce, are without doubt essential components in accounting for the 
pattern and pace of their economic development. 
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Chapter 6 
Patterns of Popular Confucianism 
It has been proposed in the previous chapter that Confucianism has undergone 
significant transformations in response to increasing western influence since the 
nineteenth century. It has also been argued that many of the basic tenets of 
Confucianism have retained their hold despite the scale of change, although they now 
operate mainly in the form of a popular ethical code. However, Confucianism from 
its inception has generated diverse versions in different societies (Kim, 1994). While 
the previous chapter has concentrated on the aspects of Confucianism common in all 
the Asian NISs, one has to bear in mind that degrees of variation exist among 
different societies. Hence while this chapter presents the findings of a quantitative 
content analysis of press coverage in order to establish the general pattern of popular 
Confucianism more systematically and in more detail, it also explores variations in 
the ways Confucianism has been mobilised in public discourse in two societies - 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Confucianism has developed through interaction with other cultural, political and 
economic forces. Among these, the one of central importance is the state. In the past 
the spread and enforcement of Confucianism had always been a process initiated at 
the top, by officially sanctioning Confucianism as the only thought system deemed 
worthy of learning and rewarding Confucian knowledge and practices with prestige 
and prosperity. In contemporary East Asia, although no state is truly Confucian and 
none has the power to influence individual behaviour as extensively as before, some 
have deployed Confucianism as a formal legitimating ideologyl. The degree and 
I Please note that Confucianism as a political ideology is different from Confucianism as a cultural 
resource. For instance, Confucianism as a code of behaviour was brought to Singapore by the Chinese 
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direction of official sponsorship is important in shaping the specific way 
Confucianism is perceived and mobilised in public discourse. Accordingly, this 
chapter examines press reporting of Confucianism and Confucian themes in two 
societies with differing degrees of state intervention in the economic and cultural 
spheres - Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
In Taiwan, Confucianism is officially supported, though not so vigorously promoted 
as in Singapore. Although the KMT government was driven out of the mainland by 
the communists, it has never given up its claim to be the 'legitimate' government of 
all China and the true heir of Chineseness. Hence, in deliberate opposition to the 
radical social and political changes and marginalisation of Confucianism on the 
mainland, it took upon itself the role of maintaining Chinese tradition, a task in 
which Confucianism was assigned a central role. In contrast, the British government 
in Hong Kong have adopted a largely laissze faire policy, neither attempting to 
employ Confucianism to its benefit nor intentionally rejecting anything Confucian. 
As a consequence, Confucianism in Hong Kong has been transmitted completely 
through popular and vernacular rather than official channels. 
The newspapers selected for analysis also have different relations to the power 
structures in their societies. Zhong Yang Ri Bao is an official newspaper supported 
by the KMT government in Taiwan while Ming Bao is a standard commercial 
newspaper in Hong Kong with no special ties to the government. Given this, and the 
differences in the forms and degrees of state intervention in the two societies, we 
might expect the following: 
1. That there would be more overall coverage of Confucianism and Confucian 
themes in Zhong Yang Ri Bao. 
2. That in Taiwan more attention would be given to Confucian precepts relating to 
the role of the state, the nature of Political rule, and the duties of citizenship. 
immigrants. But recently it was proclaimed as the official ideology of the Singaporean government, 
though this move can be seen more as a strategic political choice to validate and perpetuate its 
autocratic rule than as a revival of Confucian tradition. 
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3. That Ming Bao would give more emphasis to those elements of Confucianism 
that are most firmly embedded in popular culture, most resonant in peoples' 
everyday lives, and most closely related to personal behaviour and economic 
activities. 
Furthermore, both Taiwan and Hong Kong experienced important shifts in their 
political situation in the 1980s . As Allen Chun (1996) points out, the effects these 
shifts have produced were in a way 'mirror images' on one another. The British 
announcement in 1984 that Hong Kong would be returned to China generated a 
resurgence of interests and debates around the notion of Chinese identity. 
Conversely, the democratisation of Taiwan, stimulated an upsurge of attention to the 
distinctiveness of Taiwanese identity. We would expect both of these movements to 
help account for the patterns of coverage over time, and for the specific coverage in 
the 1990s. 
A systematic comparison between the two papers allows us to examine both the 
similarities and the differences in the aspects of Confucianism they emphasise and 
the way they present them. Since the similarities indicate the basic features of 
Confucianism common to all NISs, and the differences the variations in its 
applications under different circumstances, we are able to paint a more precise 
picture, which not only provides evidence of the continuing vitality of Conftlcianism 
as a generalised cultural system, but also points to the ways it has been mobilised as 
a cultural support for growth in contrasted political systems. 
6.1 The Content Analysis Design 
Ming Bao is the 'most respected daily' (FEER, 5 September 1996) printed in Hong 
Kong, where the press 'has enjoyed a level of freedom in Asia second only to Japan', 
and is 'allowed to advocate opposing ideological doctrines as long as they do not 
undermine the legitimacy of British rule' (Chan et al, 1994: 241). As one of the most 
popular newspapers, Ming Bao is often collected by libraries around the world as the 
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prime representative of Hong Kong newspapers. Politically it maintains a neutral 
stance, which means that it is motivated mainly by commercial 
During the period covered by the analysis Ming Bao went through considerable 
changes. From the 1970s to the 1990s its maximum number of pages per issue was 
raised from 16 to 64. Over this time, the balance of content also shifted to incorporate 
more entertainment and economic features and to provide more advice and 
information. Taking a typical copy of Ming Bao from the year 1993 as an example, 
we find it divided into four sections. Each had roughly the same number of pages 
except for a leaner second section and a bulkier last one. The first section included 
the main news, both local and international, with the front page devoted to 
advertisements. The second contained mainly entertainment news and the four page 
supplement, the majority of which was taken up with essays from regular columnists. 
The subjects addressed varied from current affairs and social problems to history, 
culture, science and technology. The third section comprised horse racing news and 
classified advertisements, whilst the fourth section was largely devoted to the 
economy and to mainland China, with some additional coverage of entertainment and 
half a page of sports news. The location of advertisements was not restricted by the 
divisions between the different sections. They could be found on almost every page, 
from the first to the last, and accounted for more than half the paper's content. Items 
of local news could also be found in every section, with many being presented in the 
form of pictures. Consequently although it is counted as a serious newspaper in Hong 
Kong, Ming Bao bears a stronger resemblance to the tabloids rather than the quality 
newspapers in Britain. It is filled with advertisements, gossip about film stars and 
celebrities, and photographs. 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao is published by the ruling party in Taiwan. It is thus famous for 
its respectful coverage of official policies. In Taiwan an official ban on the 
registration of new newspapers was in force between 1951 and 1988. During this 
period there were only 32 newspapers, and Zhong Yang Ri Bao was privileged 
among them because of its 'official' status. After the ban was lifted, however, the 
number of newspapers in Taiwan increased to more than 300 and Zhong Yang Ri 
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Bao's influence was progressively eroded. Due to severe problems of issue 
availability over the period covered by the analysis, the issues under consideration 
here are taken from the international edition, which is published for overseas Chinese 
and readers outside Taiwan2. This edition has two distinct features. It does not cover 
international news except for a very few events that have a direct influence on 
Taiwan. And it has a digest section reprinting articles originally published in other 
newspapers. 
The maximum number of pages carried by Zhong Yang Ri Bao increased from 4 in 
the 1970s to 8 in the 1990s. At the same time the balance of contents remained nearly 
unchanged. A typical 8 page copy would consist of four and half news pages 
featuring a mixture of different kinds of news and comment and analysis; two 'light' 
pages representing alternatively sports, entertainment and fashion or society, 
education and technology; and one and a half page for the supplement. Unlike Ming 
Bao, however, the supplement frequently contained literary works of extended length 
and there were very few fixed columns. Advertisements occupy very little space, 
normally about a quarter of page on the 'light' pages. These are colourful, but the rest 
of the copy is normally tightly dovetailed by the black characters. 
The masthead design of Zhong Yang Ri Bao stands out as an illustration of the 
continuing significance of Confucianism to a modem newspaper. On the right side is 
a small section entitled words of wisdom, made up of quotations from Confucian 
classics originally written in the ancient Chinese language. They appear in single 
sentences each day with translations in both English and modem Chinese. The 
themes of the quotations cover almost every aspect of Confucianism. Quite often 
they are specially selected to suit the issue of the time. For example, 'Let production 
be active but consumption sparing. Then wealth will always be sufficient. ' was 
chosen when the government fought a campaign against ostentatious spending. This 
section is not included in the content analysis since our aim is to explore the ways in 
which Confucian themes are integrated into everyday news and commentary. 
21f not specified, Zhong Yang Ri Bao refers to the international edition in the rest of the chapter. 
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Table 6.1 The selection of the press sample 
1970s 1980s 1990S 
Ming Bao Feb. 1976 Feb. 1985 Feb. 1992 
Sept. 1976 Apr. 1985 June 1992 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao Jan. 1975 Jan. 1985 Jan. 1993 
May 1976 Oct. 1985 Aug. 1993 
The process of sample selection (Table 6.1) was a compromise born of the need to 
cover the whole period of recent economic development, to keep the data to a 
controllable size, and to negotiate the uneven availability of the material. Because no 
British library holds both titles over the entire period covered by the analysis, the 
data had to be collected from three different locations - London, Oxford and Leeds. 
In the end a total of six months' issues of Ming Bao and Zhong Yang Ri Bao was 
selected drawn from a period between the 1970s and 1990s. Two months were 
selected in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s respectively. Within each decade, the year 
was randomly chosen. Of the two months, one was chosen randomly, and the other 
one around the time of Chinese New Year since this is the major traditional festival 
and Confucianism is part of that tradition. The samples drawn for the two 
newspapers do not necessarily come from the same month or the same year. The 
procedure was designed in this way partly because of the practical difficulty in 
matching the two titles. But more importantly, the primary purpose of the content 
analysis was to provide both an illustration of working Confucianism in 
contemporary East Asia and a comparison of patterns of Confucianism and shifts in 
public discourse over the period covered by the analysis. Therefore there was no 
intention to construct a point-by-point comparison between two newspapers at the 
same moments in time. 
In the analysis process, all the contents of each issue were examined except for the 
advertisements, pictures, fiction and literature. Items which contained one or more 
Confucian themes were coded. These items may advocate Confucian ideas, use 
Confucian ideas to approach a problem or make judgements, or directly talk about 
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Confucius or Confucianism. A list of themes was designed to cover the major aspects 
of Confucian ideas. This was modified according to the results of a pilot study which 
analysed Confucian related items from one month's issues of Zhong Yang Ri Ba03. 
6.2 Results 
385 items were coded altogether, 207 from Zhong Yang Ri Bao and 178 from Ming 
Bao. This means that, over the sample period at least one item referring to 
Confucianism could be found everyday, a consistent appearance indicating its 
continuing influence. As expected, Zhong Yang Ri Bao had a higher proportion of 
Confucianism related items (1.14 per copy) than Ming Bao (1.06 per copy). This 
difference becomes more significant if one considers the wide disparity between the 
two titles in terms of the average number of pages per issue, up to 8 pages for Zhong 
Yang Ri Bao and 64 pages for Ming Bao. This confirms our assumption that Zhong 
Yang Ri Bao, supported by a government that consistently deployed Confucian 
themes in its official discourse, would give more coverage to Confucianism than 
Ming Bao, a popular newspaper with a stronger articulation to vernacular culture. 
When the sample was originally devised, it was assumed that more items drawing on 
Confucianism would appear in the festive season since the associated ceremonies and 
rituals are strong expressions of tradition. This assumption, however, was proved 
unfounded. There were 186 items in January and February, and 199 at other times. 
The average daily coverage was the same (I. I item per day) for both the festive 
season and ordinary days. Thus there would appear to be no direct relationship 
between the traditional festival and Confucian themes. This suggests that 
Confucianism has become widely incorporated into modem daily life and discourse 
rather than being something associated particularly with the 'old days'. 
The coding schedule is reprinted as an appendix to this thesis. 
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Despite this ubiquity, commentators have frequently expressed concern that 
Confucianism has been declining in influence as a point of reference. Table 6.2 
shows that for Ming Bao items relevant to Confucianism did decrease over the 
sample period (from the 1970s to the 1990s) despite the large increase in the number 
of pages per copy. This confirms the decline in the salience of Confticianism in Hong 
Kong. In the case of Zhong Yang Ri Bao, however, there was an upsurge of interest 
in the 1990s. This was due to the large number of articles discussing the Confucian 
art of governing stimulated by political reforms and the dispute between the president 
and the head of the Legislative Yuan. Prior to that however, there had been fewer 
items relating to Confucianism in the 1980s than in the 1970s, but the difference was 
relatively small. The influence of Confucianism might be weakening in Taiwan, but 
it was far from disappearing. 
Table 6.2 Items relevant to Confucianism during different periods 
1970s 1980s 1990S 
Ming Bao 69 57 52 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao 61 55 91 
The types of items containing Confucian themes and the sections where they 
appeared are revealing. The most frequent type of item was the short essay, which 
accounted for almost half of all cases analysed. Second, was news, and in third place, 
editorials (Table 6.3). In line with these findings, the supplements, where short 
essays are normally placed, carried almost half of all items coded (45.7%). The 
general news sections and front pages also carried substantial numbers of coded 
items (Table 6.4). Therefore, Confucian themes were most often located in 
supplements in the form of essays. This would suggest that Confucian ideas and 
ideals were mostly mobilised when people make comments or provide analysis or 
advance opinions. 
166 
Table 6.3 Types of items relevant to Confucianism 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total sample 
news 20 11.2% 61 29.5% 81 21.0% 
editorial 7 3.9% 26 12.6% 33 8.6% 
feature article 13 7.3% 18 8.7% 31 8.1% 
essay 105 59.0% 84 40.6% 189 49.1% 
other 33 18.6% 18 8.7% 51 13.2% 
total 178 100% 207 100% 385 100% 
Table 6.4 Location of items relevant to Confucianism 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total sample 
front page 7 3.9% 47 22.7% 54 14.0% 
general news 18 10.1% 64 30.9% 82 21.3% 
supplement Ill 62.4% 65 31.4% 176 45.7% 
mainland china 14 7.9% to 4.8% 24 6.2% 
economic/financial 4 2.2% 2 1.0% 6 1.6% 
other 24 13.5% 19 9.2% 43 11.3% 
total 178 100% 207 100% 1 _385 . 
100% 
If we look at the two newspapers separately, however, different patterns are revealed. 
For Ming Bao, the essay was easily the predominant form in which Confucian items 
appeared (59.0%). Correspondingly, 62.4% of the items were placed in the 
supplement. In contrast, news accounted for only 11.2% of items and editorials a 
mere 3.9%. Similarly, only a small number of items were found in the general news 
section (10.1%) and very few on the front page (3.9%). In the case of Zhong Yang Ri 
Bao, however, although the essay remained the single largest type at 40.6%, it was 
outweighed by news related items, comprising news and editorials together at 42.1 
Furthermore, less than one third of the items appeared in the supplement section 
(31.4%), as against more than half in the general news section and front page. 
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These differences can be partly explained by the different structures of the two 
newspapers. The fact that Ming Bao often devoted the whole front page to 
advertisements, reduced the space available for front page items drawing on 
Confucian themes. Similarly, the fact that Zhong Yang Ri Bao carried a high 
proportion of news, increased the possibility of coded items appearing in the general 
news section. But these differences cannot be accounted for solely by variations in 
lay-out. One possible conclusion to be drawn is that Confucianism has enjoyed a 
stronger influence in Taiwan than in Hong Kong. The high percentage of Confucian 
related items on the front page in Zhong Yang Ri Bao can be read as an index of the 
importance accorded to Confucian themes. The high portion of mentions in news 
items indicates that Confucian themes have become integrated into observations on 
people's daily life. And the fairly large number of feature articles and editorials with 
Confucian themes suggest that they have risen above a threshold of significance and 
thus require discussion and review. 
The analysis of actors is also revealing. Among all the actors identified in the items 
referring to Confucianism, the general public stood out as the most frequently 
mentioned (14.6%), followed by the head of state (10.3%), and two groups of actors 
with the same frequency of appearance (8.1%), high ranking officials and 
intellectuals. This pattern is entirely consistent with the traditional tripartite role of 
Confucianism as a political philosophy for officials, an intellectual resource for 
literati, and a code of behaviour for ordinary people. 
In line with our hypotheses, Ming Bao and Zhong Yang Ri Bao displayed different 
patterns of coverage in terms of actors. Ming Bao featured a higher percentage of 
ordinary people, businessmen and historic figures, while Zhong Yang Ri Bao featured 
a much higher percentage of political parties, officials and politicians, and the head 
of state (see Table 6.5). Again, this reflects the official backing for Confucianism and 
its mobilisation as a support for government intervention in Taiwan as against its 
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ýpopular' status in Hong Kong4. To a certain extent, it also mirrors the social reality 
in the two societies under analysis. In Hong Kong, with the road to political 
prominence blocked by the British rule, people have turned to economic activities for 
fulfilment. As a result the Hong Kong people represented in the newspaper were 
mostly ordinary people or businessmen. It also explains the significance of historic 
figures in Ming Bao, which were often used to illustrate a key point when politics 
was the topic of discussion. On the other hand, both the government and the KMT 
are a formidable presence in Taiwan. Party, government, officials or politicians have 
always featured on the public agenda, either as the source of orders or as figures to be 
admired. Not surprisingly a KMT controlled public medium reflects this pattern. 
Table 6.5 Differences between Ming Bao and Zhong Yang Ri Bao in the 
coverage of actors 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao 
general public 30 18.8% 28 11.8% 
party 0 0% 16 6.8% 
head of state 10 6.3% 31 13.1% 
officials & politicians 2 1.3% 30 12.7% 
businessmen 13 8.1% 2 0.8% 
historic figures 14 8.8% 2 0.8% 
others5 91 56.8% 128 54.0% 
total 160 100% 237 100% 
As we have argued earlier, in the past, the Confucian classics were the only subject 
deemed worthy of study. Although they have long since lost this status, they are still 
viewed as the source of relevant 'words of wisdom'. It is therefore worthwhile to find 
out how they were used in the coded items. About one in three (32.5%) quoted from 
4 Saying Confucianism is 'popular' in Hong Kong does not mean that it is not also popular in 
Taiwan. As a reminder of our previous argument that outside the official realm Confucianism exists 
as a popular code of behaviour, please note that the prominence of the general public (11.8%) in 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao is close to that of the head of state (13.1 %) and officials and politicians (12.7%). 
5This category includes all other actors which received similar coverage in the two newspapers. 
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Confucian classics, and half of these actually quoted the words of Confucius. 
Moreover, this rate of occurrence remained almost the same from the 1970s to the 
1990s (see Table 6.6). Since all the items dealt with in this study had Confucianism 
related themes, it is to be expected that they would carry quotations from Confucian 
classics. Even so, the relatively frequent and persistent appearance of direct 
quotations suggests that the traditional authority of Confucianism still retains 
considerable currency. 
Table 6.6 Distribution of quotations over the sample period 
1970s 54 31.8% 
1980s 52 30.6% 
1990S 64 37.6% 
The differences between the two newspapers confirm our hypothesis. Whereas 34.9% 
of items from Zhong Yang Ri Bao employed quotations from Confucian classics only 
24.7% of those from Ming Bao did so. In Hong Kong, though people recognise 
Confucianism as part of their cultural heritage, their knowledge of it comes mainly 
from the unwritten practices handed down from generation to generation. They 
receive a western style education which pays little or no explicit attention to Chinese 
classics. In Taiwan, on the other hand, Confucianism is incorporated into the 
curriculum in the form of moral education (Meyer, 1988). And knowing 
Confucianism is a sign of a 'good education'. Given these differing contexts it is not 
surprising that the Taiwanese title would mobilise more quotations from Confucian 
classics. 
The length of an item is another indicator of its importance. The length of a Chinese 
publication is normally counted not by the number of characters that appear in an 
item, but by the number of characters which can be put into the space occupied by 
the item. This method is practicable because all Chinese characters are of the same 
size. The normal total editorial space of a broadsheet newspaper is around 62,000 
words. In this study the length of an item is classified either as short (under 800 
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characters), medium (between 800 and 1,500 characters) or long (over 1,500 
characters). 
Table 6.7 The length of items 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total sample 
short 116 65.2% 76 36.7% 192 49.9% 
medium 51 28.7% 67 32.4% 118 30.6% 
long I1 6.2% 64 30.9% 75 19.5% 
total 178 100% 207 100% 385 100% 
Table 6.8 The relationship between the length and type of items 
short medium long total 
news 49 23 9 81 
60.5% 28.4% 11.1% 100% 
editorial 2 18 13 33 
6.1% 54.5% 39.4% 100% 
feature article 1 7 23 31 
3.2% 22.6% 74.2% 100% 
essay 116 50 23 189 
61.4% 26.5% 12.2% 100% 
letter 13 6 0 19 
68.4% 31.6% 0% 100% 
other 11 14 7 32 
34.4% 43.7% 21.9% 100% 
As shown in Table 6.7, about half of all the items coded were short, and only one in 
five was long. This might lead one to conclude that the majority of coded items were 
thus of little importance, but it should be noted that very few of the articles in the 
chosen newspapers were long. The distribution of Confucianism related items 
between different lengths roughly reflected the pattern of the two newspapers as a 
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whole, which means that although Confucian themes were not singled out for special 
attention, they were certainly not overlooked. Rather, they were treated as an integral 
part of daily life and public comment. This observation is further supported by the 
connection between the length and the type of an item. As we have already noted, 
most coded items were in the form of either essays or news (70%), and these are 
normally of short length (see Table 6.8). While very few news and essay items were 
long, even fewer editorials and feature articles were short. 
Table 6.7 also reveals the difference between Ming Bao and Zhong Yang Ri Bao. In 
the former, 65.2% of items were short and only 6.2% long. Whereas in the latter, 
short, medium and long items each accounted for about one-third of the total 
coverage. Despite the difference of style, these findings again point to the higher 
profile of Confucian themes in Zhong Yang Ri Bao. 
6.3 Themes 
Altogether 561 different themes were coded. Those concentrating on hurnan 
relationships and society accounted for 40.4% of the total, and those addressing 
personal behaviour for 28.3%. There was also a significant proportion of themes 
dealing with goverment and officials, 14.4%. 
Because of the variety of themes addressed throughout the analysis it is useful to 
group them under more synoptic headings for further analysis (Table 6.9). As a group 
of themes, those related to Chinese people, culture and tradition appeared most 
frequently. The second most prominent category includes all the themes which deal 
directly with Confucianism. They amounted to 17.3% of the total. Both Hong Kong 
and Taiwan have been modernising rapidly, and it is generally held that in this 
process traditional values would be gradually displaced. If this supposition was 
correct, it would be reasonable to assume that there would be relatively few 
items 
talking directly about the Confucian tradition. However, as the above figure shows, 
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Confucianism and its core values are still an important topic in both modem Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. 
We have mentioned in the previous chapter that a Confucian's mission is to 
discipline himself, then to regulate his family, and lastly, to govern the nation. In our 
sample overall, this order was neatly reflected with the more difficult task receiving 
more attention. Items relating to government and officials accounted for 14.4% of the 
total, those relating to family and group, 12.3%, and those relating to proper 
behaviour, 9.4%. Hard work and frugality, two prominent Confucian qualities, were 
also strongly represented. However, not all aspects of Confucianism were given 
equal attention. The importance of virtues, for instance, received less coverage than 
might be expected given its significant place in traditional Conftician teaching. This 
pattern provides support for the argument that in the contemporary era some aspects 
of Confucianism have been accentuated while the others have been discarded, 
depending on their utility in the process of modernisation. 
Table 6.9 Group themes relating to Confucianism 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total sample 
Chinese people, 
culture & tradition 
52 21.7% 63 19.6% 115 20.5% 
Confucianism 51 21.2% 46 14.3% 97 17.3% 
government and 
officials 
21 8.8% 60 18.7% 81 14.4% 
family and group 18 7.5% 51 15.9% 69 12.3% 
proper behaviour 33 13.7% 20 6.2% 53 9.4% 
work and money 30 12.5% 23 7.2% 53 9.4% 
morality of society 12 5.0% 27 8.4% 39 7.0% 
others 23 9.6% 31 9.7% 54 9.7% 
total 240 100% 321 100% 561 100% 
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As might be expected from the results already presented, the two newspapers vary in 
the emphases they gave to various Confucian themes. In Zhong Yang Ri Bao, themes 
relating to government and officials and to family and group featured more 
prominently than those directly related to Corifticianism. Moreover, the figure for 
family and group derived mainly from the high concentration of themes relating to 
group, which often means society at large. This suggests that Zhong Yang Ri Bao was 
not so much interested in Confucianism per se as in how it could be employed to 
promote stable government and patriotic sentiments. This would be entirely 
consistent with our previous argument that it would tend to represent an 'official' 
version of Confucianism. 
Ming Bao, on the other hand, had a lower proportion of themes relating to the 
government and officials, and a higher proportion of themes relating to personal 
traits, including proper behaviour and work and money. Again, this is in line with our 
hypothesis that it would disseminate a version of Confucianism more closely 
associated with everyday life and with commercial activities. One more point worth 
noting was the relatively low concentration of themes referring to family and group, 
which is seemingly in contradiction with our previous analysis that the family is the 
central institution in Hong Kong. The explanation can be found in the fact that Ming 
Bao had a very low coverage of group which resulted in the overall low percentage6. 
Last but not the least, one has to note the relatively high concentration of themes 
talking directly about Confucianism, which suggests that it is a topic of discussion 
among Hong Kong people. 
As we have seen, an analysis of item type can reveal how and to what extent 
Confucian themes were discussed. As shown in Table 6.10, items directly related to 
Confucianism were much more likely to be essays (68% compared to the average 
49.8%). They also displayed a higher than average concentration among feature 
articles (14%). These findings suggest that Confucianism was often associated with 
detailed analysis, comments or argument. On the other hand, Confucian themes 
6 More detailed discussion of this point is given later this chapter. 
174 
focusing on the family and group were much more likely to be found in news items 
(48.1% compared to 22.2% overall). Since news items normally cover the ongoing 
process of daily life, it could be inferred that in modem Hong Kong and Taiwan 
Confucian values still exert strong influence when it comes to families and people in 
groups. Themes relating to government and officials revealed yet another pattern of 
coverage. Although they were quite often (3 1.0%) the main topic of essays, they 
engaged even higher prominence in editorial coverage (33.3% compared to the 
average 8.0%). This indicates that stories about government and officials tended to 
be treated as important and requiring in-depth analysis. Again, although this reflects 
to some extent the high news value of political elites, it can also be read as an 
indicator of the continuing relevance of Confucianism in modem politics. 
Quotations from Confucian classics are often used to give more weight to a given 
item. In our analysis such mentions can be interpreted as a tribute paid to the 
tradition since the classics form an important part of it. Overall, 24.4% of the items 
with a Confucian main theme had quotations (Table 6.11). However, two groups of 
items stood out as having a higher percentage, those with themes that related directly 
to Confucianism (39.0%) and those related to proper behaviour. The first case is 
easily explained in that Confucianism itself was the topic. In the second case, we can 
suggest that since the norms of 'proper behaviour' as defined by Confucianism (such 
as the avoidance of competition or conflict or the duty to respect seniors) are often in 
contradiction with modem or western values, support for their value is relatively 
easily found in the classic texts. 
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Table 6.10 Relationships between the focus and the type of items7 
news editorial feature essay letter other total 
Chinese people, 16 0 2 31 7 4 60 
culture & tradition 26.7% 0% 3.3% 51.7 11.7 6.7% 100 
Confucianism 7 0 7 34 0 2 50 
14.0% 0% 14.0% 68.0 0% 4.0% 100 
government 10 14 4 13 0 1 42 
and officials 23.8% 33.3% 9.5% 31.0 0% 2.4% 100 
family and group 13 2 1 10 0 1 27 
48.1% 7.4% 3.7% 37.0 0% 3.7% 100 
proper behaviour 5 0 1 14 2 6 28 
17.9% 0% 3.6% 50.0 7.1% 21.4 100 
work and money 5 3 2 11 0 11 22 
22.7% 13.6% 9.1% 50.0 0% 4.5% 
1 
100 
morality of 4 2 2 11 1 1 21 
society 19.0% 9.5% 9.5% 52.4 4.8% 4.8% 100 
others 1 1 5 13 1 4 25 
4.0% 400% 20.0% 52.0 4.0% 16.0 100 
total 61 22 24 137 11 20 275 
22.2% 8.0% 8.7% 49.8 4.0% 7.3% 100 
7The 'focus' of an item is defined by the main theme. 
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Table 6.11 The relationship between the focus of items and quotations from 
Confucian classics 
with quotations without total 
Chinese people, 11 109 120 
culture & tradition 9.2% 1 90.8% 100% 
Confucianism 39 61 100 
39.0% 61.0% 100% 
government and 24 60 84 
officials 28.6% 71.4% 100% 
family and group 14 40 54 
25.9% 74.1% 100% 
proper behaviour 19 37 56 
33.9% 66.1% 100% 
work and money 7 37 44 
15.9% 84.1% 100% 
morality of society 6 36 42 
14.3% 85.7% 100% 
others 14 36 50 
28.0% 72.0% 100% 
total 134 416_ 550 
24.4% 75.6% 100% 
One other thing that needs to be explained, however, is that two groups of items, 
those focused on Chinese people, culture and tradition and those dealing with the 
morality of society, had low rates of quotations, 9.2% and 14.3% respectively. These 
findings were unexpected since themes relating to Chinese people, culture and 
tradition were the most prominent in the sample. One possible explanation could be 
that these themes often dealt with distinctively modem phenomena, and that 
consequently there were not many readily available quotations dealing with these 
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eventualities8. Similarly, almost half of the themes related to the morality of society 
are laments over its decline in modem society. Possible support from the Confucian 
classics were not felt necessary in order to make this point. 
Chinese People, Culture and Tradition 
This was the most prominent group of themes, both main and secondary, for both 
newspapers. These themes encompassed topics around the greatness of Chinese 
culture, pride in being Chinese, the importance of tradition, how to preserve culture 
and tradition and to advocate their greatness, and, a negative theme, the harm of 
being fettered by tradition. This reservation (4.1 % of the total within the group), 
which featured exclusively in Ming Bao, was an exception. The overall attitude 
expressed towards Chinese culture and tradition was positive in Hong Kong and even 
more so in Taiwan. 
Table 6.12 Types of items containing a main theme of Chinese 
people, culture and tradition 
news 16 26.7% 
editorial 0 0% 
feature article 2 3.3% 
essay 31 51.7% 
letter 7 11.7% 
other 4 6.6% 
total 60 100% 
The high frequency of appearance of the items with a main theme of Chinese people, 
culture and tradition suggests a high degree of importance. However, few of these 
pieces were long (6.7% compared to an average of 19.7%). These items also had the 
lowest proportion (9.2%) quoting from Confucian Classics. These figures suggest a 
8For example, as shown in the previous chapter, Chinese centric themes were frequently advanced by 
emphasising the advantages of Chinese culture over other world cultures, some of which has not 
developed by the time the classic texts were written. 
178 
low level of importance. To understand these conflicting results, we need to look at 
what kind of items focused on this group of themes. As shown in Table 6.12, the 
majority were essays and news items, which tend to be short. As a consequence 
whilst this group of Confucian themes were often mentioned, they were not discussed 
in detail. 
Within this group tradition was the most prominent topic accounting for 43.3% of the 
total. It included both positive and negative themes. But the single most common 
theme within the category was the greatness of Chinese culture accounting for 24.7% 
of the total. This suggests that Chinese people are proud of their culture and tradition 
and that they have a strong sense of belonging to an imagined community that is 
distinctively Chinese. 
Confucianism 
This category covered mentions of social activities commemorating Confucians, 
discussions on Confucianism and the Confucian classics, the greatness of 
Confucianism, the relationship between Confucianism and Chinese culture and 
tradition, the role of Confucianism in modem society, its hindrance to modernity, and 
its negative influence on people and society. Since up to three themes could be 
identified in any one item and negative themes often went together in a single item, 
the proportion of items on this theme containing negative mentions was 21.8% 
(Table 6.13). 
Although overall both newspapers presented a predominantly positive image of 
Confucianism, Ming Bao seemed to be more critical than Zhong Yang Ri Bao. In 
Taiwan, people are expected to follow the officially proclaimed ideology rather than 
to criticise it. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, the colonial government does not 
promote Confucianism, leaving it up to the individual to evaluate its worth. To a 
certain extent then the results reflected the contrasted political realities of the two 
societies. 
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Table 6.13 Items containing themes with positive or negative stances towards 
Confucianism 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total sample 
positive 32 69.6% 36 87.8% 68 78.2% 
negative 14 30.4% 5 12.2% 19 21.8% 
total 46 100% 41 100% 87 
Table 6.14 Comparison between positive and negative themes on Confucianism 
Main theme Secondary theme I Secondary theme 2 total 
positive 42 21 12 75 
56.0% 28.0% 16.0% 100% 
negative 8 5 9 22 
36.4% 22.7% 40.9% 100% 
More than half of the positive mentions (56%) were identified as main themes, as 
against about one third (36.4%) negative mentions. Moreover high proportion of 
negative mentions were identified as the least important themes (secondary theme 2, 
see Table 6.14). This pattern indicates that themes referring to Confucianism 
positively were most often the main topic of items, whereas themes concentrating on 
its negative aspects were often second or third thoughts. This further reduces the 
salience of negative images of Confucianism in the newspapers. Similar conclusions 
can be drawn from an analysis of the length of items. As shown in Table 6.15, none 
of the items which had a main theme focusing on the negative aspects of 
Confucianism was long whereas two thirds of the items advancing the merits of 
Confucianism were. 
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Table 6.15 Length of items focusing on Confucianism 
short medium long total 
positive 15 13 14 42 
35.7% 31.0% 33.3% 100% 
negative 6 2 0 8 
75.0% 
1 
25.0% 
1 
0% 
1 
100% 
1 
Looking at the themes individually, Confucianism, tradition and culture was the most 
frequently mentioned (26.8%), followed by Confucianism and modem society 
(14.4%), social activities referring to Confucians or Confucianism (10.3%), and the 
greatness of Confucianism (9.3%). Together these constituted 60.8% of all themes 
relevant to Confucianism. On this basis, it seems that what the newspapers were most 
concerned about in relation to Confucianism was firstly its relationship with tradition 
and culture and secondly its role in modem society. A sense of pride in Confucianism 
was also expressed. 
It is interesting to note that this sense of pride was not equally expressed in Ming Bao 
and Zhong Yang Ri Bao. Most themes referring to the greatness of Confucianism 
(77.8%) and the need to change Confucianism in order to adapt to the modem world 
(75%) had their origins in Zhong Yang Ri BaO. Again this pattern reflects social 
realities in the two societies. In Taiwan, where the Nationalist government claims to 
be the true inheritor of the Confucian tradition, patriotic feelings towards 
Confucianism are frequently expressed and there is a conscious effort to change 
relevant aspects of Confucianism to make it into a working ideology. In Hong Kong, 
on the other hand, its existence is very much a matter of fact. Confucianism is 
accepted as part of tradition, great or not. 
Govemment and officials 
In line with our previous argument, most themes in this category (74.1 %) were from 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao. Themes relating to government had an especially low 
prominence in Ming Bao (10.8%). 
181 
Table 6.16 Distribution of themes referring to government and officials 
unite under one opinion 18 22.2% 
good officials 16 19.8% 
care and work for public 10 12.3% 
Confucian officials 7 8.6% 
virtuous officials 6 7.4% 
keeping stability 5 6.2% 
nation for people 5 6.2% 
strong goverment 4 4.9% 
knowledgeable officials 3 3.7% 
govern with compassion 2 2.5% 
others 5 6.2% 
total 81 100% 
In the Confucian ideal, government and officials can not be separated from each 
other since the source of authority is man rather than law. Ordinary people are 
expected to respect and obey rulers (officials). In return, the ruler is obliged to take 
care of their needs. The results of the press analysis showed a similar picture (see 
Table 6.16). Good officials (19.8%) look after ordinary people and work for the 
public interest (12.3%), and a strong goverment requests everybody to unite under 
one opinion (22.2%). In contrast other aspects of traditional Confucian teaching, such 
as governing with compassion (2.5%), officials being virtuous (7.4%) and 
knowledgeable (3.7%), received relatively low level of attention. These findings lend 
strong support to our second hypothesis. 
Family and group 
This section covered the themes of marriage, family, and the relationship between the 
individual and the group. Although it was a relatively large category, most of 
mentions appeared as second themes accompanying the major topic. Only 39.1% 
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were major focuses. However, when they did become the primary subject of an item, 
there was a higher than average possibility of the item being long. 
Putting the interests of others before one's own was the most frequently mentioned 
theme (26.1%), though the items containing this theme were found exclusively in 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao. The second most prominent theme was filial piety (24.6%), 
which was given equal prominence in both newspapers. The least frequently 
mentioned theme was the need to take care of family members (1.4%). This seems 
odd at first sight since this obligation is an important part of the Confucian tradition. 
However, given the fact that the special attention paid to family members and 
relatives has been consistently criticised for generating favouritism and corruption, it 
is perhaps understandable that it would not be openly advocated in the press. 
Themes relating to the family received slightly less coverage than those focusing on 
the group. But they had a much higher likelihood of being the main theme (53.3%) 
and they constituted a higher proportion of long items (31.3%). These figures 
underline the high degree of importance accorded to the family, and are entirely 
consonant with popular Confucianism which places the family at the centre of social 
life. The core of the Confucian family ethos, filial piety, was one of the commonest 
themes and was often discussed as a major issue (58.8%). Filial piety is both the 
basis of parental authority and the main principle governing conduct within the 
Confucian family. Its strong representation within the sample suggests that the 
central importance of this aspect of tradition remains relatively unchanged. 
Ming Bao carried more themes on the family while Zhong Yang Ri Bao featured 
more on the group (see Table 6.17). This again supports our hypotheses. It also 
illustrates the differences between the two societies. As discussed above, in Hong 
Kong, people's social and economic activities are based around the family. It is 
therefore understandable that family related themes were accorded higher 
prominence. In Taiwan, on the other hand, a strong sense of nationalism, partly 
cultivated by the Nationalist government, has been an important element in public 
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culture. As its corollary, much attention has been paid to the unselfish individual and 
the importance of the group. 
Table 6.17. Distribution of themes relating to the family and the group 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao 
family 11 61.1% 19 37.3% 
group 7 38.9% 32 62.7% 
total 18 100% 51 100% 
Proper behaviour 
In this group the most prominent single theme was the need to behave in conformity 
with Confucian principles (30.2%). Hannonious relationships were also very salient 
(18.9%). The Confucian way was therefore presented as a main guideline for proper 
behaviour, and its principal rule, harmonious relationships, was duly observed. In 
contrast only three cases dealt with the theme of respecting seniors. This could imply 
that older people are now losing the special status they used to enjoy in traditional 
society. 
Overall, Ming Bao contributed 62.3% of the themes in this group, which suggests 
that popular Confucianism in Hong Kong paid more attention to people and their 
everyday life, which is in line with our third hypothesis. The pattern of collection in 
the two newspapers was similar with the exception of two themes: that women 
should stay at home and that men and women should maintain a distance from one 
another. Ten cases were coded from Ming Bao and none from Zhong Yang Ri Bao. 
This suggests that Hong Kong may be more conservative with respect to women's 
rights, though the sample is too small to draw firm conclusions. 
Work and Money 
56.7% of themes in this category appeared in Ming Bao (Table 6.18), providing a 
relatively weak support for our hypothesis that the Hong Kong title would pay more 
attention to themes directly relating to economic activity. The need for hard work 
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was the most common theme (39.6%) in this section. It was also the third most 
frequently featured of all themes. Frugality was also an important theme, accounting 
for 35.8% of the themes within this group. These two together constituted 75.4% of 
the section, and received similar coverage in both papers. This is perhaps not 
surprising since both qualities have long been considered essential qualities in 
Confucian tradition. It is also possible to argue that their salience has been further 
strengthened by their consonance with the process of industrialisation in both Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. 
Nowadays in both societies, money has become synonymous with success, fame and 
status. With this in mind, it is somewhat surprising to find that there were a number 
of items referring to the negative influence of money or urging people to work to 
advance the good life and the good society rather than simply for money. While the 
morally conscious Zhong Yang Ri Bao carried more content disclosing the evil nature 
of money, Ming Bao concentrated more on advising people to work for the public 
good. One possible explanation is that after several decades of seeking money and 
economic success there had been something of a reaction and traditional moral values 
were bein revivified. This con ecture is supported by the distribution of these 9i 
themes over time: two in the 1970s, four in the 1980s, and six in the 1990s. 
Table 6.18 Distribution of themes relating to work and money 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri 
Bao 
total sample 
be frugal 10 33.3% 9 39.1% 19 35.8% 
work hard 12 40% 9 39.1% 21 39.6% 
money is bad 2 6.7% 4 17.4% 6 11.3% 
work for good 6 20% 1 4.4% 7 13.2% 
whole category 30 100% 23 100% 53 100% 
56.6% 43.4% 100% 
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The Morality of Sociely 
This section included only three themes: the declining morality of modem times 
(46.1%), rebuilding a moral society (38.5%), and reinforcing the teaching of ethics 
(15.4%). Almost half (48.7%) of the themes coded came from items printed in the 
1980s. This reflects the strong campaign to rebuild morality launched by the KMT 
government in Taiwan. Both societies lamented the decline of morality, but the 
reaction was different. Taiwan tried to combat the trend. Hong Kong was more 
laissez faire (Table 6.19). 
Table 6.19 Distribution of themes relating to morality 
Ming Bao Zhong Yang Ri Bao total 
declining morality 9 9 18 
50.0% 50.0% 100% 
rebuilding morality 1 14 15 
6.7% 93.3% 100% 
teaching ethics 2 4 6 
33.3% 66.7% 100% 
Education 
Several additional single themes are worth noting. One was the importance of 
education, which constituted 2.0% of all themes coded. As noted earlier, the high 
standard of education in oriental societies has been widely seen as one of the engines 
of their recent economic development. The importance of education can be traced 
back to the prestige given to learned man by Confucius. At 2.0% of the sample total 
this theme was one of the frequently featured ones. It was also prominent, as shown 
by the following figures: 63.6% of all mentions were coded as the main theme, well 
above the average of 48.8%; 27.3% of the coverage related to this topic appeared in 
editorials or feature articles, compared to the average of 16.2%; and 50% of the cases 
which discussed the importance of education quoted Confucian classics, compared to 
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the average 32.5%. The fact the theme of education received more than average in- 
depth analysis, and was more often supported by citations from Confucian classics 
confirms its significance in public debate within these societies. 
Virtues 
One further theme worth noting was praise of virtuous people, which constituted 
3.0% of all the themes coded. Although its overall frequency of appearance is high 
for a single theme, most of the themes in this category were secondary (88.2%). This 
suggests that classical virtues were considered desirable in the contemporary world, 
but not perhaps essential. However, one particular virtue, being modest, featured 
rather more strongly. It made up 1.4% of all themes coded. This figure is notable 
because the traditional Confucian emphasis on modesty is in sharp contrast to the 
positive modem valuation of assertiveness and competitiveness. The fact that it had 
not been entirely displaced by these contemporary values can again be taken as an 
indicator of the continuing influence of Confucianism. 
The distribution of themes: 1970s - 1990s 
As mentioned earlier, newspaper samples were selected at three points in time - the 
mid-seventies, mid-eighties and early nineties. The mid-seventies was a time of hard 
work and achievement for both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economies were 
booming, but were still at an early stage of development. By the mid-eighties, they 
had surprised the world by the sustained speed of their economic development and 
the rapid improvement in living standards. It was a time of pride and problems, pride 
in the new wealth and the problems of adjusting economic policies to reach a higher 
stage and of dealing with the issues generated by the new wealth. In the early 1990s, 
movements for political reform swept most East Asian societies. Politics was high on 
the public agenda. 
As shown in Table 6.20, the only group of themes featured consistently and 
prominently throughout the sample period were those relating directly to 
Confucianism, being the second most frequently mentioned group of themes of all 
times. Themes referring to Chinese people, culture and tradition are also prominent 
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as number one in the 1970s and the 1980s and number three in the 1990s. Apart from 
these two groups, themes relating to family and group and proper behaviour were 
leading groups in the 1970s. In the 1980s themes relating to work and money, and 
the morality of society received more attention than at other times, while politics, 
family and group were mentioned less often. The most common themes in the 1990s 
concerned government and officials. During the period between the eighties and 
nineties, the importance of previous leading themes on Chineseness decreased 
considerably. However, apart from this group of themes and the themes on proper 
behaviour, there was no sign of a steady decrease in themes relating to Confucianism 
in the analysed newspapers. This result supports our argument that Confucianism 
remained salient despite the rapid pace of change although the particular aspects that 
were emphasised varied with shifts in the political and economic systems. 
Table 6.20 Distribution of themes at different times 
1970s 1980s 1990S 
Chinese people, culture 
& tradition 
41 23.2% 43 26.5% 31 14.0% 
Confucianism 29 16.4% 29 17.9% 39 17.6% 
government & officials 21 11.8% 6 3.7% 54 24.3% 
family & group 23 13.0% 14 8.6% 32 14.4% 
proper behaviour 21 11.9% 18 11.1% 14 6.3% 
work & money 13 7.3% 21 13.0% 19 8.6% 
morality of society 9 5.1% 19 11.7% 11 4.9% 
others 20 11.3% 12 7.5% 22 9.9% 
total 177 100% 162 100% 222 100% 
On closer analysis, we find that the overall amount of attention given to 
Confucianism increased over the sample period, and that the proportion of positive 
reference to Confucianism was higher in the 1980s, 93.9%, compared to 62.2% in the 
1970s and 76.7% in 1990s. One explanation is that the economic achievements of the 
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in the supplements in the form of short essays, but a substantial number were 
contained in news items, feature articles or editorials which were mostly put on the 
front page. These findings further support our argument that Confucianism is still 
alive and exerting considerable influence within the public cultures of modem Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Moreover, the frequent association of Confucian themes with 
comment and analysis suggests that Confucian ideals are being used as a measure 
against which to make judgements, a status enjoyed by ideas or ideals widely held to 
be valid and worthwhile. 
In theory, Confucianism believes that society functions through the interactions of 
different human relations. Harmonious human relations guarantee social harmony, a 
perfect state of society. But the Confucian model of society is also strongly 
hierarchical. People are expected to obey the ruler in return for his concern for their 
well being. The family is the pivotal institution. Filial piety, the most important 
guarantee of a family in harmony, is the root of all Conftician virtues. Confucianism 
also believes that human beings should work hard to be virtuous and knowledgeable 
so to reach a state of perfection. 
The analysis of the themes showed that all these major aspects of Confucianism were 
present in the newspapers, though the degree of prominence varied. Human relations 
was significant by its frequent appearance (38.8%). Although the family received 
relatively low coverage in itself, together with its major extensions, the group and the 
nation, the general theme of collective cohesion amounted to 39.8% of all themes. It 
is likely that while the importance of the extended family is decreasing as a form of 
social organisation in modem East Asian societies, the Confucian rules which 
regulated people's behaviour in the family continue to be applied to other institutions 
and to the nation state. Personal virtues, on the other hand, were not prominently 
featured in the sample with a few exceptions, filial piety (3.0%), hard-work (3.7%) 
and frugality (3.2%). At a societal level, morality and especially its perceived 
decline, was also given a high profile. 
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This pattern of coverage places the emphasis more on groups but less on the family; 
more on hard work, frugality and education but less on propriety, more on a strong 
government and its commitment towards people but less on the virtues or knowledge 
of officials. As we have argued in the previous chapter, the interaction between 
Confucianism and capitalism has produced a selective variant of the tradition, in 
which the elements conducive to economic development have been strengthened and 
the parts judged obstructive to development jettisoned or downgraded. The results of 
the quantitative content analysis lend clear support to this general argument. 
The results also revealed different patterns of coverage in Ming Bao and Zhong Yang 
Ri Bao. Although Zhong Yang Ri Bao had fewer pages per issue, it carried more 
items relevant to Confucianism, and featured a much higher proportion on the front 
page. The items from Zhong Yang Ri Bao also had more quotations from Confucian 
classics, and more themes from Zhong Yang Ri Bao were covered in the form of 
news, editorial and feature articles (42.1% compared to 22.4% for Ming Bao). 
Together these findings point to the higher profile given to Confucianism in Zhong 
Yang Ri Bao. 
As to differences in emphases, Zhong Yang Ri Bao focused more on politics and 
society while Ming Bao concentrated more on personal traits. When Confucianism 
itself was the subject, the articles from Zhong Yang Ri Bao projected an entirely 
positive image, illustrated by a heavy concentration on themes such as the greatness 
of Confucianism. In contrast, a much more equivocal image of Confucianism was 
presented in Ming Bao, where both high praise and condemnation can be found. In 
addition, the urge to adapt Confucianism to modem situations and to rebuild social 
morality according to the Confucian ideal was expressed solely in Zhong Yang Ri 
Bao. 
These differences can be taken as indicators of the variations in the way 
Confucianism has been mobilised in public discourse in East Asian societies with 
different structures, official policies and political priorities. These differences were 
determined firstly by the differing sponsorship and market situation of the two 
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newspapers, and secondly by the social and political situations in the two societies. 
Zhong Yang Ri Bao, being sponsored by the government, is obliged to promote the 
officially sanctioned version of Confucianism and to focus on those aspects which 
are particularly useful to the government in legitimating its rule and facilitating 
growth. Ming Bao's viability, on the other hand, depends on popular support in the 
marketplace. Accordingly it emphasises Confucianism as an ethical code deigned to 
regulate people's personal behaviour and offers a more equivocal evaluation of the 
tradition, presenting it at times as undesirable and a barrier to modernisation. The 
results of the content analysis therefore, not only illustrate the basic themes of 
Confucianism common to the modem East Asian NISs, it also reveals the dynamism 
and flexibility of Confucianism as it adapts to the differing situations of the two 
societies. 
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Chapter 7 
Confucianism and Modern Capitalism: A Theoretical 
Inquiry 
Within discussions on the possible relationships between Confucian culture and 
economic development, Max Weber's work stands out as an essential starting point. 
In his extensive comparative studies of world religions, Weber argued that whereas 
ascetic Protestantism provided an essential cultural precondition for the rise of 
modem capitalism in Europe, Confucianism inhibited capitalist development in 
China. More recently, however, the rapid movement of the East Asian NISs towards 
capitalist forms of organisation has posed problems for this argument. How then can 
we explain the role played by contemporary Confucianism in the growth of 
capitalism in these societies? In order to answer this question, we need to look at two 
separate issues: the role of culture in the process of social change, and the 
relationship between Confucianism and modem capitalism. 
7.1 Culture and Social Change 
Until very recently, the study of culture has been peripheral to the core concerns of 
the major disciplines of contemporary social sciences. For both Marxists and 
functionalists, social structure has been the primary focus. If culture was studied, the 
emphasis was often on the structural influences on cultural beliefs. It is only since the 
1980s that culture has become an increasingly central focus for social sciences. This 
is largely the result of a rethinking of the basic concept of 'culture' in response to 
contemporary developments in the cultural sphere. The word 'culture' contains a 
variety of alternative, overlapping meanings accreted over centuries. Classical 
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sociological theory and classical social anthropology both view culture mainly as a 
set of every day beliefs, values or orientations. Culture today, however, is expressed 
and negotiated increasingly through recorded media, in a variety of forms from print 
and film to computer networks. 
Confucian culture in this thesis is understood more in terms of values and 
behavioural patterns. Anthropologists at the beginning of this century defined culture 
as the way of life of a people. It is what an individual needs to know in order to 
survive in a society, a stock of knowledge which could be learned and passed down 
generation by generation. Clifford Geertz, a distinguished anthropologist, usefully 
narrows this general conception down by defining it as 'an historically transmitted 
pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and 
develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life' (1973: 89). 
This definition conceives of culture as a pervasive symbolic force which is embedded 
and expressed in habits, manners, rules, values, ethics, rituals, and other cognitive or 
symbolic devices. It embodies the rules and values underlying the everyday activities 
of a society and the operation of its core institutions. Culture is plural. While in 
general it provides an established pattern of life which requires people to conform, it 
can be conceptualised and acted out by different people in very different ways. 
As another influential contemporary anthropologist, Marshall Shalins, has put it, 'In 
their practical projects and social arrangements, informed by the received meanings 
of persons and things, people submit ... cultural categories to empirical risks. 
To the 
extent that the symbolic is thus the pragmatic, the system is a synthesis in time of 
reproduction and variation ... 
in action meanings are always at risk' (Shalins, 1985: 
ix). This dialectic between pre-existing structures and grounded action is particularly 
affected by encounters with other, external, systems. These meetings or collisions 
have the effect of relativising taken-for-granted verities, providing new points of 
comparison and evaluation and opportunities for new syntheses and incorporations. 
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As -Ae noted earlier, Confuciardsm. has been in precisely this situation as it has 
struggled to adapt firstly to the impact of East Asia's extended encounters %ith 
uestem technologies, values and notions of modernity in the nineteenth and early 
tuentieth centuries, and secondly. to the processes set in motion bN the rapid 
economic development of the last three decades. The result has been a highly 
selective deployment of an already flexible tradition, which has emphasised elements 
which resonate %ith unfolding econornic and political dynamics. and jettisoned or 
downplaved those that no loncrer have a secure purchase on common sense thinking 
and everyday action- Contemporary Confucianism- as presented here then, is a 
thoroughly pragmatic response to late capitalism and high modernity. Because it is a 
moral rather than a religious s-%-stem. and focuses on life in the here-and-now rather 
than the hereafter. it has not produced the fundamentalist reactions common to 
contemporan- Islam, Hinduism, Christianity or Judaism. 
The elasticity of Confucianism as a cultural resource poses particular problems for 
theories that propose general models of the relationship between cultural and social 
sN-stenis. 
One in1juential tradition in explaining the role of cultural systems in social change is 
to treat them as a dependent on the social structure and on economic conditions. This 
is most eNident in Maries theory that the 'economic base' determines the 
'superstructure'. But it is also found in Durkheirns view that changes in religion and 
other cultural systems are rooted in the increasing complexity of society- 
The maj or alternative tradition has stressed the role of culture, and especially of 
ideas, as a relatively autonomous force in effecting change. Max Weber is the most 
important social theorist to propose this model. However, he never intended to 
supply a one-sided causal interpretation of culture and history. His insistence on the 
W-ciprocal relationship' between religious belief and economic action clearly accepts 
that cultural changes are determined in part by social-structural fators. 
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Max Weber wrote on a wide range of sociological issues. Although the question of 
social and historical change is central to his thought, he never systematically 
presented a theory of social change. Instead, studies on segments of universal history 
lie scattered across his works, especially those on antiquity, the famous The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and his Sociology of World Religions. 
Because of this fragmentation of presentation, Weber's theory of social change has 
been subject to various contending reconstructions none of which has achieved the 
status of orthodoxy. 
When Weber was first introduced to the English-speaking world through translation, 
he was either depicted as a founder of a historical sociology that rejects evolutionism, 
or as an evolutionist whose account is organised around the rationalisation of all 
forms of social interaction and the 'disenchantment' of all otherworldly values (see, 
for example, Bendix, 1966 and Parsons, 1937). Since the 1970s, however, he has 
been rediscovered, and his theory of social change reformulated. 
Wolfgang Schluchter (1981) elucidates Weber's sociology 'as a developmental 
history of the West', a neo-evolutionary theory about the emergence of western 
rationalistic capitalism, with an emphasis on the role of material interests rather than 
religious ideas within this process. Friedrich Tenbruck (1980), on the other hand, 
reconstructs Weber's work in a neo-idealist manner. According to him, Weber's main 
interest is in the autonomous role of ideals or ideas in generating social changes. The 
world's history is, to certain extent, a history of rationalisation and disenchantment. 
Taking as evidence Weber's memorable sentences 'Not ideas, but material and ideal 
interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the "world-images" that 
have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along 
which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest' (Weber, 1958: 280), 
Tenbruck further explains: 'Notwithstanding the fact that human action is motivated 
directly by interests, there occur periods of history whose direction in the long run is 
determined by ideas so that, in a way, men work themselves to death in the pursuit of 
their interests, and in the long run the water of history is conducted by the mill of 
ideas and men's actions remain under the influence of ideas' (1980: 335 -6). 
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Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1989) has attempted to synthesise these 'material' and 'ideal' 
approaches to produce a 'two-dimensional' model. He points out that Weber 
deliberately emphasised the innovatory role of individuals oriented by otherworldly 
ideas, but at the same time repeatedly argued that the life-conduct of individuals is 
largely determined by social structures. Also referring to Weber's famous metaphor 
quoted above, Mommsen argues that 'ideal' interests drive one dimension of social 
change and 'material' interests the other. Ideal interests result in 'value-rational, or 
'substantive rational' actions by individuals. As value-rational action is directed by 
the inner self of the acting person and therefore unrestricted by the material situation, 
it has the power to challenge social reality, and potentially it may induce innovation, 
and even revolutionary change on a social scale. On the other hand, material interests 
lead to 'instrumental-rational' or 'formal rational' forms of human action, which tends 
to conform to dominant world-views and existing social systems, thereby supporting 
on-going trends of social change. 
To understand Weber's theory of social change in relation to religious systems of 
thought, it is necessary to study his Protestant Ethic (1930). Its aim, Weber himself 
declared, was 'to ascertain whether and to what extent religious forces have taken part 
in the qualitative formation and quantitative expansion of that spirit (of capitalism) 
over the world. ... At the same time we shall as 
far as possible clarify the manner and 
the general direction in which ... the religious movements 
have influenced the 
development of material culture' (193 0: 91-92). 
Weber opened his Protestant Ethic by presenting the evidence that significantly more 
Protestants than Catholics were involved in the ownership and leadership of capitalist 
enterprises and in the fields of higher educational training for science, technology 
and business. After examining some possible explanations, he argued that the 
explanation 'must be sought in the permanent intrinsic character of their religious 
beliefs' (1930: 40). In order to do this, Weber attempted to identify the relationship 
between a 'state of mind' or the 'spirit of capitalism' and the Protestant ethic. 
196 
According to Weber, modem capitalism was based upon the rational, endless pursuit 
of profits. Essential to this project was the spirit of capitalism, a set of values and 
attitudes characterised by the combination of devotion to earning money through 
legitimate economic activities and restraints on spending money for personal 
gratification. For Weber it was obvious that this 'spirit' could exist only when hard 
work was regarded as a duty, or 'calling toward which the individual feels himself to 
have an ethical obligation' (1930: 75). Therefore his next step was to discover where 
the idea of a calling had come from. 
Weber located it in the Reformation and argued that the religious doctrine bearing the 
closest affinity to the spirit of capitalism was to be found in Protestantism. 
Protestantism took four principle forms: Calvinism, Methodism, Pietism, and the 
Baptist sects. Though it was treated as a whole in its connection with capitalistic 
economic activities, Weber singled out Calvinism for his analysis, because it 'gives 
the most consistent religious basis for the idea of calling ... ' (193 0: 15 5). 
Calvinism rested on the foundation of predestination: the belief that only a small 
proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace. It was believed that the universe 
exists according to the purpose of God and that His decrees are beyond human 
comprehension. Consequently, Weber argued, a Calvinist was forced to follow 
his/her path alone to meet a destiny which had been determined by God. In addition, 
the believer suffered from uncertainty as to whether he or she was one of the Elect. 
The solution to this spiritual isolation and psychological discomfort was to be found 
in'intense world activity'. 
For Calvinists, belief in God meant that it was obligatory to consider oneself chosen. 
In order to prove that they were favoured by God, the Calvinists had to work harder 
and to produce more. During this process, Weber argued, they began to put more and 
more emphasis on the efficiency of work and how to maximise it. They began to 
calculate rationally. Another consequence of their devotion to hard work in a calling 
was that the pursuit of wealth became 'not only morally permissible, but actually 
enjoined' (1930: 163). Wealth came to man through God's grace. Thus the anxiety 
197 
and isolation experienced by the believers had 'far-reaching psychological 
consequences' (1930: 160): worldly activity and the pursuit of wealth came to be 
sanctioned in subsequent developments of Protestant doctrine. Weber also pointed 
out that although the acquisition of wealth was not in itself considered bad, the 
believer was not supposed to 'spend any of it for a purpose which does not serve the 
glory of God but only one's own enjoyment' (1930: 170). 
This combination of hard work and limited consumption was what characterised the 
'Protestant ethic' for Weber. He compared it with'the spirit of capitalism' and found 
that their mutual congruence indicated a strong functional relationship beyond 
chance coincidence. He then went on to argue that'One of the fundamental elements 
of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modem culture: 
rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was bom - that is what this 
discussion has sought to demonstrate - from the spirit of Christian asceticism' (1930: 
180). 
Weber devoted The Protestant Ethic to tracing the ultimate origins of modem 
capitalism, which he found in ascetic Protestantism. In the course of the discussion of 
this case he also demonstrated that a new set religious ideas could transform people's 
daily behaviour and thus help to initiate socio-economic change. It is worth noting, 
however, that Weber made a clear distinction between the 'qualitative formation' and 
'quantitative expansion' of the social change process. The main focus of The 
Protestant Ethic was on the initial formation of capitalism and on the part played by 
religious ideas in the process. 
Seeking further support for his hypothesis, Weber conducted a series of comparative 
studies of ancient Judaism and the religions of China and India, through which he 
sought to show how these belief systems could hinder the formulation of modem 
capitalism. Of these studies, his analysis of Confucianism offered the best 
counterexample to his Protestant ethic thesis. 
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Weber started his discussion of The Religion of China (195 1) with an analysis of the 
economic, political, and social conditions of Chinese society, so to pay due attention 
to 'material' factors. He examined the monetary system, cities and guilds, the 
patrimonial state, kinship organisation and law. Within this mixture of material 
conditions, some were in opposition to the development of capitalism, some in 
support of it. In general, however, Weber concluded that the balance of favourable 
material conditions was sufficient for a genuine industrial capitalism to develop. 
Therefore he argued, the reason why modem capitalism failed to arise in China could 
only be found in 'ideal' factors, and Confucianism in particular. 
Weber began by examining the literati as the key carriers of Confucianism. The 
Chinese literati were distinguished from their counterparts in other cultures by their 
strong involvement in officialdom, their high social prestige, their nonhereditary 
status acquired though examinations, and their secular nobility. The literati were 
traditionalistic in nature. They were more interested in maintaining order and 
continuity than in initiating changes into the society. The elements that had 
determined this worldview, Weber argued, were to be found in the core 
characteristics of Confucianism. 
In his analysis, the centre of Confucianism was the belief in harmonious and 
immutable order underlying both the natural universe and human society. This pre- 
existing social and cosmic order required men to adjust and accommodate. The world 
on earth was presented by Confucianism as 'the best of all possible worlds. Man was 
in principle capable of achieving unlimited perfection and fulfilling the moral law. 
Thus there was no need for the Confucian man to look to the kingdom of God for 
salvation and eternal happiness. The self-confidence of the Confucian belief in the 
possibility of perfection in this world made a sharp contrast to the psychological 
tension of the Puritan, enjoined to work hard in order to demonstrate a state of grace 
from the other world. This, Weber argued, accounted for Confucianism's 
fundamental contrast with Protestantism. 'Confucian rationalism meant rational 
adjustment to the world, Puritan rationalism meant rational mastery of the world' 
(1951: 248). 
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In Weber's view, the Confucian literati desired to be saved from no sin but 'the 
undignified barbarism of social rudeness'. This goal could be achieved by subjecting 
one's emotions and way of life to a strict code of 'propriety'. The discrete self-control 
and ceremonial conduct entailed in this meant that the literati were bound to a 
rational life style not unlike Puritans. For Weber, however, these acts were mere 
external conformity to an externally imposed way of life. Again, it provided a strong 
contrast to the Puritans' striving produced by an inward aspiration. 
Weber concluded The Religion of China with a comparison between Confucianism 
and Puritanism. Both had attained a high level of formal rationality. But the content 
of Confucian rationalism and its consequent impact on social and economic life were 
very different from those of rational Puritanism. Whereas the Puritan ethic produced 
an intense enthusiasm for the mastery of the world, Confucianism centred upon the 
adjustment of the individual to a given order. 
Completely absent in Confucian ethic was any tension between nature and deity, 
between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need 
for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty 
and socio-political. reality. Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct 
through inner forces freed of tradition and convention (Weber, 1951: 235-6). 
For Weber, therefore, the absence of this tension was the most important hindrance to 
the emergence of capitalism in China. 
His studies of world religions enabled Weber to establish the mechanism of social 
change in its formative stages: ideas and ideals are potentially powerful forces in 
breaking tradition. Despite this concerted focus on the initiation of change, a few 
remarks can be found scattered across his writings on the expansion of the social 
change process. For example, on the later development of modem capitalism, 
he 
argued that, 'Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out 
its 
ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an 
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inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. ... 
victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no 
longer' (1930: 181-2). For Weber, therefore, there is a much reduced role for ideas 
and ideals in the expansion and further development of social change. Rather, it is 
technical and economic conditions that sustain its momentum. 
The main concern of this study is the relationship between Confucianism and 
economic development in East Asia, that is, the expansion of capitalism beyond 
Europe. Weber once remarked, 'The Chinese in all probability would be quite 
capable ... of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been 
fully developed in the modem culture area' (1951: 248). But he did not explore this 
probability further because he was more interested in the emergence and 
development of modemity in the West. Nevertheless, his studies have provided a set 
of tools for us to understand capitalist development in non-westem societies and the 
cultural change it has brought to these societies. 
Firstly, in his analysis of world religions, Weber established culture as an analytically 
distinct aspect of social life to be analysed on its own level. He showed how cultural 
beliefs guided everyday practices and affected people's life. With its own 
autonomous dynamics, culture has track-laying, transformative effects at particular 
historical conjunctures. Despite the emphasis he gave to the power of culture, 
however, Weber did not claim it as the only cause of social change. On the contrary, 
he was at pains to emphasise that, 'No economic ethic has ever been determined by 
religion - it is only one of the determinants of the economic ethic' (quoted in 
Worseley, 1984: 37). 
Secondly, instead of presenting a grand theory of a universal trend in the 
development of human society, Weber was careful to stress the importance of 
specific historical and cultural contexts and conjunctures. In his analysis of other 
religions, even though the emphasis was on their 'traditional' aspects as compared to 
the innovations of Protestantism, Weber recognised the dynamics of these cultures. 
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In his other studies he consciously stressed the specificity of European modernity as 
one particular period in historical development with a unique cultural expression. 
Thirdly, Weber saw a dialectical relationship between culture and structure. In his 
effort to highlight what had been ignored by Marx, he emphasised or sometimes 
over-emphasised how ideas and ideals affected the material world. At the same time, 
he also recognised cultural change as the consequence of material forces. For 
example, he believed that the process of modernisation was determined mainly by the 
'immanent dynamic' of institutions. In his comments on the origins of the 
Reformation, he further argued that changing social and economic conditions, 
especially the rise of the bourgeoisie as a class, were important factors (1978: 1197). 
Based on the studies of Weber we can suggest a framework for the analysis of the 
role of Confucianism in the East Asian NISs' recent economic development. In this 
approach, culture is treated as an explanatory variable in social change, but not the 
only one. It works in conjunction with other structural variables. Cultural and 
structural factors interact and influence each other. Thus there exists a non- 
deterministic causal relationship between cultural and social change. The final 
direction is often determined by the specific contexts, processes, and mechanisms 
that conditioned the changes. In the words of Greenfeld, 'the arrow of causality may 
point both ways'. And, 'the very same phenomenon at one phase in its development 
may be a result, and at another -a primary factor in the social process' (1992: 20). 
When we look at history, there are examples of both material and ideal forces as 
causes for social change. It was the use of ocean liners and firearms that enabled the 
West to expand and colonise other continents, which in turn changed the fate of the 
people of Asia, Africa and America, and shaped today's world. On the other hand, it 
would be impossible to imagine the existence of the Soviet Union or Communist 
China had it not been for the revolutionary theories of Marx and his successors. 
Mao's China was conceptualised and built according to the ideals of revolutionary 
socialism developed by Marxists. 
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As shown in these examples, both material and cultural factors can act as 
independent forces capable of affecting the process of social change. At a cer-tain 
historical moment or in a certain social context one may be more important than the 
other. The two sets of factors have their own paths of development, but they also 
interact. Sometimes they are concordant and together produce a concentrated spurt of 
change. At other times they can be contradictory. In these situations the stronger 
factor will dictate the direction of social change though its speed and scale will be 
hindered by the resistance of the other 
Full-scale societal change can be triggered by either material or cultural forces, 
depending on the specific social and historical contexts. But once the process of 
change is underway, changes in one sector will inevitably lead to changes in another. 
Significant alterations in social structures may create contradictions between 
transformed socio-economic conditions and existing symbolic systems, which will 
result in changes in these systems. On the other hand, changes in the cultural sphere 
may release forces which can legitimate, stimulate or reinforce new directions of 
change and leave their marks on the other spheres of society. Hence, changes in 
social structures may lead to changes in the cultural sphere, or vice versa. The 
analysis of the relations between Confucianism and capitalism that follows will be 
made in accordance with this belief. 
7.2 Confucianism and Capitalism 
In talking about Confucianism and capitalism, one is very soon confronted with a 
central historical question: why didn't capitalism develop in China? Many scholars 
have tried to answer this question, with replies that stress a variety of factors ranging 
from the Chinese mode of production to Confucian ideology. But to ask this question 
at all requires an underlying assumption that capitalist society is an inevitable stage 
in the development of China. This assumption is in accordance with the prevailing 
notion of the sociohistorical development of human society: evolutionary theory. 
Comte described social evolution in terms of an ineluctable sequence which lead to a 
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predestined end. Although contemporary scholars have rejected nineteenth century 
formulations of evolution and proposed different pathways, many still accept that the 
predestined end will take the form of a modem western society. The much publicised 
lend of history' thesis is simply the latest expression of this belief, a belief made more 
plausible and attractive by the collapse of Soviet communism 
The dramatic economic development that has occurred in East Asia seems to confirm 
this view. But it is a product of external stimulus rather than indigenous 
development. It has been achieved under a capitalist system developed in the West. 
The issue in question is, therefore, how this capitalist system was incorporated by the 
East Asian societies. Instead of believing that capitalist development is a natural 
stage of development as indicated by a universal theory of evolution, this thesis 
proposes that a combination of Confucian beliefs and western capitalist structures has 
created a unique kind of capitalism in East Asia which has produced the economic 
miracle of a sustained high rate of growth. 
In combining Confucianism and capitalism, the East Asian NISs have held them 
together in a viable though contradictory combination that has resulted in rapid 
economic development. They have adopted western capitalism, but not in its 
entirety. Rather, considerable selectivity has been exercised. Some aspects of western 
society have been accepted, but others have been ignored or rejected outright. Even 
the elements that have been borrowed may not necessarily have the same effects as 
they had in the West. 
To say that Confticianism and capitalism can be combined entails two assumptions. 
One is that Confucianism, though born in an agricultural economy, can be separated 
from its origins and transformed to suit an industrial-based economy. As we have 
emphasised throughout this work, Confucianism has experienced considerable 
mutations in response to changing social conditions and has repeatedly absorbed 
ideas from other belief systems and religions. This ability to assimilate new ideas 
without losing its essence has arguably been the primary source of Confucianism's 
continuing vitality. When Confucianism was faced with the challenge of the modem 
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age, I want to argue that its response has been continuous with its long established 
pattern: strengthening itself by learning from others. In other words, the advancement 
of western science and technology in East Asia has introduced new patterns of social 
action and interaction which have in turn generated significant transformations in 
Confucianism. 
The other assumption entailed in combining capitalism and Confucianism is that 
capitalism, though often treated as part and parcel of modernity in the West, can be 
separated from it and transplanted to non-western culture. When Weber maintained 
that the Chinese would be capable of assimilating capitalism, he also implied that the 
existence of mature capitalism did not require a universal set of cultural conditions. 
Peter Berger has devoted a major book to disengaging capitalism as an economic 
system from western modernity. Recognising that the rise of capitalism was part of 
the great transformation that created the modem West, he argues that capitalism, 
once set free, develops into an autopoietic system. It reproduces itself from the 
elements it has already produced. Berger has also paid special attention to the East 
Asian NISs on the grounds that 'the successful capitalist societies of East Asia can no 
longer be seen as a mere extension of western capitalism' (1987: 11). 
To separate capitalism from western modernity necessitates some analysis of the 
basic characteristics of both systems. The greatest contribution to the study of 
capitalism has been made by Marx, even though he himself never used the term. 
Marx viewed capitalism as a system of commodity production. The mode of 
production of this system was dominated by the deployment of capital, its private 
ownership, and its concentration in the hands of a capitalist class. Weber shared this 
basic conception of capitalism as a specific kind of economic system. In his 
definition, capitalism was a system in which the economic requirements of a society 
were predominantly met by economic activities that were oriented toward a market 
and geared to making a profit out of market exchanges. 
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Instead of seeking a definitive definition, capitalism in this thesis is viewed as an 
economic system comprised of inter-dependent attributes, the most important being 
free market mechanisms; production for profit; private ownership of the means of 
production; and free labour. Private ownership and free labour are the essential 
conditions for profit making in a free market. In a free market the rate of exchange or 
price fluctuates in response solely to perceived magnitudes in supply and demand. 
This is the most important attribute of capitalism, but is not confined to it. The free 
market is actually both ancient and widespread (Braudel, 1986: 227). Production for 
profit, on the other hand, is peculiar to capitalism. Traditionally production was to 
satisfy the immediate needs of people. Although people's needs are still catered for in 
a capitalist system, the ultimate end of production has been transformed into making 
money, or more precisely, making money for its own sake. 
Making money for its own sake has never been a virtue in any culture. In the West, 
however, it is justified and legitimated by becoming part of the market mechanism. 
In the market the pursuit of profit is a rational action following the natural law of 
economy. The high value of rational action is closely related to the central belief of 
western modernity, that the world, be it social, cultural, or natural, can be 
transformed by conscious human activity and participation. Guided by this belief, 
activities are organised in ways that are considered to be as efficient and effective as 
possible, and the object world is seen primarily as means to achieve goals. They 
further lead to a particular emphasis on technological and economic development. 
A central premise of western modernity is 'individualism', which values, 'in the first 
place, the individual human being: every man is, in principle, an embodiment of 
humanity at large, and as such he is equal to every other man, and free' (Dumont 
1977: 4). This supreme and intrinsic value assigned to the individual is most 
succinctly expressed in the ideals of liberty and equality; that everyone possesses the 
same right to freedom, and each in turn can make the same use of this right. They 
manifest themselves in the political life as the principle of democracy, that every 
citizen has the right to participate in the processes of political rule. In the economic 
field, everyone has the right of access to the market. Accordingly it is not acceptable 
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for the state to grant undue privileges to certain people because it violates others' 
rights. 
In Europe capitalism is linked to the vast transformations brought about in the 
material conditions of human life and to a stratification system based on class. At the 
same time, it is also linked to 'modem' representative political systems, and a culture 
characterised by an emphasis on the individual. All of these elements are intertwined 
within western capitalist society, often conceptualised as a totality or unity. So, can 
the economic processes of capitalism be lifted out of this complex, and incorporated 
into a society operating under a different set of rules? 
Looking at the evidence from the East Asian NISs, the answer should be 'yes'. 
Capitalism is linked with some aspects of modem western society intrinsically. For 
instance, one can hardly imagine its existence without the free market and the 
rational organisation of economic activities. But these are not exclusive to modem 
western societies. The free market long antedates the rise of industrial capitalism. 
And the operation of traditional Chinese bureaucracy was based on a high level of 
rationality. Furthermore, many other attributes of modernity are linked with 
capitalism only extrinsically. Individualism, for instance, has been widely regarded 
as both a cause and a consequence of capitalist economies. But the empirical 
evidence from East Asia has proved that capitalist economies can blossom without 
the blessing of individualism. 
If capitalism, in its essential features, can be lifted out of the complex of western 
modernity and bloom in a Confucian society, what is the mechanism of interaction 
between Confucianism and capitalism? When Weber analysed the relationship 
between the Protestant ethic and the emergence of capitalism, he focused on 
individual action. The Protestant ethic created a distinctive frame of mind which 
encouraged certain forms of economic behaviour. Weber's analysis of the religious 
ethic continues to be relevant to our discussion. But it must be seen not simply in 
relation to personal motivation but also as embodied in a wide range of institutions. 
Culture informs social institutions and structures, independently of individual 
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consciousness. Its impact cannot be reduced to the actions of individuals. The 
principal institutions in which Confucian values are embedded and reproduced are 
the family, the educational system, and the government. 
The construction of capitalism in East Asia has involved a process of establishing its 
compatibility with Confucianism and this has involved, in turn, the transformation of 
both formations. The seeds of capitalism were first sown in East Asia by western 
colonialists, but the rapid development of a modem capitalist system happened a 
century later. Western colonialism brought deep humiliation and physical suffering to 
the people of East Asia. It made them dissatisfied with their traditional ways and 
anxious to prove themselves in modem terms. Thus the stage was set for a full-scale 
social change, and a transformation of Confucianism. In this process, the ideas of 
profit making, competition, the rationalisation of production and rational 
innovativeness were absorbed. Above all, the accumulation of personal wealth 
became a legitimate, if not the most important, goal of life for most people. At the 
same time, however, many essential features of traditional Confucianism such as 
filial piety, respect for hierarchy and authority, and the emphasis on education, 
remained. 
When the East Asian NISs gained their independence and proceeded to industrialise, 
the transformed variant of Confucianism, which underlines the principles of major 
social institutions, became more functional. Under the influence of Confucianism, the 
East Asian people committed themselves to economic growth with great 
determination because they saw it as advancing the welfare of their families and 
nations. Growth has been achieved through collective efforts and the sacrifice of 
certain individual rights. Through the action of Confucian informed institutions and 
individuals, Confucianism has helped facilitate the growth of capitalism in East Asia 
and has given it some special characteristics in the process. 
In Confucian teaching, the point is very often made that unless there is sufficient 
prosperity, it is not possible to develop a moral community. And the basic moral 
requirement of an ordinary man is to provide adequate living conditions for his 
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family. The emphasis on the importance of wealth is obvious, but never wealth for its 
own sake. Rather, classic Confucians believed that profit is an ignoble goal leading to 
contentiousness rather than harmony. As mentioned before, production for profit is 
the central feature of capitalist development. How then did it become acceptable for 
Confucian East Asians? 
The attitude towards profit had already changed considerably in the late Song period 
(1127-1297) with the growth of an urban-centred commercial culture. Profit came to 
be seen as a good which is only likely to become evil if not properly controlled. Even 
so, profit-making was not viewed as a driving force in the constitution of social 
progress. In modern East Asia, the pursuit of profit is considered essential to success, 
but not as the ultimate goal of business operations. While in the West economic 
production is part of the larger effort to conquer nature, in 'modem' Confucian 
societies it is seen as a necessary condition for improving the living conditions of the 
people, and keeping the nation strong and independent. When the economic success 
of a particular firm is seen as for the good of the nation and people, naturally profit is 
not supposed to end up entirely in the pockets of the company's owners. 
This emphasis on the proper distribution of economic gains is congruent with the 
spirit of social egalitarianism intrinsic to Confucianism. In the West, large gaps in 
income are tolerated because they are seen to be indicative of differences in 
individual effort and performance. In Confucian thinking, everyone has a certain role 
to play in a stratified social order. While what one is judged fit to perform determines 
a person's position and status in the social hierarchy, it does not determine his or her 
economic well-being. Just as it is the moral responsibility of a family to care about 
the welfare of its members, a Confucian government is morally obliged to decrease 
economic inequality in order to guarantee a decent living standard for every citizen. 
In East Asia, this Confucian thinking has resulted in an unusual characteristic for a 
capitalist society: relatively equal income distribution. 
While the Confucian attitude towards making money had to be changed to suit the 
pursuit of capitalist development, many Confucian values and personal traits readily 
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support modern economic rationality. Among these are: a great capacity for delaying 
gratification, diligence, discipline, and frugality. Diligence and frugality have long 
been basic positive values in Confucian societies. Confucian culture was born in an 
agrarian society with limited natural resources. In agriculture life there can be no 
good harvest without hard work. And because of the distinctive four seasons in the 
Far East, the period between production and harvest is very long. People have to save 
during an extended period of waiting. For such a life diligence and frugality are not 
only desirable but essential to survival. 
Not surprisingly these qualities are in abundant display among the East Asians. 
Stevan Harrell has listed a series of accounts of the Chinese people from a variety of 
observers ranging from travellers to scholars. They all document hard work and 
diligence among Chinese from all walks of life: 'an acceptance of work as a 
necessity, a willingness to do much, and an assumption that whatever is necessary for 
economic betterment of oneself or, more accurately, one's family, must be done and 
ordinarily will be done without complaint' (1985: 207). Although the observation is 
made about the Chinese, the qualities in question are essentially Confucian. Thus it 
can be seen as relevant to all people who have accepted Confucian values. 
Harrell's interest, however, is in why the Chinese work so hard. The answer, he 
found, is that they 'exert enormous amounts of effort in search of familial 
improvements and security' (1985: 224). Indeed, in no Confucian society do 
individuals work primarily for personal benefit. Rather a person's identity is 
determined by his relationship with others. It is created through identification with a 
group. And the most important group of all is the family and kinship network. East 
Asians work hard to ensure that family members have the necessary means to live. 
They also live frugally to safeguard the future of their family. 
East Asians are also taught the virtues of self-discipline and self-sacrifice in the 
interests of long-range gratification within the family. The hierarchical family 
structure places the individual in a strictly defined position and one has to behave 
accordingly. The complex rules, especially those of filial piety, demand discipline 
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and self-control. The priority of the family over the individual also demands that one 
must subordinate one's own preferences for the benefit of the family. It is often 
necessary for someone to forsake personal enjoyment for the sake of family. 
Discipline, self-control, and the ability to put off for the future are fostered within the 
family and institutionalised in society. 
In the modem East Asian NISs the family is no longer the only group people identify 
with. Groups based on common local origin, common school experience, and 
common workplace also demand loyalty. Within these groups people have a strong 
sense of shared identity and mutual responsibility. They are expected to make a 
commitment to the group which is more exclusive and binding than in other 
societies. 'The emphasis on group loyalty, the responsiveness of people in 
organisations to group demands, and the predictability of individual behaviour in the 
group setting have been characteristics well suited to the needs of industrialisation, 
especially for the late developer, where centralised co-ordination has been so critical' 
(Vogel, 1991: 99). 
The redirection of the traditional Confucian emphasis on the family to the workplace 
has created some of the distinctive features of the East Asian version of capitalism. In 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, the family is the basic unit of economic activity. The 
Confucian rules governing the function of family are therefore directly transferred 
into businesses organisations. In Korea where gigantic chaebols dominate the 
economy, the Confucian ethos relating to the family serves as a foundation for a 
special kind of management practice. This is characterised by long range planning 
horizons, the commitment of the firm to the welfare of employees, the readiness of 
employees to work hard without making great personal demands, and the low level 
of industrial disputes. 
The strong sense of belonging to the group means that the employees in an East 
Asian company are more likely to equate their own interests with those of the 
company. They feel obligated to further the fortunes of the company by working hard 
and obeying rules set by management. With the loyalty of the employees a company 
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has the ability to make long-range plans and to adapt quickly to changing 
circumstances by redirecting labour and revising goals. Moreover, the voluntary 
compliance of the subordinate, together with the strong Confucian emphasis on 
harmonious relationships, helps to dampen protest movements that might otherwise 
disrupt industrial production. The relationship between the employee and the 
company is not one-way only however. On the contrary the Confucian principle of 
reciprocity lies at its heart. In exchange for obedience and hard work from 
employees, the company commits itself to high levels of investments in their 
development and personal welfare. Not only does a company subsidise employees' 
housing and other financial needs and give out gifts on festive occasions, it often 
guarantees lifetime employment. 
Another distinctive feature of the East Asian capitalism, with the possible exception 
of Hong Kong, is that the government is the biggest player in the economy. The 
government provides credit, subsidies, financial incentives, housing, education, and 
sometimes engages in production directly, through public enterprises. The ability of 
the East Asian governments to engineer economic growth has been widely 
recognised and discussed. It is commonly attributed to their high degree of autonomy 
and the effective use of this capacity in planning economic development. But few 
scholars have explained why East Asian governments are relatively free from public 
pressures, why they are committed to the goal of economic growth even though they 
are not constrained by any other forces, and why their highly authoritarian type of 
govemance is accepted by the people. 
The explanation, I would argue, lies with the historical form of government in East 
Asia and the principle that had regulated its operations, that is, Confucianism. 
Traditionally Confucianism was upheld by scholar-officials, and government practice 
was the sphere where Confucian principles were most applicable. Although 
modernisation has brought great changes to government practice in East Asia, its 
political system is still far from identical with that in the West. According to Pye, a 
'distinctive type of political system ... 
has emerged out of the uniting of 
Confucianism and advanced capitalism' (1988: 82). 
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Being authoritarian is the most pronounced characteristic of East Asian governments. 
Within the government, power is monopolised by a small number of bureaucratic 
elites. No challenge to their power and status is tolerated. Although an authoritarian 
government is by no means a necessary condition for economic development, the 
freedom of East Asian governments to construct institutions and to change them as 
required in response to the changing economic environment has been a clear 
advantage in their pursuit of capitalist development. Western governments in 
contrast, are more immediately responsive to public opinion. But their weaker 
bureaucratic organisation tends to create the potential for great volatility in short- 
term policies, even though the basic system remains well protected by constitutional 
guarantees. 
Unlike other authoritarian regimes, the authority of the East Asian governments rests 
on their commitment to the well-being of the people. They seek to nurture legitimate 
social and economic activities. The government is the guardian of public goods, and 
the sponsor of private enterprises. The responsibility the East Asian governments 
have taken has an ideological base in Confucian teaching. As summarised by 
Mencius: 'There is a way to gain the Empire. It is to gain the people ... . There is a 
way to gain the people. Gain their sympathy. ... Share with them the accumulation of 
the things you wish for, and do not practice what goes against them' (Mencius, Book 
7). This and many other similar paragraphs in the Confucian classics serve both as an 
enduring reminder of the responsibility of the ruler, and as a legitimation of popular 
opposition if the contract is broken. 
In a Confucian society, the relationships between government and private enterprise 
and between government and citizenry are similar those one would find in the family. 
They are paternalistic and reciprocal. Governments in East Asia give extensive 
support to private businesses. In exchange, they hold private businesses accountable 
for achieving concrete performance standards. That is why government intervention 
can be effective. Relations between the government and individuals are based on a 
similar system of mutual obligations. While the government feels obliged to act in 
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the interests of the people, typical East Asian citizens tend to trust their governments 
and to look to authority for problem solving. These two basic systems of reciprocity 
help explain firstly why the East Asian governments are concerned with economic 
growth, and secondly why strong authority is tolerated by East Asians. 
The East Asian NISs are also distinguished by their high levels of attainment in 
education. This is universally considered as an important instrument for enhancing 
technological development and the skills base which are of critical importance in a 
successful capitalist system. In East Asia, both society and individuals place 
particular emphasis on pursuing the highest possible education. Again, this zeal for 
education is deeply rooted in Confucianism. Traditionally, entry into government 
service was determined by examinations in knowledge of Confucian classics. In a 
society where the only path to upward mobility was entry into officialdom, education 
became the key to status and advancement. 
In modem East Asia education remains a major route to prosperity and prestige. The 
extension of the entrance examination system into almost every profession means 
that high level of education is directly related to good jobs. The present education 
system exhibits a 'modem' form with a complete structure from pre-primary to 
tertiary levels. The character of the knowledge and skills one gains from education 
has also long since changed. Confucian classics are no longer part of the curriculum. 
The emphasis now is on scientific and technological knowledge. Such education 
systems have produced a large number of efficient bureaucrats, well-informed 
entrepreneurs, well-trained floor managers, and skilled workers who together have 
provided the knowledge base on which the economic miracles of East Asia have been 
built. 
We have seen that Confucianism has undergone considerable changes in the process 
of becoming supportive of capitalist development. But there are still some aspects 
which have been applied without significant modification. Both the modem western 
mind and the Confucian worldview focus on life on earth in the human community. 
In contrast to the West, where Enlightenment thought had to struggle to displace 
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religion, the advancement of capitalism in East Asia has been supported by the basic 
secularism of Confucian thought (Tu, 1992: 30). 
The other important continuity is the pragmatism inherent in the Confucian world 
view. Striving to live in harmony with nature and the ideals of synchronicity and 
adjustment have dominated the mode of thinking in East Asia. This gives rise to a 
generalised pragmatic attitude. Its best illustration is a famous dictum of Deng Xiao 
Ping, the architect of Chinese economic reform: 'No matter whether a cat is black or 
white, the one that catches mice is a good cat. ' When this pragmatism is applied to 
economic activities, East Asians became adept borrowers of foreign practices. 
In short, East Asian capitalism has been constructed and reconstructed through tile 
continual interaction between symbolic and material forces. Although tile East Asian 
NISs share an emphasis on economic and technological development with western 
capitalist societies, they differ greatly with respect to the meanings given to such 
development and the means to achieve it. In the East, econornic development is 
connected with an emphasis on adaptation to the environment rather than the need to 
establish mastery over it. The state has played an active role in sliaping tile 
development process and in guaranteeing a relatively equitable income distribution 
following Eastern conceptions of authority, hierarchy, and equality. At the individual 
level, the Confucian virtues of diligence, frugality and self-cultivation have 
supported high productivity, high savings rates and high levels ofeducation. In short, 
Confucianism has played a key role in establishing the special characteristics of tile 
East Asian capitalism. 
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I 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
Within the voluminous literature on economic development in East Asia, the impact 
of culture is often dismissed. But, as I have argued, it must be taken into account as 
an important force in the process of social change. Weber demonstrated the potential 
influence of culture as both a source of pressure for change and as a shaper of social 
action. At the same time, he acknowledged the reciprocal influence of economic 
forces on cultural change. Rejecting the language of determinism, this chapter has 
tried to continue this line of argument by presenting a dynamic and dialectic 
relationship between cultural and material forces structured by specific historical and 
social contexts. According to this conception, both culture and structure change 
through interaction with each other and either can be the decisive factor depending 
on the particular conjuncture. In the context of the East Asian NISs, this view 
emphasises the ways that Confucianism changed in response to the force of 
westernisation brought by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century, and how, 
during the recent economic take-off process this changed Confucianism has in turn 
facilitated and shaped the establishment of industrial capitalism. 
Corifticianism has survived and regained its strength by adjusting to the changing 
social and economic environment and selecting strategically from the menu of 
western tradition. The Confucian disdain for money-making behaviour has been 
discarded by modern East Asians. The traditional Confucian family has declined, but 
at the same time, family values have been extended to other social groups, especially, 
the firm. East Asian governments are still authoritarian in nature, but less emphasis is 
put on moral values. Rather, economic development has become their main priority, 
and the new basis for their legitimacy. The continuing Confucian enthusiasm for 
education has underwritten the modem education system's drive to equip East Asians 
with the scientific and technological knowledge necessary for industrialisation. Add 
to this the continued currency of personal traits such as diligence and discipline, and 
it is evident that a transformed and modernised version of Confucianism has not only 
been highly conducive to economic development but has helped to shape a specific 
type of capitalism in Asia. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the survival and transformation of Confucian values and 
their influence on the recent capitalist economic development of the contemporary 
East Asian NISs. It has studied Confucian institutions, particularly government 
practice, the family and education, and personal traits. It is obvious that 
Confucianism does not produce economic miracles by itself. But it is also clear that 
Confucian informed institutions and personal behaviour do constitute a 'thick' support 
network for economic growth. 
It can be seen from the above analysis that the East Asian governments have played 
an important role in promoting economic development. They are able to do so 
because they have enjoyed an unusually high degree of autonomy and, more 
importantly, have effectively used it to shape the economic growth process. High 
state autonomy is a common feature of authoritarian governments which are not 
unusual in the developing world. What distinguish the East Asian NISs from the rest 
are the sources of state autonomy and the ways they have used it for economic 
growth. 
Some socio-historical conditions, such as the absence of powerful landed interests 
and external threats from their immediate neighbours, have contributed to 
concentrations of power and nondemocratic practices in the East Asian NISs. In a 
more fundamental sense, howeverý the authoritarian nature of East Asian 
governments can be seen as a product of a political culture which finds its roots in 
Confucianism. Historically Confucianism had been the guiding ideology of 
government in China and Korea. In today's Chinese societies and in South Korea it 
still exerts a strong influence, despite the moves towards political modernisation. 
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In Confucian culture harmony and co-operation are preferred over disagreement and 
competition. High priority is given to the maintenance of order and respect for 
hierarchy. Hence there is little room for the idea of legitimate conflict. The western 
practices of modem democratic politics which are competitive and adversarial in 
nature find little favour. The political culture derived from Confucianism, however, 
not only contributes to the continued concentration of political power in the hands of 
East Asian governments, it also provides a check on the abuse of the power. The 
strong ethical-moral basis of government places limits on the purely pragmatic uses 
of power and demands that those in authority be concerned about the livelihood of 
the people. While traditionally the emphasis was more on the possession of 
Confucian virtues, today it has shifted to the ability to increase general living 
standards. In a word, the strong governments of East Asia are paternalist. 
But as with all paternalistic systems, duties move in two directions. At the heart of 
effective rule in East Asia is a principle of reciprocity. The people respect hierarchy 
and follow government initiatives. In exchange the government is obliged to deliver a 
better life and provide support. The tendency of East Asian people to look to the 
government for guidance is combined with their high expectations. The autonomy of 
governments is accepted only on the condition that they are nurturing and supportive. 
Strong government does not guarantee economic development. What is needed is a 
government strong enough to guide the economy, and at the same time, committed to 
the development of the country and the well-being of the people. Confucianism has 
worked to make the East Asian NIS governments not only strong, but also socially 
responsive. 
Another important focus of cohesion is the family. As the cardinal institution in 
Confucian societies, it has provided a model for government practice and business 
management, defined principles for social relations, and socialised individuals into a 
special set of Confucian values. After Confucian teachings ceased to be part of school 
curriculum, the family became the primary carrier of the Confucian tradition. It is 
within the family that people learn to subordinate personal interests for the collective 
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good, to work hard in order to glorify their ancestors, and accumulate wealth for their 
descendants. 
In contemporary East Asia, especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the family has 
entered the industrial world as the basic unit of production. Family savings have 
provided investments, and the family members have supplied devoted workers. 
Associations based on family or clan also provide invaluable business contacts. The 
family is an enriching and nourishing support system for entrepreneurs 
The family has also provided a paternalistic style of business management in the East 
Asian NISs, which stresses harmonious relations, requires employees to give 
unconditional devotion to the firm, and disapproves of trade union activities. On the 
other hand, the management takes a personal interest in the workers' non-work 
related activities and provides a wide range of welfare benefits. In this way 
personalised ties are formed between employers and employees, which inhibit the 
growth of class consciousness and group action. 
Another widely recognised Confucian heritage which has contributed to economic 
development in the East Asian NISs is education. Confucianism believes that human 
beings are in principle perfectible and that the way to reach perfection is through 
learning. This includes both self-cultivation in moral terms and the accumulation of 
knowledge. Based on this ideal, all Confucian societies have developed an entrance 
examination system to select the most learned men for official office. The system 
continues today, though the rewards of education have expanded to embrace a wide 
range of positions. In these societies, education is the principal channel of upward 
mobility open to everyone. Amongst this background, it is not difficult to understand 
the popular zeal for education or the high standards of attaim-nent in the East Asian 
NISs. 
There is no doubt that education has been considered increasingly important as an 
instrument for enhancing technological development and facilitating the 
modernisation process. Educational achievements' positive impact on income 
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distribution has often been mentioned too. In the East Asian NISs, however, a well 
developed meritocratic system has another important role to play, that is, to offset the 
nepotism which is often associated with paternalistic rule. In these societies where 
the rule of law is subordinate to the rule of man, recruitment according to 
examination results provides a useful balance to the tendency to give preferential 
treatment to one's kinsmen. 
East Asian people who have grown up under strong Confucian influence display a set 
of personal traits which are also conducive to industrialisation. They live a relatively 
thrifty life with more emphasis on saving than spending; they work hard for the 
betterment of themselves and their families; they respect hierarchy and authority; 
they tend to avoid confrontations in the interests of maintaining harmonious 
relationships; and they are ready to sacrifice their own immediate interests for the 
collective good. 
Many scholars have identified aspects of Confucianism which have had positive 
impact on economic development. They have also noticed the transformation of 
Confucianism in these rapidly changing societies. However, in characterising the 
meaning of Confucianism, most have relied on the classic texts. Even the recent 
notion of 'post-Confucianism' has been based more on general inference than on 
detailed investigation. In order to develop a more concrete understanding of 
Confucianism in modem East Asia and its popular expressions, this study has 
provided some empirical data derived from a content analysis of newspapers. It is 
hoped that this material will prompt further investigation of everyday Confucianism 
as it operates in the public sphere. 
As we have seen in the thesis, although the influence of Confucianism has weakened 
over time, and the importance of the family has decreased, the central themes of 
Confucianism have proved remarkably resilient. Order is still strongly stressed; 
authority is respected; harmonious relationships are emphasised; group and society 
are placed above the individual; industriousness and frugality are associated with 
wealth and success; and filial piety is considered the most important virtue of all. 
220 
By analysing the contemporary variants of established Confucian institutions and 
tracing their origins in the past, the thesis has attempted to develop a dynamic and 
historical view of cultural and social change. This perspective takes change as an 
integrated process which involves all sectors of society. During this process cultural, 
social, political, and economic forces interact, causing each to adjust and adapt to the 
new course set by the dominant force. 
The development of capitalism and its interaction with Confucianism provides an 
excellent case study of the value of this approach. Capitalism failed to develop in the 
Far East when it first emerged, due to the inhibitions of traditional Confucianism. But 
after it had triumphed in the West and been introduced to these societies by the 
colonisers, Confucianism could no longer resist the force of capitalist modernity, it 
had no choice but to adapt to the new situations. As a result, Confucian culture 
absorbed the idea of profit seeking, competition and rationalisation of economic 
activity, but retained its emphasis on collectiveness, family, and harmony. Combined 
with the continuing Confucian emphasis on education, merit, hard work, discipline 
and high achievement motivation, these values form a potent underpinning for 
economic growth. And this force has given rise to a special kind of capitalism in the 
East Asian NISs. 
All the societies under discussion here have undergone, and are still undergoing, 
rapid and radical social change. As we have argued, change in one sphere leads to 
change in the others. Hence, as these societies pursue economic development, new 
values such as individual rights, political freedom and pleasure seeking, emerge in 
response to the altered environment brought by sustained growth. These new values 
are now straining the limits of a Confucian tradition that has survived and adapted for 
centuries. Moreover, the East Asian NISs, with their economies based largely on 
exports, have been particularly responsive to changing external conditions. In an era 
of increasing globalisation, they are securely tied to the outside world, especially the 
West, by trade, economic penetration, and international conflict. Inevitably, western 
culture is entering these societies and challenging the retention of the old ways. It 
is 
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unavoidable that people's attitudes and ideas would change in accordance with the 
rapid social change brought about by the process of modernisation. 
The thesis has argued that Confucianism has played an important role in the process 
of post-war modernisation in East Asia. However, 'it is vitally important to note that 
the East Asian form of modernity is in a substantial way "western... (Tu, 1996: 9). 
After more than thirty years of rapid development, these societies have now become 
both highly industrialised and highly commercialised. They are changing in the 
direction set by the West and Confucianism itself is under pressure to change into the 
same direction. So, will Confucianism continue to be conducive to capitalist 
economic development? In a more fundamental sense, will Confucianism still be 
relevant to East Asian people's life in the future? Although only time will provide 
definitive answers, what is happening now in the East Asian NISs and what has 
happened in the West can provide pointers to the likely future of Confucianism. 
The answer to the question of Confucianism's continuing relevance to economic life 
could well be 'no'. For all the East Asian NISs, 'the era of labour-intensive, locally 
manufactured commodity production and trade has ended' (Clark & Kim, 1995: 277). 
After a period of rapid and centrally orchestrated development, the East Asian 
economies have grown into colossal complexes. The nature of economic 
management has changed greatly and goverm-nent intervention had come to be seen 
as less desirable. To stimulate future growth, spending is now needed more than 
saving. Moreover, there are signs that the ethic of hard work and discipline is 
softening. Even the hard working Koreans have started to complain about long 
working hours. As a response to wide-spread demands, Samsung, one of the largest 
chaebols in Korea, has recently adopted a new policy of clearing offices by six 
o'clock in the evening. 
As to the question of whether Confucianism will survive as a significant point of 
cultural reference in a more industrialised and commercialised society, the current 
democratisation movement can cast important light on the discussion. Since the late 
1980s, the East Asian NISs have made a startling and near- simultaneous turn toward 
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western ideas of democracy. Taiwan and South Korea have democratised more fully. 
Both governments are now run by popularly elected civilian presidents, both hold 
free and fair elections regularly, both have freed thousands of political prisoners, and 
both allow opponents to criticise them openly and to run for office. 
According to the dominant western conception of democracy, a political system is 
defined as democratic on the basis that 'its most powerful collective decision makers 
are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote' 
(Huntington, 1991: 7). Implicit in these institutional structures is the idea of mass 
participation in the political process, which rests on one necessary condition, that the 
presence of a political opposition is constitutionally protected and is capable of 
providing an alternative government. 
It is through a legalised political opposition operating within the framework of 
constitutionalism that different people and groups can compete to advance their 
different interests and needs. These processes are adversarial and competitive, and 
they determine the character of modem democratic political practice. However, we 
know from our previous analysis that Confucianism is non-democratic in nature 
because of its emphasis on harmony, the collective, and authority. When the 
Confucian emphasis on harmony is transferred into politics, consensus becomes the 
basis of the political system, and there is little room for the idea of institutionalised 
conflict. And in the name of group responsibilities, individual rights are sacrificed. 
But most importantly, within Confucianism, political power is viewed in moral 
terms. 'Conceived in this way, political power cannot be obtained through 
competition; it is not something to be contested or argued about' (Lawson, 1993: 22). 
Given the seeming incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy, it is 
reasonable to ask if the present democratisation movement signals the end of 
Confucianism's cultural centrality. It has been argued that a distinctive kind of 
political system is emerging in East Asia, one that can meet all the formal 
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institutional requisites of a democracy but displays no real alternation of power or 
participation in office (Pye, 1985; Huntington, 1991). 
However, the combination of western democratic practices and Confucian political 
values is a highly unstable entity. The political system of Japan has often been hailed 
as the prototype of East Asian politics: democratic in form but authoritarian in 
essence. But in 1993, after 38 years of one party rule, political power changed hands. 
Unquestionably, democratic political practices are able to undermine systems of 
authoritarian paternalism and to challenge the Confucian ideas of power and 
authority. This will, in turn, affect established views of social hierarchy and 
interpersonal relationship, shaking the foundations of one central premise of 
Confucianism. 
Parallel with the political changes is the rise of a new consumer system. This 
challenges the foundations of Confucianism in a different way. The success of 
industrialisation in the East Asian NISs has created a world of consumer goods 
beyond anything that could have been imagined even thirty years ago. Steady 
increases in people's discretionary income and their accumulated savings have 
boosted their spending power. As goods and money become more available, patterns 
of consumption change. Take the example of food. While people used to buy fresh 
food every day from the market, now they go to supermarkets for artistically 
packaged and semi-processed foods bearing well advertised brand names. Their daily 
diet has incorporated more and more 'western styled' products such as milk and 
yogurt. Luxurious foods, such as exotic fruits and vacuum-packed beef jerky are also 
entering ordinary people's kitchens. In the public domain, the change is even greater 
with ever growing numbers of international fast food chains establishing outlets. 
While local restaurants are still generally preferred as the best milieux in which to 
enjoy good food and socialise, McDonald's and Burger King have increasingly 
become part of people's, especially young people's, daily life. 
Similar changes are happening in almost every area of consumption. Electrical 
appliances and cars, which used to be the objects of dreams are now upgraded 
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regularly in many households. New forms of packaged experience such as travelling 
and Karaoke have mushroomed. Accompanying these trends is a change in the 
meaning of consumption. While it was previously seen as necessary but as something 
to be exercised with restraint, it is now increasingly considered as a way to promote 
the economy and express the self. As we have seen in the West, mass consumption 
and consumerism constitute the basis of both the industrial capitalist economic order 
and public culture. This has increasingly become the case of the East Asian NISs 
A mass consumerist culture challenges the culture of Confucianism. The shift in the 
meaning of consumption means that it is gradually coming to be seen as a primary 
social good. Frugality, one of the core Confucian virtues, has become less and less 
relevant to the new emerging life styles. This in turn, has ramifications for people's 
attitudes towards work and self. As we have mentioned before, East Asian people 
have traditionally worked hard and saved amply for the family's sake. When the 
importance of saving is replaced by the importance of spending, the established 
motivation for hard work disappears and the ties between individuals and the family 
are attenuated. 
In a more fundamental sense, consumerism contradicts Confucianism's constitution 
of a sense of self. As we have argued, in a Confucian society the value of the 
individual is located primarily in the person's function in the society. Self identity 
derives mainly from personal relations and particularly from family relations. The 
emphasis on social relations has been so strong that until now it has negated the 
radical individualising effect of capitalism. Instances of this counter influence include 
the human-centred style of business management and the direct involvement of the 
family in economic production through small businesses. 
However, there is a strong possibility that what capitalism has not been able to 
accomplish through the institutions of production will be achieved through the 
expansion of consumption. Consumption is essentially an individual action. With the 
wide range of goods and services on offer in the marketplace, individuals as 
consumers are presented with considerable choices, and are relatively free to choose 
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according to their own wills. As a way to define the self, consumption can either 
express differentiation and difference within the social context, thus emphasising 
individuality, or integration with the social context, thus emphasising uniformity. 
Either way, however, the symbolic meanings of goods are constructed according to 
pre-coded mass-produced messages (Belk & Shultz, 1994; Slater, 1997). In contrast 
to traditional sources of identity such as social hierarchy and family relations, more 
and more East Asian people are expressing themselves through consumption. As the 
role previously played by people is giving away to that of commodities, the central 
premises of Confucianism, which are based on human relations, are acutely 
threatened. 
Finally, mass consumption has provided an effective channel for western culture to 
spread rapidly within the East Asian NISs. As Sklair has argued, consumerism is the 
master ideology of a global capitalist system. The cultural-ideological practices of 
mass consumption go hand in hand with the rationale for continuous capitalist 
accumulation (1995: 95). People not only buy goods, they also buy the vision of the 
good life associated with them. These visions are promoted by advertising, which is 
instrumental in changing the ways people think about consumption. Advertising not 
only appeals to people's pre-existing 'needs', it also creates new wants by presenting 
ideal or desirable life styles (Ewen, 1976). Although the degree of western 
domination of consumer products and advertising varies across the East Asia NISs, 
the life style promoted and the messages conveyed by the advertisements are 
inevitably western. 
Rapid changes in the East Asian NISs have opened up a new world for many people. 
For those who have moved into a new social space without fixed patterns of 
appropriate taste or behaviour, advertising provides a guide on how to live a 'modem' 
life, and consumer goods supply essential materials to anchor this life- In this respect, 
advertising begins to play a more subtle role in changing habits than merely 
stimulating wants. Though at first the changes are primarily in manners, taste, and 
food habits, in time they will begin to affect more basic patterns such as the structure 
of authority in the family and the meanings of achievement in the society. 
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Therefore, one important outcome of the capitalist development in the East Asian 
NISs is the inexorable power of material goods. As we have argued, after its initial 
emergence, capitalism has proved capable of reproducing itself without the support 
of a universal set of values, which is the reason that it has been transplanted 
successfully to the Far East. But this very success is now undermining the symbolic 
order of Confucianism which has nurtured its growth. Instead, it is creating a new 
order resting on capitalist consumption. 
In the course of its first encounter with capitalism, a system with economic growth as 
its primary concern, Confucianism was transformed. The combination of this revised 
Confucianism and state sponsored market relations produced fast-growing economies 
in the East Asian NISs. Now there are signs that this capitalist development has 
reached the stage where it no longer needs the cultural support of Confucianism. On 
the contrary, the process of democratisation and the increasing significance of 
consumption are undermining Confucian systems of authority and interpersonal 
relationships. Again Confucianism has to adapt. Maybe in the future we will see the 
withering away of Confucianism as an effective force within the private sphere. As a 
cultural heritage and marker of Chineseness however, it may continue to provide a 
public identity for people, but it will no longer have any real power to effect their 
everyday actions. In this light, the current reassertion of Confucianism as the core of 
a distinctive system of 'Asian values' appears as a rearguard and ultimately doomed 
attempt to defend a way of life whose conditions of existence are currently being 
undermined on a daily basis. With the benefits of hindsight, future historians may 
come to see the role played by contemporary Confucianism in providing a 
comprehensive cultural underpinning for the East Asian NISs' post-war take off to 
growth and their construction of a distinctive mode of late capitalism, as the peak of 
its influence in the modem world. 
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Appendix: Coding Schedule 
1 Case Number 
Columns I-3 
2 Date 
Columns 4- 9 
Date, month and year to be coded numerically using all six columns. 
3 Newspaper Title 
Column 10 
I Ming Bao 
2 Zhong Yang Ri Bao 
4 Type of Article 
Column II 
I News 
2 Editorial / Leader 
3 Feature article 
4 Essay 
5 Letter 
6 Other 
5 Page/ Section 
Column 12 
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This is to be taken as the page / section on which the article begins. 
I Front page 
2 General news page 
3 Economic / Financial / Business section 
4 Mainland China / Overseas Chinese section 
5 Education / Society section 
6 Supplement 
7 Art / Entertainment section 
8 Other 
6 Author 
Column 13 
I reporter 
2 Guest writer 
3 Letter writer 
4 Other 
7 Size 
Column 14 
1 Short (under 800 characters) 
2 Medium (between 800 and 1,500 characters) 
3 Long (over 1,500 characters) 
8 Themes 
Columns 15 - 23 
Main theme Secondary theme 1 Secondary theme 2 
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This section of the coding schedule assesses which of the many potential issues 
surrounding Confucianism are mentioned in the newspaper coverage, and which 
have been given the greatest prominence. 
As many articles refer to more than one theme, it will often be necessary to code the 
main and marginal themes in every article. A maximum of three themes can be coded 
for each item. The main theme is the most prominent one dealt with in the article. 
The 'secondary theme F category is to be used to denote the second most prominent 
theme. And the 'secondary theme 2' the third most prominent theme. Sometimes not 
every secondary theme can be identified, and sometimes they may not be all related 
to Confucianism. If there are no secondary themes, or less than three, the remaining 
theme category is coded '000'. The theme unrelated to Confucianism is also coded 
'0001. 
The themes are grouped under the following subtitles: 
I To Govern a nation or 12ga 
00 The right way according to the Confucian teaching 
01 The government should be strong and determined 
02 Top priority: keep stability of a society 
03 A nation for people 
04 Choosing officials by merits 
05 Unite under one opinion 
o6 Govern with compassion 
07 Govern a nation like a family 
2 Government officials and politicians 
01 What government officials and politicians (should) do according to Confucianism 
02 be morally right, honest and upright (nurture virtues) 
03 look after the lower people and treat them like family members 
04 be knowledgeable, especially in classics, literature and arts 
05 be capable of playing their professional roles 
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06 Good government officials and politicians (general) 
07 - virtuous, honest and upright 
08 - knowledgeable and capable 
09 -a model to be emulate by others 
10 work for public interests rather than his own 
II Bad government officials and politicians (general) 
12 - possess no Confucian virtues 
13 - incapable 
14 - dissolute private life 
3 Proper behaviours 
00 Middle way, or the way of means and its application 
01 Ethics, the way of Confucianism 
02 Importance of harmonious relationship and good feelings between people 
03 Men and women should not have close contact 
04 Women's place is at home 
05 Propriety 
06 Respect teachers and knowledgeable people 
07 Show respect to seniors 
08 Respect to seniors 
09 Respect and learn from the ancestors 
4 Family and group 
01 People (should) take care of their family members or relatives 
02 - someone who comes from the same school 
(university), region, or country 
03 Importance of group (nation and society) 
04 Importance of family 
05 - filial piety 
06 - stable marriage 
07 - people in the same group (should) help each other 
08 One (should) put the interest of the family, company, or nation before 
his own 
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5 Chinese people. culture and tradition 
01 Importance of one's roots, motherland 
02 Tradition and its importance 
03 Ethnic Chinese are forever Chinese and proud of it 
04 To keep the Chinese culture, tradition and language 
05 The greatness of Chinese culture 
06 To advacate the greatness of Chinese culture 
07 Shouldn't admire the West blindly 
08 Declining of Chinese civilization 
09 The organic combination of tradition and modernity 
10 Wrong to forget tradition 
II People behave according to tradition 
12 One should bread tradition 
6 Morality of socigty 
01 Declining morality of modern society 
02 To rebuild a society with morality and culture 
03 More ethics education needed 
7 Work and mona 
01 Be frugal, not ostentatious 
02 Earn more, spend less 
03 Importance of hard working and the ability of endure hardship 
04 Negative aspects of money 
05 Working for good course is more important than working for money 
06 Unchecked desires for material goods are harmful 
8 Confucian tradition, positive _orneutral 
01 Social activities remembering Confucius and imminent 
Confucians 
02 Confucianism, tradition and Chinese culture 
03 Confucius, Confucians or Confucian Classics 
04 Confucian or Confucianism and modem society 
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05 The greatness of Confucianism and the necessity to carry forward Confucianism 
06 Confucianism basically good, but needs to change 
07 Confucianism does not exit any more 
9 Confucianism, negative 
01 Confucianism is out of date, a hindrance to modem world 
02 Its negative influence on politics 
03 -economy 
04 - education 
05 - culture 
06 - society 
07 - family 
08 - individual 
09 - Women's right 
II Others 
01 Conditions for success 
02 Experience leads to success 
03 Virtue leads to success 
04 Virtuious people 
05 Degenerate people have no virtue 
06 Keep face 
07 Be modest, unagressive 
08 Importance of education 
9 Actors 
Columns 24 - 28 
Main actor Marginal actor 
'Actors' are those individuals or institutions whose actions or opinions constitute the 
subject matter of an article / item. Similarly to the themes, there is one main actor 
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and one marginal actor to be coded. If the actor cannot be identified, the relevant 
category should be coded '00'. 
00 Cannot code 
01 Taiwan (China) as a society 
02 - Hong Kong 
03 - China (mainland) 
04 General public 
05 Government, state owned organisation 
06 Political party 
07 Private organisation 
08 Business / Financial company 
09 Family 
10 Other 
II President, head of state, or prime minister 
12 Central government bureaucrat / Politician high rank military official 
13 Civilservant 
14 Manager / Industrialist / Business man / Banker 
15 Intellectual / Academician / Writer / Artist 
16 Celebrity 
17 Imminent Confucian / Philosopher / Religion founder 
18 Confucius 
19 Professional 
20 Teacher 
21 Student 
22 Clergy of different religions 
23 Housewife 
24 Historic figures 
28 Chinese 
27 Overseas Chinese 
25 Other 
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10 Reference to Confucius 
Column 29 
0 Not referred to 
I Direct quotation 
2 Indirect quotation 
3 Both I and 2 
11 Reference to other Confucian classics 
Column 30 
0 Not referred to 
I Direct quotation 
2 Indirect quotation 
3 Both 1 and 2 
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